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Dissertation Supervised by Janie Harden Fritz, Ph. D.  
Friendship is a central relationship-style that grounds us.  Much of the literature on the 
effects of technology on our relationships, especially friendship, has taken a skeptical approach.  
The notion of friendship is historically-situated, thus, it requires attention in each era and has 
prompted questions throughout human history.  Our time is no exception.  Changing cultures and 
redefinitions of basic human institutions have led us to our current moment, in which we are 
experiencing a loud and continuing debate on the effect of technology on our lives.   
Advancements in science have allowed us to understand our past and present in new ways.  
Technology, too, has opened the door for new possibilities of encounter. From initial encounter 
to our sense of we-ness, this text examines the possibilities and challenges of technology on our 
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Introduction:  Friendship as a Communicative Phenomenon 
A friend is a person with whom I may be sincere. Before him I may think aloud. I am 
arrived at last in the presence of a man so real and equal, that I may drop even those 
undermost garments of dissimulation, courtesy, and second thought, which men never put 
off, and may deal with him with the simplicity and wholeness with which one chemical 
atom meets another.  –Ralph Waldo Emerson 
For most of human history, philosophers have been investigating and pondering various 
facets of friendship. Rake (1970) wrote, “Friendship is one of the eternally fascinating topics to 
which great minds of every age turn with fresh interest” (p. 3).  One of the earliest exercises in 
grappling with the notion of friendship can be seen in Homer’s Odyssey.  There are several 
thorough works that have studied friendship over the course of human history.  In his work 
Friendship in the Classical World, Kanston (1997) discussed friendship in Homer’s work and 
also examined friendship in multiple works from as early as the eighth century B.C. to the fourth 
A.D. (1997).  Reisman (1979), too, examined ancient works, including the Old Testament to 
place the study of friendship into context historically.  Plato discussed friendship in several of his 
works including Lysis, Symposium, and Phaedrus and several contemporary scholars have 
interpreted Plato’s work on friendship in more depth (Ferrari, 1992; Price, 1989; Reeve, 2006).  
Friendship was a major focal point for Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics and of tertiary 
importance in the Eudemian Ethics.  Aristotle began his work on friendship in the Nicomachean 
Ethics by saying that friendship “is either itself a virtue or connected with virtue” and made the 
argument that friendship is imperative for human flourishing.  Cicero would eventually, under 
the influence of Aristotle and Plato, write an entire work on friendship, De Amicitia.  Also 





friendship.  Montaigne wrote his essay On Friendship in the mid-1500s and Shakespeare, too, at 
the turn of the 16th century was working with friendship themes.  Several contemporary scholars 
have examined these themes in Shakespeare’s works (Bloom, 2000; Waithe, 1986; Cox, 2008).  .  
Upon researching near any contemporary scholar, one will find some type of work related to the 
nature of friendship, including Gadamer, C.S. Lewis, Foucault, Ricoeur, Derrida, Levinas, 
Arendt, Nietzsche, to mention only a few.   
The notion of friendship is historically-situated, thus, it requires attention in each era and 
has prompted questions throughout human history.  Our time is no exception.  Changing cultures 
and redefinitions of basic human institutions have led us to our current moment, in which we are 
experiencing a loud and continuing debate on the effect of technology on our lives.   
Advancements in science have allowed us to understand our past and present in new ways.  
Technology, too, has opened the door for new possibilities of encounter.  Throughout the ages, 
friendship has been consistently recognized as a human good that facilitates human flourishing, 
and as we are in an age of virtue contention, questions about the navigation of competing goods 
and how they relate to friendship are pertinent.   
Cultural Transformations  
Related to cultural shifts and the redefinitions of human institutions, many friendship 
scholars have recognized the unique challenges of our post-modern world related to friendships.  
McPhee (1998), grounded in the work of Giddens (1979; 1981), noted we have a fragmented and 
undermined sense of community.  Kinship, too, has “become fragmented and less relied on” 
which has elevated the necessity for friendship in our lives (McPhee, p. 98).  Suttles (1970) 
wrote, “Friendships are especially valued in a population where social contacts of outgrown the 





Allan (1998) pointed out that various areas of our social lives have gone through historical 
transformations, like domestic life, work, employment, gender relations, community 
involvement, etc. Friendship research in the 19th century has tended to recognize the various 
different social possibilities for relations (Naegle, 1958; Kurth, 1970).   
Brain (1976) argued that there is a need to understand friendship “at times when our ideas 
are becoming so fluid and changing,” particularly related to our “Western preconceptions of love 
and friendship” (p. 10).  Culture and our institutions are evolving, and we have arrived at an era 
of virtue contention (Arnett, Fritz, and Bell, 2009; Fritz, 2013).  This age is defined by 
disagreement on most topics, particularly related to the good life.  Arnett, Fritz, and Bell 
explained that “our confidence in one universal sense of the ‘good’ is no longer normative” (p. 1) 
and “Goods are often in conflict in this postmodern era of difference” (p. 4).  The trio added that 
“The application of those goods is then negotiated and enacted through discourse” and we see 
this played out in the form of debate in the literature associated with the negative and positive 
effects of technology on friendships and our ability to flourish.   
There is no doubt that technological development has spurred radical shifts in the primary 
relationships we have in our life.  Shifts in communicative technology have thrust us into 
difference as commonplace and have positioned us to experience alterity regularly. Even in the 
80s, Gumpert and Cathcart noticed the revolutionary shifts in communication and technology.  
They wrote that “The new media have altered our patterns of communication just as surely as the 
ice age changed the contours of the land” (1986, p. 57).  They added “The modern electronic 
media have affected what we know, who and what we talk about, who talks to us, and who 
listens.  Our knowledge and store of information have been immeasurably increased” (p.  9).  





we were in close proximity (Adams, 1998).  Technology made possible our ability to not only 
meet but maintain relationships at a distance.  While the restriction of physical presence on 
friendship has now been removed, problematic romanticized ideals about friendships of the past 
still are pervasive.  O’Connor noted that even if two people made initial contact in each other’s 
physical presence in the past, “maintaining already established relationships across distances was 
difficult because contact was infrequent, expensive, or unsatisfying” (1998, p. 157).   O’Connor 
(1998) noted that “The assumption of physical co-presence made some sense in the technological 
context in which these territorially-bound theories developed” (p. 157).  Bakardjieva (2014) 
explained that post web 2.0, in the world of social media, we are seeing friendship being 
redefined, and challenged “on grounds of linguistic, cultural and ideological differences” (p. 
270).  This is no surprise from a communication ethics standpoint.   
Technology Use Today 
 Today, technology use is standard and part of the everyday personal and professional 
lives of most people in the Western world.  It is important then to review exactly how technology 
is being used and conceptualize some of the terms then to help contextualize the nature of this 
project.  According to a 2019 Pew Research Study, nearly all Millennials own a smartphone.  
Roughly half also own tablets, and about 80 percent of millennials have broadband internet 
access in their homes.  Gen Xers have similar statistics, and the majority of Boomers have 
smartphones, tablets, and broadband access.  The Silent generation trails behind with under half 
owning smartphones, tablets, and broadband internet.  A staggering near-100 percent of 
Millennials use the internet regularly, 20 percent of which go online from their smartphones 





 While there are multiple reasons that individuals go online, many are social media users.  
Eight-six percent of millennials use social media (Pew Research, 2019).  The majority of social 
media users visit Facebook regulary, although other options for social media include Instagram, 
Snapchat, and Twitter.  Obar and Wildman (2015) noted the difficulty in defining social media 
and likened it to a “moving target.”  The pair noted four areas that all forms of social media 
share: 
1)  They are Web 2.0 technology.   
2) They depend on user-generated content.   
3) They consist of individuals who are moderated by a larger organization.   
4) They “facilitate the development of social networks online by connected a profile with 
those of other individuals/groups” (p. 9).  
Aichner and Jacob (2015) noted several types of social media.  They listed: 
1) Blogs 
2) Business networks 
3) Collaborative projects 
4) Enterprise social networks 
5) Forums 
6) Microblogs 
7) Photo sharing 
8) Products/services review 
9) Social bookmarking 
10) Social gaming 





12) Video sharing 
13) Virtual words 
Kaplan (2012) differentiated mobile social media from standard social media forms.  Mobile 
social media, he argued, have location sensitivities and time sensitivities.  He distinguished four 
types.   
1. Space-timers.  Space-timer types of social media are those which are sensitive to both 
time and space.  An example of this is Foursquare.   
2. Space-locators.  Space-locator types of social media are sensitive to space but not time.  
An example of this would be Yelp.   
3. Quick-timers.  Quick-timer types of social media are sensitive to type but not space.  
Twitter and Facebook news feeds are examples of this.    
4. Slow-timers.  Slow-timer types of social media are neither time nor space sensitive.  
Kaplan gives Youtube and Wikipedia as examples.   
An important distinction in the above discussion is made with the mention of Web 2.0. is the 
term used to signify the major transformation of internet culture after the year 2000.   Blank and 
Reisdorf (2012) have termed Web 2.0 “The Participatory Web.”  Bakardjieva  and Gaden (2012) 
explained:   
Although no scholarly consensus exists on the issue, the claim that a substantive 
reconfiguration of the Internet has occurred in the beginning of the 2000s has settled 
firmly in pubic common sense.  The label tentatively chosen for the new turn in the 





The pair argued that “the hermeneutic utility of social networking sites” opens the door for new 
horizons for our interactions and interpretations of others (p. 411).   Web 2.0 technologies, they 
argued, require creative labor.  They added:  
The creative labor that they invent in web 2.0 technologies and practices helps bloggers 
and SNS participants to find new affinities and solidarities far outreaching their mediate 
interaction circles.  Not surprisingly, along with the vanity fair (of amassing friends and 
posting fancy self-flattering pictures and stories) in an equally viable stream of Web 2.0 
activities, users come together as a political force to resist the commercial imperatives, to 
formulate civic concerns and mobilize for action.  (p. 411)  
Friendship and the Good 
Friendship is deeply connected with human flourishing.  A debate has been playing out 
over the last several decades related to the ways in which technology has affected friendship.  
Scientific advancements have shown this to be not just philosophically sound but also 
empirically so.  Many medical disciplines have turned to the study of friendship in the last 
decade to make sense of the various ways in which friendships affect us and are affected by the 
world.  Johnson and Dunbar (2016) showed that there is a correlation between one’s pain 
tolerance and the size of their social network.  In another study in 2015, increased social network 
size was correlated with a decrease in depression (Hill, Griffiths, & House).  In older adults, 
social relationship activities were linked with a decrease in cognitive decline (James, Wilson, 
Barnes, & Bennett, 2011).   
We are physiologically and emotionally affected by the quality and quantity of our 





maintain friendships, but that there is a social stigma attached to the lack of friends.   She noted 
that lacking friends in our culture is stigmatized and often a source of shame.  She also highlights 
the concern caregivers have for childhood friendships, that is, that parents are concerned with 
their child’s ability to make friends.  Signs of a child struggling to make friends is a 
developmental warning to parents and educators, and a possible alert that the child may be 
struggling with flourishing.  Friends provide us with a plethora of developmental support.  
Friends guide us through human development and help young adults transition from family life 
into full-fledged members of the civil society.  Ginsberg, Gottman, and Parker (1986) highlight 
several other means of support that friends provide, including companionship, stimulation, 
physical support, ego support, social comparison, and intimacy and affection.   
Technological Considerations 
It is no wonder then, that technology’s effects on friendship have become some contested 
in our current moment.  Some scholars have argued that technology has negatively impacted 
friendship and our ability to flourish.  For example, one thread of research argues that technology 
has had a negative impact on friendships or that mediated relationships are of poorer quality 
(Valkenburg & Peter, 2009).  Turkle’s (2011) popular work, Alone Together, argues that 
technology is driving us inward at the cost of our relationships.  Postman (2011), too, argues that 
technology run amuck is destroying our very human nature and social relationships.  In her work, 
Bennett’s (2016) purpose was “to discover if (and how) eudemonia can continue to be associated 
with the digital exchange of information and images, otherwise known as contemporary 
friendship” (p. 245).  Working from Elull, Bennett argued that technique diminishes face-to-face 
communication.  She wrote, “The quick, unobstructed access to one another has morphed in 





eclipsing the natural reaction to have a conversation or spend time together” (p. 248).  She 
concluded that “media distance us from the other” (p. 255).   
 Cocking and Matthews (2000) also take a negative view of the effects of technology on 
our friendships.  They explained that the ability to share one’s experience online is limited.  They 
wrote, “Though we think internet ‘friendship’ is quite inferior to non-virtual friendship, we do 
not think that it is necessarily bad in itself and indeed for some people, it clearly provides an 
important good” (p. 224).  However, the pair found technology to interfere with the ability to 
flourish in the sense that “to the extent that my Net ‘friendships’ replace friendships I might well 
have had non-virtually, this will subtract from the good of friendships” (p. 224).  In addition to 
the loss of face-to-face relationships, the pair also argued that the second problem associated 
with friendship and technology is related to the lack of hermeneutic cues which we will address 
in the following chapter.  They wrote:  
We claim that what is lacking here is not merely a partial, or marginal set of factors, but a 
significant global loss and distortion of the real case.  What is distorted and lost, in 
particular, are important aspects of a person’s character and of the relational self 
ordinarily developed through those interactions in friendship.  (p. 231)   
McFall (2012) was skeptical about the effects of technology on our friendships.  From his 
perspective, technology can help with virtue friendships that were formed outside of the 
mediated realm, but “character-friendships cannot be created and sustained entirely through 
technological mediation” (p. 221).   The problem, McFall argued, is related to the “perceptual 
and communicative elements” of virtue friendships that “cannot wholly be mediated 





Other scholars are much more adamant that technology benefits our friendships.  In her 
work on relationships and social media, Chambers (2013) argued that new scholarship is 
indicating that social media and the internet have created “important sites for cultivating personal 
relationships” (p. 4).   
 Munn (2012), focusing solely on MMORPGs, addressed the shared activity argument and 
while he agreed that “shared activity is a core element in the formation of friendships” he added 
that “friendships can form in immersive virtual worlds as they do in the physical world” (p. 1).  
For him, particularly, MMORPGs allow for two individuals to share activity in an online space.  
Elder (2014), following an Aristotelian orientation, argued that “fulfilling friendships may occur 
via social media because social media allows friends to share distinctly human activities such as 
conversation and exchange of thoughts, mutual development of ideas, making art and playing 
games” (p. 287).   Briggle (2008) took a balanced approach and recognized that often, many of 
the arguments making the case for technology as problematic or detrimental for our friendships 
fail to address the numerous issues associated with friendship in a non-virtual environment.  He 
wrote that “offline relationships can be constrictive and insincere” and that mediated 
communication “mitigates this problem by promoting the courage to be candid” (p. 71).  He 
added that online communication attracts a deliberativeness absent in many oral 
communications.   
Soraker (2012) charged us with considering whether “actual and virtual friendships differ 
when it comes to enhancing our subjective well-being” (p. 209) and one aim of this project is to 
enter the conversation through a phenomenological and philosophical framework.  The hope is to 
bypass issues surrounding the psychosocial goods of friendship that narrow us into the 





technological age from a communicative standpoint.  Friendship is extremely deserving of our 
time and effort as communication scholars.  As Rawlins (2009) contended, friendship reaches 
and impacts every part of our society and world.    Sigman (1998) claimed that communication 
“produces and sustains” all human relationships and Rogers (1998) also emphasized 
communication as the production center for relationships.   
The purpose of this dissertation is to understand the effects of technology on friendship as 
experienced, informed by an attentiveness to the philosophy of communication.  Particularly, this 
project will explore the intersections of media ecology and the philosophy of technology, 
rhetoric, interpersonal communication, and ethics.  This is a task well-suited for the 
communication discipline.  While there is a significant amount of communication research in the 
quantitative and qualitative scholarship, work in the media ecology, philosophical, and ethical 
tracks is lacking.   
Rationale for Philosophical and Ethical Approach 
In Explorations in Media Ecology, there has been only one published article featuring 
friendship.  Bennett (2016) examined the “inefficiency of friendship” grounded in the work of 
Ellul.  There is a rich field of scholarship that examines the role of technology in friendships, yet 
media ecology scholars have seemingly overlooked this important element of our lives.  Bennett 
noted that in our historical analyses, we must conclude that the meaning of friendship has shifted 
In the interpersonal communication realm, Walther’s (1992) Social Information Processing 
Theory (SIP) examined the effects of technology on relationship development.  He suggested 
that despite our lack of nonverbal cues in the mediated setting, relationships actually do develop, 
although they do so at a much slower pace.  In fact, individuals actually adapt their 





create the Hyperpersonal Model (1996).  He argued that computer-mediated communication can 
actually become hyperpersonal.   
Hyperpersonal communication, Walther explained, can be more socially desirable (1996). 
His model shows that we do tend to draw from stereotypes more via mediated-communication 
and over attribute certain characteristics.  In that same year, Parks and Floyd (1996) presented 
their research and showed that it was not a question of whether relationships could develop—
they were developing.  Walther and Parks in a 2002 article added to their earlier work and 
reviewed multiple theories.  They showed several benefits related to communicative 
technologies, including improved mental health and well-being, access to more resources, more 
expertise, more support, and the possibility to engage with others who are interested in the same 
things we are, rather than those who are close to us.   
While there is a substantial amount of research on technology and relationships, and 
technology and friendship, there is little research at the phenomenological level on the shifts that 
technology has caused in the experience of friendship.  Friendships are hybridized in various 
ways, to be discussed later, but at the contemporary level, the questions that have guided the 
literature in friendship have centered on whether mediated friendship is possible, authentic, or 
beneficial.  In her work, Bennett (2016) grappled with understanding if friendship in our time is 
“qualitatively different” and that is one aim of the research that will be presented in this project 
(p. 245).   
Difficult Definitions 
One possible reason for such a lack of attentiveness from the various humanities-
grounded communication traditions is the difficulty of concretely defining friendship.  First, 





areas of central agreement throughout friendship literature are fuzzy and gray.  Third, friendship 
varies at both the macro and micro levels and is both a personal and social relationship.  In 
addition to the historical shifts, defining friendship is also elusive also, as Scult (1989) pointed 
out, “there is no clear ‘object of investigation’ and therefore nothing to focus on as we work our 
way around the hermeneutical circle” (p. 204).  Here, he is responding to the point that 
“friendships are” “extremely delicate and complex attempts at human bonding” with no “defined 
nor any agreed-upon institutional rules or conventions” (p. 203).  In attempting to define 
friendship, one standard approach is to focus on what friendship is not.  For example, friendship 
is separate from kinship, although the two share several attributes.   Allan (1979) explored the 
way in which our roles shape our expectations about particular relationships.  He explains that 
kinship is institutionalized and formal but friendship is not.  In the case of family, we have 
bloodlines or pedigrees and family is institutionally protected in Western culture.  Laws are in 
place that specifically are designed to define kin relations.  
Typological Differences and Areas of Fuzzy Agreement 
 Several scholars are quick to point out that there is a difference between friendship and 
friendly relations and that we currently have many words to approach friend-type relationships 
(Gareis, 1999; Bakardjieva, 2014; Kurth, 1970).  Scott (2014) noted, “For the exacting language 
user, terms such as acquaintance, casual friend, close friend, and best friend offer the promise of 
differentiation” (p. 432).   Technology has only complicated in the issue, as now “friending” is a 
verb in which online social media profiles are linked.  There are several agreed-upon elements 
that help us approach friendship.  Rawlins in his work Friendship Matters (1992), showed us that 
friendships: persist in both public and private, are voluntary, maintain a spirit of equality, have a 





(1993) highlighted that friendships have relatively little structure and the central features are 
“voluntary self-disclosure, reciprocity, positive mutual regard” and autonomy (p. 63).  Suttles 
(1970) explained that liking is likely to occur when two are similar in status.  Dreher (2009) 
described several common features of friendship: 
1.  It is done of both party's own free will.  
2. There is normally no sexual element.   
3. There is unlikely to be physical attraction, unlike in a love relationship.   
Like Rawlins, Suttles argued that friendships are voluntary, personal, and generalized.  Emmeche 
(2019) acknowledged the central elements of friendship, adding that similar interests, common 
experiences, affection, and care are imperative.   Ginsberg, Gottman, and Parker (1986) argued 
that intimacy and affection are central to all friendships across the lifespan and that these two 
qualities are what differentiate close and distant friends.   
Contextual Variations of Friendship  
Another problem with definitional attempts is related to the fact that our friendships are 
contextually dependent.  They vary by culture, gender, age and many other factors (Gudykunst, 
1989; Liu & Yang, 2016; Fritz, 1997).  Rawlins (1992) discussed the changing nature of 
friendships over the course of the lifespan.  Childhood friendships are centered on coordinated 
play and grounded in proximity.  As we develop, he explained that our friendships shift from 
momentary physical playmates to friendships grounded in mutuality and understanding.  Allan 
(1998) wrote, “Changes in friendship patterns develop across the life-course as people’s 
responsibilities, commitments, and opportunities alter” (p. 72).   In the Nicomachean Ethics, 





with changes in the underlying ends sought (e.g. pleasure, utility).  Westmyer (1996) noted, 
“Friendships can exist between older and younger people; differences in sex do not necessarily 
constitute an obstacle for friendship, socio-structural boundaries can be overcome by friendship 
and, moreover, friendships between individuals with completely different cultural backgrounds 
are conceivable” (p. 411).  Dreher (2009) pointed out that friendship defies barriers based on age, 
sex, socio-structures, and culture.  In all of these categories, while the literature shows that 
typically friends are similar in these above categories such as gender, age, and culture—they are 
not limiting, and individuals of different ages, sexes, and cultures can and do become friends.  
Despite cultural and temporal variations, friendship is universal (Brain, 1976).   
Traditional literature on friendship cannot account for or the above variations, fuzzy 
arenas, and variations from person to person and place to place.  Literature has tended fall into 
one of three themes.  Some threads of research paint friendship as a relationship.  While 
friendship is a relationship, these perspectives, in my opinion, tend to objectify the nature of 
friendship and cause a shift in our thinking.  We conceive of friendship as a tangible thing that 
we can hold and possess.  As such, it creates an idealized notion of friendship at both the macro 
and micro levels.  At the macro-level, it creates unrealistic views about expectations for others 
and fails to recognize the dynamic nature as friendship.  At the macro-level, it leads to 
romanticized notions about friendship that are inattentive to the historical moment.   Other 
theories frame friendship as a process, many times a developmental process.  While I do not 
reject the excellent research that examines the developmental life stages and the various types of 
friendships, and appreciate that this approach overcomes the static-orientation of the relationship 
views of friendship, these views are problematic because friendship as process seems to invoke 





friendship has a unique story, and friendship, in general, is part of an ongoing human 
conversation that will always need to be revisited.   A third thread imagines friendship as an 
achievement.  In these accounts, friendship must be earned, fought for, or won.  Friendship is 
much more than a trophy, an end, and these accounts endanger the good of friendship and instead 
quash the important element of particularity within the friendship itself.   
Friendship as Communicative Phenomenon 
To overcome the above problems, this dissertation frames friendship as a communicative 
phenomenon.  It is created, sustained, managed, produced, and reproduced via various forms of 
communicative work.  Framing it in such a way allows us to work through the different areas and 
recognize the historically situated and evolving nature of friendship. Also, it follows a long 
tradition which begins with Aristotle.   
 Friendship as a communicative phenomenon involves various kinds of communicative 
work.  For one, there is the communicative work of identification.  Rawlins (2009) showed us 
that we use language to identify our friends, and we typify characteristics of what we anticipate 
as being associated with a ‘friend’ and apply it within our everyday encounters with others.  
Within these friend types, we have very different types of communicative work.  Helm (2010) 
for example argued that among types of friendship, the major differences are grounded in the 
conceptualization of the friendship itself the two have (which may even be implicit).  Westmyer 
(1996), too, recognized the differences at the communicative level related to types of friendship.  
She explains “friendship is primarily symbolically constructed, i.e. that it is formed by means of 
constructive processes based on a collegiately shared symbolism with a repertoire of culturally 
defined categories” (p. 408).    As we frame friendship as a communicative phenomenon, then, 





dialogue as essential activities of friendship.  Whether explicit or implicit, Communication is the 
base from which all friendships emerge.  Sigman (1998) pointed out that it is solely through 
communication that relationships, in general, are produced and sustained.  Thomas (1993) 
highlighted unless we interact with another person, it’s impossible to know if a friendship is even 
possible.  Rogers (1998) explained that communication is formative in relations.   
Rawlins (2009) argued that “Friendships emerge among the personal, relational, and 
cultural narratives of our lives negotiated within a host of stories already in progress” (p. 47).  He 
continues, “Friendships are ongoing narrative achievements reflexively shaping our identities, 
convictions, participation, and possibilities (p. 47). Rawlins' work grounds friendship in the 
communicative realm.  This dissertation follows his work to argue that friendship is a 
communicative phenomenon.  Part of this project is to examine how it is that this naming can 
take place sans reification of the term.  Rawlins explains that “we produce the category of 
‘friend’ in our daily lives through the people we choose to describe by that term (and negatively 
through the people to whom we refuse to apply it)” (2009, p. 25).  Framing friendship as a 
communicative phenomenon allows us to avoid the difficulties encountered in attempting to 
define the essence of friendship in addition to the earlier problems encountered in different types 
of friendship.    Framing friendship as a communicative phenomenon also allows us to attend to 
the current work from a historically-mindful perspective, a process that is essential to projects 
within the philosophy of communication.  Arnett (2010) wrote:  
Philosophy of communication engages particulars contingent on a particular situation, a 
particular moment, and a particular public contribution to public opinion. Philosophy of 





offered as a philosophy of communication road map that details the particulars and 
temporal suggestions for engaging those particulars.  (p. 58)   
A goal of this project is to offer a road map that explores the particulars of friendship and 
temporal suggestions for engaging those particulars.   
Laas (2018) argued that definition work is problematic as it draws us away from the 
ethical and practical implications of friendship. Laas (2018) noted, “real definitions, like other 
kinds of definitions, are linguistic entities, and as such are unavoidably historically contingent on 
the definer’s circumstances, goals, and theoretical commitments” (p. 123).   Rather than center 
on the definitional characteristics, honing in on a communicative framework allows us instead to 
dedicate the inquiry at hand to uncovering the qualitative differences at the phenomenological 
level with an overall goal to understand friendship in our current moment.   
Operating from an Aristotelian framework, this dissertation assumes that friendship is 
necessary for human life.  For Munn (2012), a central element of friendship was “shared 
activity” (p. 1).  Elder (2014), drawing from Aristotle, argued that the hallmark of friendship is 
the shared life, specifically, a communicative life.  He wrote, that friends share “especially 
reasoning together by sharing conversation and thoughts, and communal engagement in valued 
activities” (p. 287).  Meilaender (1981) explained that for Aristotle, the emphasis was on choice.  
It is this grounding of friendship in choice, then, that places friendship in the middle of 
deliberative work and communicative action.  Aristotle wrote that friendship “is a thing most 
necessary for life since no one would choose to live without friends” (1155a).   Rawlins operates, 
too, from an Aristotelian tradition.  He explained that “in close friendship, we desire good things 
to happen to our friend because we care about this particular person.  The activities compassing 





p. 5).  He continued that “For Aristotle true dyadic friendships also involve mutual well-wishing, 
which includes reciprocated concern and actions to benefit each friend.  They jointly experience 
the gratifications of their friendship” (p. 5).  It would be difficult to find anyone who would 
argue that friends do not improve our life.  
Staging friendship as a communicative phenomenon also offers the possibility for 
epistemic, ontological, and metaphysical confirmation of being.  Branden (1993) explains that 
through friendship, there emerges a “psychological visibility” that is a “metaphysical 
experience” (p. 66)  and helps separate friendship from kinship and romantic ties, in the sense 
that friendship as emerging communicatively and maintained through communication places it in 
a different tier.  Kinship and romantic  relationships biological underpinnings.   C.S. Lewis 
(1960) wrote that true friendship is difficult to come by.  He explains “Friendship is—in a sense 
not at all derogatory to it—the least natural of loves; the least instinctive, organic, biological, 
gregarious and necessary”  (p. 88).  Thomas (1993) explained that there are also communicative 
differences between friendships and parent-child relationships in addition to the biological 
elements.  They are related to the “manifestation of choice,” there is no authority of one over the 
other, and “enormous bond of trust” (p. 49).   
Aristotle discussed the nature of relationships like husband and wife and son and father—
he said that they are different because the ‘work’ is different.  He wrote, “because the work, and 
therefore the excellence, of each of these is different, and different therefore are the causes of 
their feeling Friendship” (1171a).  All relationships require communicative work, but for 
friendship, the relationship is produced and maintained solely through communication.  
Another central notion related to communicative work and friendship is tied to sharing 





constitutive elements, one clear indication of the value of friendships comes from the value of 
having someone to share with” (p. 215).   The idea of sharing with is a central theme within this 
dissertation.  The sharing of time, space, place, experiences, thoughts, conversations, feelings, 
etc. will all be explored.  For Soraker, sharing with particular is grounded in communication.  
Soraker wrote, “research indicates that one of the most significant determinants of well-being 
lies in the ability to share one’s positive and negative experiences with others” (p. 215).    Liu 
(2010) advocated from an Aristotelian perspective to show that shared activity is a necessary 
component of friendship and “this activity has a phenomenal character perhaps more akin to 
sense perception than to intellectual apprehension” (p. 585).  Munn (2012), too, interpreted 
shared activity to be central to Aristotle’s conceptualization of friendship.  This shared activity 
will be developed throughout this work.  Shared activity is a sharing with, particularly grounded 
in the communicative world. 
In addition to the sharing with component of friendship, another important 
communicative element of most interpretations of friendship is for the sake of.  Cooper (1980) 
wrote, “To wish for someone else’s good for his sake entails (perhaps means) wishing for his 
good not as a means to one’s own (or anyone else’s) good” (p. 310).  Munn (2012) wrote, 
“mutual caring is the idea that each friend cares for the other and does so for the sake of the 
other, not themselves” (p. 2). We act not because it is reciprocal, nor for the sake of the 
friendship, but for the friend in their particularity.     
 Friendship as a communicative phenomenon opens the door for rhetorical and 
communication ethics approaches, due to the role of narrative in developing our character.  For 
various reasons, story-telling between friends is a key component in shaping who we are as 





ongoing personal and social significance of our endeavor, setbacks, accomplishments, and 
hopes” (p. 47) and this, too, connects with the sharing with.  Friendship as the highest virtue, and 
the path to all other virtues, is also manifested through the practice of communicative virtues.  
Sokolowski (2002) wrote:   
The ability to engage in friendship, the virtue of friendship, requires that we possess the 
other virtues, both the individual virtues and the virtue of justice.  We have to be morally 
good in all the other ways in order to be able to enjoy true friendship.  If we are 
intemperate or cowardly, for example, we will find that our intemperance or cowardice 
will prevent us from even thinking about someone else’s good, or they may make us 
think wrongly about what is good for our ‘friend.’ (p. 260) 
Chapter Overviews 
 The project ahead embraces the tradition of the unity of contraries.  It explores the 
various ways in which specific parts give rise to revelations of the whole related to friendship.  
Chapter Two—Encounter:  Persons and the Origins of Friendship 
Chapter two begins from the point this introduction ended, examining friendship as a 
communicative phenomenon between persons that is created, sustained, managed, produced, and 
reproduced via various forms of communicative work in which the persons do good things for 
and with the other.  All human relations begin with meeting.  Alfred Schutz, Austrian 
phenomenologist, places intersubjectivity at the center of all social relations.  Numerous scholars 
have worked with and from Schutz’ work, particularly drawing relevance to the importance of 
his work in understanding communicative action.  We take for granted that others exist and that 





peopled.  When we encounter the bodies of others in our world, they are given to us in their 
originary presence.  However, their consciousness is not presented but appresented.  In the 
paradigmatic communicative setting, one’s spatial presence is used as a source for entering or 
penetrating their subjective experience as well as their givenness in speech.  Encounter is the 
communicative phenomenon in which persons enter into a communicative common environment.  
As such, it is not dependent on the face-to-face setting and can occur via technology.   
Chapter Three—Particularity and Personhood:  Humanizing the Friend Through Voice 
Chapter Three explores the tension between encounter and particularity.  We have the 
potential to encounter hundreds if not thousands of others on any given day.  Friendship emerges 
from a tension that arises between encounter and particularity.  Particularity is the reciprocal 
recognition of the other’s unique consciousness (interiority) through voice within a context of 
belief.  Voice, in the context of this project, is the expression of one’s interiority.  Corey Anton 
proposes a triadic structure of intentionality and using this, the conclusion is drawn that 
particularity arises when we mundanely dwell in the voice of our friends, in their givenness.  
Particularity, also, is not dependent on the face-to-face setting and can occur via technology.   
Chapter Four—Dialogue and Digitization:  The Language of Friendship 
Dialogue and digitization and their role in friendship are the topics chapter four explores.  
In the last decade of his life, Walter J. Ong explored the nature of hermeneutics in a digital 
world.  Throughout his career, he was concerned with depersonalization.  Ong’s work was 
influenced by Martin Buber’s philosophy.  While there is no explicit connection between Alfred 
Schutz and Buber, there are some basic tenets of their work that may arise from their Jewish 





show that the Other in friendship emerges as a result of a unity of contraries, specifically 
between dialogue and digitization.  Human thought is binary and “breaks down” the Other.  
Language is hermeneutic and dialogue is the “building up” of the Other.  Dialogue is imperative 
for friendships in that it is the practice from which particularity arises, and that it is necessary for 
the co-creation of meaning of the friendship itself.  In our digital age, the presence of the other 
can be hermeneutic and as such, mediated communication is more conducive to 
depersonalization than spoken.  While mediated communication creates more challenges, it does 
not make friendship impossible.   
Chapter Five—Time and Space:  Altered Dimensions of Friendship 
The next chapter begins with Giddens’s argument that Social systems have been extended 
in time and space.  For most of human history, friendships were limited to those in which we 
were in close proximity.  As communication technologies have evolved, our perceptions and 
experience of time and space have changed.  Friendship is connected to time in two ways.  
Friends must share the same historical moment.  Second, friendship is extended duration, 
perceived as continuous duration although experienced as fragmented and discrete.  Traditionally 
friendship has been linked to space, although research indicates that lack of shared space is not a 
barrier.  Through the social dimensions of time and space, intimacy surfaces.  Intimacy depends 
on communicative choices.  Specifically, the choice: to communicate, to communicate with you, 
of how to communicate, and to communicate in a way that is unique to our friendship.   
Chapter Six—Sunaisthesis:  The Synecdochical Activity of Friendship 
The final unity of contraries, sunaisthesis, is the activity in which two friends become a 





friendship; therefore, it is the center of all of his political philosophy.  April Flakne argues that 
the translations of Aristotle’s term were inaccurate.   Interpreting both Eudemian Ethics and 
Nicomachean Ethics, she argued that the term derived from suzen (the shared life) and aesthesis 
(perception).   Sunaisthesis is living, perceiving, and doing together.     
Chapter Seven—Conclusion:  A Virtue Ethics Approach 
Friendship is a requirement for the good life.  Teleological and deontogical frameworks are not 
as well-suited for the task of examining the effect of technological practices on our friendships as 
virtue ethics and communication ethics approach.  An attentiveness to historicity, the particulars, 
and the communicative practices that inform the goods of friendship are explored.  Each chapter 
theme has a related discussion and conclusion related to the overall notion of virtue ethics.   







Encounter:  Persons and the Origins of Friendship 
“One’s friends are that part of the human race with which one can be human.” 
– George Santayana 
All human encounter is communicative.  Even if we never exchange words with another 
person, due to the intersubjective nature of our lifeworld, all encounter presupposes a 
communicative world.  To be human is to be with other humans.  Therefore, a relevant starting 
point for our investigation into the communicative phenomenon of friendship is at the beginning 
of all human relationships, encounter.  As a starting point to all human relationships, however 
fleeting, encounter is essential for friendship.  An awareness of the existence of the other is the 
foundational starting point.  This awareness is brought into being through communicative work 
and performance.  This chapter will draw heavily from the work of Alfred Schutz, who inspired a 
plethora of works on human relationships.    Through these works, I will show that corporeal 
presence is not required in today’s world for encounter, and so, as the fundamental step to 
friendship formation at the phenomenological level, then, encounter is our first step in all human 
relations and not only can but does occur in many various mediated settings in today’s world.   
Grinnell (1983) showed that Schutz, through his systematic analysis of social relations 
“arrived at the originating point involving intersubjectivity” (p. 185) and this chapter will follow 
that tradition.  Carrington (1979) pointed out, through Schutz, that all social relations are 
essentially based on the possibility of communication.  Barber (2018) noted that Schutz’ work 
influenced formative scholars in multiple disciplines.  Sociologist John O’Neill’s work on the 
lived body experience drew from Schutz (O’Neill, 1974).  Schutz was a close friend of the 
phenomenologist Aron Gurwitsch, bonded by their intellectual inquiries and refuge from World 





published numerous works about and influenced by Schutz (Embree, 1988; 2013; 2015; Embree 
& Barber, 2017).  Schutz was extremely influential for the work of sociologist Harold Garfinkel, 
father of ethnomethodology and his student Peter Berger (Psathas, 2004).  Berger would go on to 
work with Luckmann, another student of Schutz to write The Social Construction of Reality 
(1996).  Natanson's phenomenological and philosophical works were extremely influenced by 
his teacher (Natanson, 1986).   
Several contemporary scholars are working through Schutz to finish pressing inquiries in 
today’s world.  Knoblauch, specifically, has opened Schutz’ work to the world of communication 
studies (2001; 2013).  Phenomenologists have typically neglected Schutz’ work on 
communication (Knoblauch, 2013).  Bakardjieva (2005; 2014) has worked through Schutz to 
advance an understanding of social relationships and friendships in the internet age.  Zhao (2004; 
2015; 2006; 2005; 2007; Zhao & Elesh, 2008) is a major Schutz scholar who has expanded 
Schutz’ works and advanced his theories in our modern digital age-related to time, space and 
knowledge in social relationships.  Informed by the above secondary literature, this chapter also 
draws from Schutz’ major works.  On Phenomenology and Social Relations, originally published 
in 1932 is Schutz’ first major work.  It also draws from all four volumes of Collected Papers.   
Schutz and Intersubjectivity 
 All human encounter is communicative and to show how we will start with the 
beginning.  Schutz began his explanation of our basic human experience grounded in Husserl’s 
claim that we in our bodies are the center of all inquiries into consciousness.  We cannot remove 
the thought from the person who experiences thought (1970a).  Schutz explained that “the 
personal self rather than the thought has to be treated as the immediate datum” (1970a, p. 57).  





surrounding world.  Schutz writes that we “accept as unquestionable the world of facts which 
surrounds us as existent out there” (p. 58).  This is the natural attitude.  The world in which we 
operate on an everyday basis, the world in which we plod through life without pause to question 
or doubt the existence of self and others, is our everyday lifeworld.  We may choose to suspend 
our belief in these existences, also known as “bracketing,” but in doing so we cease to be flowing 
in the usual stream of our consciousness of the natural attitude.  All of our relations with other 
human beings begin with this starting point of the natural attitude of everyday existence.     
 We come to a particular attentiveness when we suspend our belief in the foundations of 
existence, we also lose our ability to still be within that existence. There is a particular lack of 
attentiveness we perform to live with others that Schutz addressed.  Schutz (1970a) wrote, 
“Attention a la vie, attention to life, is, therefore, the basic regulative principle of our conscious 
life” (p. 68).  Particularly, Schutz argued that there is a “plane of consciousness of highest 
tension originating in an attitude of full attention to life and its requirements” and he called this 
“wide-awakeness” (Schutz, 1970a, p. 69).  He wrote that “Only the performing and especially the 
working self is fully interested in life and, hence, wide-awake” (p. 69).  The lack of attention to 
the fragility of life and our unquestioning everyday existence is attention to life. 
 When Schutz argued that our taken-for-grantedness of the existence of others is part of 
our everyday existence, this is essential for our understanding of his project.  Our world is 
naturally intersubjective (1970a).  He wrote, “If we retain the natural attitude as men among 
other men, the existence of others is no more questionable to us than the existence of an outer 
world” (1970a, p. 163).  He added, “The world of my daily life is by no means my private world 
but is from the outset an intersubjective one, shared with my fellow men, experiences and 





introduction to Collected Papers III wrote, “We do not, each one of us, experience the life-world 
as a private world; on the contrary, we take it for a public world, common to all of us, that is, for 
an intersubjective world” (1970a).  Natanson wrote in the introduction to Collected Papers I 
(Schutz, 1973) that “‘the common-sense world,’ ‘world of daily life,’ ‘every-day world’ are 
variant expressions for the intersubjective world experienced by man within what Husserl terms 
the ’natural attitude’” (p. xxvii).  This is not only the center of our investigation of friendship, but 
this is the center for all social action.  Natanson wrote that within the natural attitude, all persons 
make sense of their worlds, themselves and others (Schutz, 1973).  We live in a peopled-world, 
and in this peopled-world, even our friendships are often without question.  In addition to taking 
our world for granted, we also take it for granted that the others we take for granted also take 
their worlds for granted.  Gurtwitszch called this reciprocity of taken-for-grantedness a 
“thorough-going reciprocity” and explained that this was the reason we “can act and work” with 
others at all (Schutz, 1970a, p. xiii).    This acting and working with others includes 
communicative action and work.   
Corporeality 
 Another part of our natural attitude is the actual taken-for-grantedness of the bodies of the 
other, and there is a particular relevance here to the inquiry into the ways in which technology 
has affected friendship.  At the time of Schutz’ work, and later in the extensions of his work with 
Luckmann, the media that shaped their phenomenological theories were radically different from 
today.  Then, the primary way that one encountered another in the routine of everyday life was in 
their physical presence. All relationships were bound by space for most of human history.    So 





his emphasis was truly on the communication that occurs between two people rather than their 
physical existence.   
 In 1973, Schutz and Luckmann highlighted the nature of nonverbal expressions in the 
communicative process.   Nonverbal expressions are culturally dependent and require us to draw 
from our learned experience of the meaning of such expressions to interpret meaning.  The store 
of meaning we keep Schutz called our stock of knowledge.  When we are in the presence of 
another person, we assign meaning outside the realm of their intentional expression in nonverbal 
gestures by interpreting it grounded in our stock of knowledge.  This is a reciprocal process.  He 
wrote, “simultaneous with my lived experience of you, there is your lived experience which 
belongs to you and is part of your stream of consciousness” (p. 169), and you have your lived 
experience of me.  He wrote, “All interpretation of this world is based upon a stock of previous 
experiences of it, our own experiences and those handed down to us by our parents and teachers, 
which in the form of ‘knowledge at hand’ function as a scheme of reference”  (1970b,  p. 72).  
All of our experience is embedded in a larger historical context which shapes what it means for 
us to know.     
Our histories and ways of knowing, while shared and developed in relation to others, is 
still unique to us.  Schutz (1970a; 1970b) used Husserl’s notion of originary presence as a 
starting point.   Other human beings are both bodies in space and subjective experiencing beings.  
They are both things and persons, or in Buber’s terms, Thou’s and Its.  While the body of 
another person is presented to us in originary presence, their subjective experience is impossible 
to apprehend communicating.  Understanding things is quite different than understanding 
persons.  Schutz (1973) noted that in the world of things grounded in Husserl, “the ‘Other’ also 





body of another by a process of appresentive pairing” (p. 125).  Schutz though departs from 
Husserl and places our apprehension of the other in the mundane.  He explained that we come 
into understanding others by drawing from our stock of knowledge, which is derived from 
interacting with others.   
Schutz wrote, “their psychological life is not given to me in originary presence, merely in 
co-presence, it is not presented but appresented” (1970a, p. 25).  In the paradigmatic 
communicative setting, that is, the face-to-face, one’s spatial presence is used as a source for 
entering or penetrating into their subjective experience.  Until though this is confirmed though, 
through speech, we cannot be certain that our interpretations of those specific expressions are 
correct.  We can never be ultimately certain that our interpretation is correct.  The interpretive 
process relies on our stock of knowledge, grounded in our language system that has been 
learned.  Even when we encounter others within their spatial existence, their physical bodily 
presence in a face-to-face situation, the body in space is relatively irrelevant—the focus is on 
communication.  Language, specifically, is the system of making meaning of our entire 
lifeworld, not only our own world but the world we share with others and all cultural objects.  
Schutz, working from Husserl, wrote: 
A book is an outer object, a material thing.  I see it as it appears to me, here on my desk, 
to my right, etc.; but reading it, I am not directed toward it as an outer object but toward 
the meaning of what is written therein:  I ‘live in its meaning’ by comprehending it.  The 
same holds good for a tool, a house, a theater, a temple, a machine.  The spiritual 
meaning of all these objects is appresentationally apperceived as being founded upon the 
actually appearing object which is not apprehended as such but as expressing its meaning.  





something connected with the words in an external way, We take the words 
apprehensively as expressing their meaning, and we live in their meaning by 
comprehending what the Other means and the thought he expresses. (1973, p. 314) 
Our bodily presence not required for the making of mutual meaning and all meeting is the co-
production of meaning in some way.   
Communicative Common Environment 
Schutz stated that with “mutual understanding and consent a communicative common 
environment is thus established” and he added that within this communicative common 
environment, the subjects “reciprocally motivate one another in their mental activities” (p. 315). 
Schutz wrote, “It is, moreover, supposed that the mutual appresentational comprehension of 
events in the Other’s mind leads immediately to communication” (p. 315).    He continues that  
“For each partner, the other’s body, his gestures, his gait, and facial expressions, are immediately 
observable, not merely as things or events of the outer world but in their physiognomical 
significance, that is, as symptoms of the other’s thoughts” (p. 16).  In this explanation, Schutz is 
drawing the significance of bodily presence.   His point about being able to ascertain the 
symptoms of thought is important, but it is not the role of the body that deserves primacy here, 
but instead, the role of communication.      
 It is important to pause here to make clear that encounter does not require at all a 
recognition of the unique individual with whom we share the communicative event.  In our 
everyday interactions, we may meet the mailperson, the bus driver, the teacher—and while we 
interact with them and are able to understand them and comprehend them, there is no necessity at 





encounter others in a face-to-face situation.  He explained that first, “I must consciously pay 
attention to a fellow-man, to a human being confronting me in person” (p. 24).  This, 
specifically, he called an “awareness”—a “Thou-orientation”  (p. 24).  He wrote:  
the Thou-orientation is the pure mode in which I am aware of another human being as a 
person.  I am already Thou-oriented from the moment that I recognize an entity which I 
directly experience as a fellow man (as a Thou), attributing life and consciousness to him. 
(1970a, p. 185)    
The face-to-face situation, Schutz explained, takes for granted the Thou-orientation (1976).  
Each and every time we communicate, doing so requires a belief in the other as “an entity which 
I directly experience as a fellow man” (1970a, p. 185).  If we did not believe them to be a fellow 
being capable of comprehending us, we would not reach out communicatively for a response in 
the first place.  This is an encounter.  Encounters are moments in which we reach out 
communicatively to others.  If we revisit Schutz’ discussion on attention, remember that to be in 
“an attitude of full attention to life and its requirements” means to be wide-awake (1970a, p. 69) 
and that “Only the performing and especially the working self is…wide-awake” (p. 69).    
Encounter emerges through the performing and working among others, specifically, 
communicative work.  It does not require a face-to-face situation.  While a face-to-face situation 
presupposes this situation, through language I can confirm that the other with whom I encounter 
in a mediated setting is human (at least for now, in our age, where no meaningful artificial 







Possibilities for Encounter  
 Because encounter is communicative, it is not dependent at all on the face-to-face 
situation and can occur across mediated settings.  Imagining all of the possibilities for an 
encounter is a daunting task, if even possible.  We have initial encounters in which we come into 
contact with the person for the first time, and we have repeated encounters, in which we have 
previously met the person and are encountering them again.  It is undeniable that the majority of 
the relationships we have in today’s world are hybridized.  Even spouses text message each other 
when apart.  By defining encounter as moments in which a shared communicative environment is 
possible, we can account for those moments in which mutual understanding is never achieved 
nor desired to be achieved.  We can also account for all of the various settings in which it is 
possible to encounter others in our modern world.   
 To exemplify this point, I will use Facebook.  Facebook is currently the world’s largest 
social network with nearly 2.5 billion users.  On Facebook, users can interact both with 
individuals they already have met face-to-face or with individuals in which they have never met 
in person.  Facebook has been promoting their groups feature recently, encouraging users to 
connect with others who have common interests.  In addition to encountering others in groups, 
that is, having moments in which a shared communicative environment is possible, Facebook 
also makes suggestions to their users to “friend.”  In these situations, there is a possible shared 
communicative environment.  We are “encountering” others.  Sometimes we might know the 
people who are suggested, and sometimes not, but in each case, a communicative common 
environment is possible.  They are somehow within our communicative reach, therefore, we 





 Some platforms are much more conducive to initiating encounters than others.  Phone 
calls, for example, are relatively unlikely to be main centers for initial encounters, but they are 
not impossible.  In fact, when we call to arrange a doctor’s appointment, for example, we are 
encountering another via telephone, and sometimes, if the person answering is new or the doctor 
is new to us, we are indeed encountering the person on the other line for the first time.  Popular 
rhetoric is full of stories of relationships that were spurred by accidental text, from young men 
being invited to dinner to couples finding marriage with a text sent to the wrong number.  
Encounters are essential for all human relationships and can happen in any environment in which 
a shared communicative environment is possible.    
 Schutz (1976) noted that is possible for a Thou-orientation to never move forward to any 
other type of relationship.  For example, if I am on a bus and outside of the window and I see a 
woman and a child walking and I am aware of them, even though I turn to them and recognize 
their existence, they have no possibility of reciprocating the attention I now give them.  In this 
case, it would be a one-sided encounter.  However, in the mutual recognition of each other’s 
existence, Schutz explained that “a social relation becomes constituted” (p. 24).  This, he 
considered the ‘pure’ We-relation.  Schutz placed a heavy emphasis on the We-relation in 
observing the bodily expressions of the Other to confirm “phases of my own consciousness” with 
“ ‘corresponding’ phases of your consciousness” (p. 25).  He argued that “I ‘participate’ in the 
conscious life of another Self only when I am engaged in a concrete We-relation, face to face 
with a fellow-man” (p. 26).  But, immediately after, he moves towards a discussion of language 
and meaning.  Schutz explained that “The We-relation, however, consists not only in the 
community of time, that is, in the synchronization of two interior streams of duration; it consists 





to face with me” (p. 26).  Collected Papers III, he again emphasizes the face-to-face, but he 
writes that what ultimately characterizes the We is when “the partners are aware of each other 
and sympathetically participate in each other’s lives for however short a time we shall call the 
pure We-relationship” (1970a, p. 186). In the Thou-orientation, we can follow particular bodily 
movements by the Other and interpret it to gain insight into the psychological life of the Other, 
but to do so presupposes a system of meaning—language.    
To be ‘present’ to another means to enter into a Thou-orientation in a way that is open to 
reciprocation.  Again, this is an encounter—the possibility for a shared communicative 
environment exists.  And none of it, actually, is dependent on one’s actual bodily presence within 
sight of another.  Schutz writes, “the experience of a fellow-man in a We-relation is, strictly 
speaking, also ‘mediate’:  I apprehend his conscious life by interpreting his bodily expressions of 
subjectively meaningful process” (p. 26). All social relations begin from this general process of 
an initial encounter.   
 In our world today, on an everyday basis we encounter other human persons on a regular 
day to day basis.  I encounter others from the moment I awake.  My family surrounds me.  While 
I drink my morning coffee, I encounter others as I scan my social media feeds and read breaking 
news stories from the night before.  As I drive to work, I pass multiple others, driving to their 
various destinations, and, too, I also encounter others who walk or bike.  When I arrive at work, I 
encounter students and colleagues both in person and through my technology.  Each person I 
encounter could be an opening, a potential friend.  But, too, it just may be so that the encounter I 
have is with someone I am already close to.  No matter how brief my participation in their 





 Repeated encounters inform our stock of knowledge in such a way that we can say that 
we might “know” another person.  Encounters involve various layers of knowing, but not 
necessarily a particularly knowing.   
Schutz (1976) wrote: 
In the pure We-relation I apprehend only the existence of a fellow-man and the fact that 
he is confronting me.  For a concrete social relation to become established, however, I 
must also know how he is oriented to me.  In face-to-face situations I gain knowledge of 
this specific aspect of my partner’s conscious life by observing the concrete manifestation 
of his subjective experiences in the common stream of the We-relation. (p. 27) 
Maines (1989) argued that there has been a “transformation of modal ways of knowing others 
based on the social organization of information” (p. 195).  He pointed out that there are two ways 
of knowing others—categorical and personal knowing, and showed how friendships involve both 
types.  Maines showed that “In small preindustrial communities, continual copresence without 
personal knowing was for all practical purposes impossible”  (p. 196).  In today’s world, it is 
possible to have repeated encounters with another person and yet never “know” the other person.  
“Knowing” someone takes us beyond encounter, into the next chapter.  
Who We Encounter:  Schutz on Our Contemporaries 
 Like for Ong and Buber, the face to face is the paradigmatic form of all communication.  
Natanson in the introduction to Schutz Collected Papers I explained that: 
The ‘face to face’ relationship is fundamental for all other structures of social relatedness.  In 





which I interpret the other's acts, but I share a temporal community as well.  Consociates are 
involved in an on-going temporal flow, bounded by common spatial limits. (p xxxiii) 
Schutz used spatial and temporal terms to make sense of how we form relationships with others.  
He wrote:   
I, the human being, born into the social world, and living my daily life in it, experience it 
as built around my place in it, as open to my interpretation and action, but always 
referring to my actual biographically determined situation.  Only in reference to me does 
a certain kind of my relations with other obtain the specific meaning which I designate 
with the world “We,”’ only with reference to “Us,’ whose center I am, do others stand 
out as “You,” and in reference to “you,” who refer back to me, third parties stand out as 
“They.” (1973, p. 15).   
Contemporaries 
Schutz discussed three types of individuals that can be applied to the notion of encounter.  
There are contemporaries, which are individuals that we share the same historical moment with.  
Predecessors are individuals who came before us.   Successors are those who will come after us.  
Schutz explained, from the outset that we know contemporaries from past recollections.  We 
apprehend the experience of our contemporaries, in a “They-orientation”, Schutz argues, as 
“anonymous processes (1976, p. 225).   We may also experience them in a “Thou-orientation,” 
he noted, when we apprehend their experience “within their setting in his stream of 
consciousness” (p. 224-5).  When They-oriented, Schutz argued that we experience the other as 
an abstraction.  Because of this, he argued that “My knowledge of my contemporaries is, 





 Mere contemporaries, Schutz explained, are “Others who are not face-to-face with me, 
but who co-exist with me in time” (p. 37).  He wrote:   
The gradations of experiential directness outside the face-to-face situation are 
characterized by a decrease in the wealth of symptoms by which I apprehend the Other 
and by the fact that the perspectives in which I experience the Other are progressively 
narrower.  We may illustrate this point by considering the stages by which a fellow-man 
confronting me becomes a mere contemporary.  Now we are still face-to-face, saying 
goodbye, shaking hands; now he is walking away…It is impossible to say at which 
precise moment the face-to-face situation ended and my partner became a mere 
contemporary of whom I have knowledge but no direct experience (1976, p. 37).   
Schutz continued:  
The gradations of directness can be also illustrated by the series ranging from a 
conversation face-to-face, to a conversation by phone, to an exchange of letters, to a 
message transmitted by a third party.  Both examples show a progressive decrease in the 
wealth of symptoms by which I experience my partner and a progressive narrowing of the 
perspectives in which my partner appears to me. (1976, p. 37) 
 Contemporary itself, I believe, comes from Schutz understanding of sharing time 
together.  He wrote” I know that he is in some Here and Now of his own, and I know that his 
Now is contemporaneous with mine, but I do not participate in it, nor do I share his Here” (1976, 
p. 38).    Specifically, as we transition from the physical co-presence of being with the Other, 





Thereby we investigated a border province lying between the domain of directly 
experienced social reality and the indefinitely experienced world of contemporaries   The 
closer we approach the latter, the lower the degree of directness and the higher the degree 
of anonymity which characterizes my experience of others.  Accordingly, the broader 
world of contemporaries itself contains various stratifications:  My patterns in former 
We-relations who are now mere contemporaries but who are restorable to face-to-face 
situations; partners in the former We-relations of my present partner in a We-relation 
who are potentially accessible to my direct experience (your friend whom I have not met 
yet); contemporaries of whom I have knowledge and whom I am to meet shortly 
(Professor X whose books I have read and with whom I have an appointment in the near 
future); contemporaries of whose existence I am aware, as reference points for typical 
social functions (post office employees involved in the processing of my letters); 
collective social realities which are known to me by their function and organization while 
their personnel remains anonymous—although I could, under certain circumstances, gain 
direct personal experience of the individuals in questions (the House of Lords)’ collective 
social realties which are by their very nature anonymous and of which I consequently 
cannot gain direct personal experience under any circumstances; objective configurations 
of meaning which are instituted in the world of my contemporaries and which are 
essential anonymous in character (the Articles of the Constitution the rules of French 
grammar); and finally, artifacts in the broadest sense, which testify to some subjective 
meaning-context of some unknown person, i.e, the sense which the artifact ‘had’ for its 
creator, user, handler, etc.  All these stratifications of the large domain of indirectly 





anonymity and by transitions from relative nearness to direct experience to absolute 
detachment from it. (1976, p. 41) 
Schutz explained specifically that are “mere” contemporaries are given to us.  He wrote:  
The Other who is a mere contemporary is not given to me directly  as a unique particular 
Self.  I do not apprehend his Selfhood in a straightforward and prepredicative experience.  I 
do not even have an immediate experience of the Other’s existence.  I can only experience 
the Other in acts of inference by which I judge that the Other is such rather than otherwise, 
by imputing him certain typical attributes.  Whereas I experience the individual Thou directly 
in the concrete We-relation, I apprehend the contemporary only mediately, by means of 
typifications. (1976, p. 42) 
To explain this, he talked about the various ways that we can encounter our contemporaries.  
First, he reminded us that we experience others as the same even when we are no longer in a 
communicative common environment with them.  To show how we experience and understand 
this other, Schutz argued: 
The act by which I apprehend the former fellow-man as a contemporary is thus a 
typification in the sense that I hold invariant my previously gained knowledge, although 
my former fellow-man has grown older in the meantime and must have necessarily 
gained new experiences.  Of these experiences I have either no knowledge or only 
knowledge by inference or knowledge gained through fellow-men by indirect sources. (p. 
42) 
Important for our purposes especially, Schutz argued that “It is abundantly clear that all such 





experience of a fellow-man” (p. 42).  However, he did note that “I can also gain knowledge 
about my contemporary social world in other ways than the one just cited” (p. 42-3).  Cultural 
artifacts are how we do such, he explained. Schutz wrote: 
My experiences of things and events in physical reality, of objects manufactures by men, of 
tools and artifacts, of cultural objects intuitions and action patters, too, refer to the world of 
my contemporaries (or point back to the world of my predecessors, a circumstance we shall 
discuss later).  (p. 43) 
When it comes to exactly how it is that we can encounter those no longer in our presence, 
that is they share a historical moment with us but not space, he argued that we apprehend them 
sometimes through their tools and artifacts.  We then interpret these.  Schutz wrote that “Such 
interpretations are by their very nature derivative.  They consist of inferences based on and 
mediated by my experiences of fellow-men, either of particular fellow-men or of fellow-human 
beings in general” (p. 43).  One of the major differences, Schutz noted throughout his works, was 
that in the face-to-face situation we experience a flow of consciousness simultaneously as the 
Other experiences their flow, and we can confirm it.  Thou-orientations, for Schutz, was a subset 
of a general They-orientation.  Schutz argued that when we experience contemporaries, they 
appear as anonymous.  For him, the We-relation could only manifest in the face-to-face.  The 
We-relation was a double Thou-orientation, and it depended on “the immediacy of a shared vivid 
present” (p. 46).  Schutz argued that: 
Whereas my experience of a fellow-man in the We-relation is continuously modified and 
enriched by the experiences shared by us, this is not the case in the They-relation.  Each 
new experience of contemporaries adds, of course, to my stock of knowledge; and the 





modifications as a result of shifts in my situation.  But these modifications remain 
minimal as long as a given situation and my interests in it--which have determined the 
original application of a given typifying scheme, remain constant.  (p. 55) 
The reason for this, he explained, relates to the following.  He wrote:   
In the We-relation I can verify my assumption that the way in which I experience my 
environment can be co-ordinated with the way in which you experience yours.  I am wont 
to extend this assumption to my contemporary and to say that if he were in my situation, 
his experiences would be roughly identical with mine.  This assumption, however, cannot 
be verified.  The question whether my partner’s interpretation of the world is congruent 
with mine cannot be resolved with certainty in a They-relation. (p. 55) 
The problem here, is that this is also not necessarily so in the We-relation, as we can never know 
this for certain.  In order to be closest as we can, it requires confirmation through words and 
speech, through voice.   
Schutz did note the importance of language in speech in this section of his materials.  He wrote 
that “In communicating with my partners in social relations I use sign-systems.  The more 
anonymous my partner, the more ‘objectively’ must I use the signs” (p. 56).  He adds, regarding 
language that: 
The reason for this is quite clear:  in the social world into which we are born, language (in the 
broadest sense) is admittedly the paramount vehicle of communication; its conceptual 
structure and its power of typification make it the outstanding tool for the conveying of 





its semantic expression and to consider language, speech, symbols, significant gestures, as 
the fundamental condition of social intercourse as such. (pp. 160-161) 
Related to contemporaries in time and space, Schutz argued that despite all “social distance,” 
“contemporaries are in principle able to act on one another” (1970a, p. 119).  He continued, “The 
world of contemporaries contains, of course, regions which consists of former fellow-men—
whether these may or may not again become fellow-men for me—and potential fellow-men” (p. 
119).  He then continued, “Furthermore, there is the world of our predecessors which acts upon 
us while itself being beyond the reach of our action, and the world of our successors upon which 
we can act but which cannot act upon us” (1970a, p. 119).   
Consociates 
Schutz contrasted contemporaries with consociates.  Consociates are those with whom we 
share a face-to-face relationship.  Schutz noted that “consociates are mutually involved in one p. 
16 another’s biography (1973, pp. 16-17).   He continued that “they are growing older together; 
they live, as we may call it, in a pure We-relationship” (1973, p. 17).  Like with contemporaries, 
we still draw on our typifications and stock of knowledge to understand the Other.  We also 
cannot ever be certain of their complete particularity.  Schutz wrote: 
Summing up, we may say that, except in the pure We-relation of consociates, we can 
never grasp the individual uniqueness of our fellow–man in his unique biographical 
situation.  In the constructs of common-sense thinking the Other appears at best as a 
partial self, and he enters even the pure We-relation merely with a part of his personality.  





Bakardjieva (2005) in explaining consociates, wrote the following regarding Schutz and 
Luckmann’s (1973) work that “Mass media, for example, enlarge the number of types of 
contemporaries of whose existence I know in general, that is, whose existence I can infer on” (p. 
101).  She continued on:  
However, just as not all those within each other’s immediate reach are consociates (e.g. 
complete strangers riding on the same bus) and all those beyond each other’s immediate 
reach are contemporaries (e.g. family members temporarily away from home, not all 
those online are consociated contemporaries).  Keeping in touch with family members by 
email and chatting with friends non-anonymous on the IRC are obviously extensions of 
the interaction between consociates; likewise, online business transactions and 
impersonal correspondence between agents of organizations are an integral part of the 
communications between contemporaries.  (p. 101) 
 Zhao (2004) specifically calls for an update to the Schutz differentiation between the 
realm of consociates and contemporaries as a result of electronic technologies.  He wrote:   
The use of electronic communications technologies extends human perceptual reaches 
beyond the limits of human naked senses, resulting in the rise of third realm—the realm of  
consociated contemporaries, where people interact face-to-device with each other in ciditons 
of telecopresence.  The emergence of this social domain in cyberspace reconfigures the 
structure of the lifeworld by providing individuals with an opportunity to establish we-
relationships in a new type of shared meaning context.  (p. 92) 





In a face to face situation, indiviudals enter a ‘we-relation’ through mutual orienation, 
and the recurrence of such a relationship over a porlonged period of time turns complete 
strangers into intimate fellows. (p. 93) 
He continued:  
A social realm is defined in terms of the combination of certain temporal and spatial 
characteristics, with the former containing not only the dimensions of immediacy but also 
the dimension of duration.  It is the recurrence of a given contact situation over a 
prolonged period of time that results in a given social realm.  This is a point that has not 
been made particular clear in Schutz’s writing   
Social Relations 
Schutz does not mention friendship specifically in many places, but he does mention it in in 
some detail.  He attacks the notion of friendship from arising out of the mundane by placing it in 
the social sphere.  Friendship is part of a we-relation, and Schutz explains that we often 
understand particular “courses of acts as unities within larger (and more lasting) meaning-
contexts (p. 71).  He argues that the “unity of” a “friendship” which is “resolved in multifacted 
relations situated in social time...which partly consists of living we-relations, partly of relations 
among contemporaries” (p. 71).  Schutz explains that the very nature of friendships is that they 
are fragmentary, and this is an important point when I discuss the tech revolution on the 
phenomenology of friendship.   He writes, “Strictly speaking, these social relations are not 
continuous but rather repeatable” (p. 71).  He continues that what we conclude from this analysis 
is that “there are social relations that essentially can be constituted only in the immediacy of 





writes, “there are also chosen relations for which a certain intimacy and depth of lived 
experience are constitutive, for example, an amorous relations, a friendship)” (p. 72).  He does 
not continue to explore this in more depth, but he does ask “”Thus, apart from the originary 
structure of such social relations, the opportunities for the restorability of a living we-relation 
pay an important role” (p. 72).  The question is, “How long can one, for instance, be a  father, a 
husband, a friend at a distance?” (p. 72).  He writes, although not explicitly referring to 
technology, that “Here, undoubtedly, the social transformation of time is of great importance” (p. 
72).   
 The addition of this section has been to decide as to whether it is possible for a social 
relation, and friendship, could develop between two persons who are not in a face-to-face 
relationship, and also, to then develop whether or not they can develop between individuals who 
are contemporaries, or who are successors/predecessors.  Shutz wrote that  “The social relation in 
the face-to-face situation are characterized by reciprocity of the Thou-orientations of the two 
partners” (1976, p. 33).   He wrote, “If I am merely observing, my Thou-orientation is, of course, 
one-sided” (p. 33).  He continued “My observation is conduct oriented to him but his conduct 
need not be oriented to me” (p. 33).   
The Role of Knowledge in Encounter 
 Our knowledge is ever-changing, dependent on our interactions and experiences and 
social transformations.  Schutz writes “it must be emphasized that the stock of knowledge is in a 
continual flux” (p. 75), and “It is clear that any supervening experience enlarges and enriches it”  
(p. 75).  Most of our knowledge is derived socially via language and all of our knowledge serves 
as a map from which we navigate our world.  There is a difference between knowledge of, 





existence.  I can know of a person whom I have never met, or I can know about them, yet I may 
not know them.  When I have knowledge of I have a mediated awareness of their existence.   For 
example, I might know of my best friend’s friend but not know about them or know them.  I 
might encounter them on Facebook even as a suggested friend.  Knowledge about implies more 
certainty about the existence of another person.  If someone says “I know about them,” they 
might mean “I have basic demographic facts about them” or even “I’ve heard stories and can 
predict what they will do, but have never shared a communicative environment with them.”  
Again I may encounter this person via a friend suggestion for my best friend’s friend, whom I 
know quite a lot about through my best friend.   
In each of the above, I have taken a Thou-orientation.  Failure to share a communicative 
environment will not open a We-relation.  Knowledge about assumes knowledge of, but having 
knowledge about another does not imply that I can understand them.  Ultimately, being able to 
say we “know” someone means that we have some degree of accuracy related to our ability to 
anticipate their “in-order-to” motives.   Schutz (1976) wrote, “Above all, I cannot understand 
other people’s acts without knowing the in-order-to or the because motives of such acts” (p. 12) 
and for this knowing of our friends, specifically, there is required a sense of history within their 
life that is required that transcends encounter.   
 Even if we have a good ability to anticipate someone’s motives, it does not necessarily 
even mean that we are friendly with them.  Schutz explained that there are “manifold degrees of 
understanding” (p. 12).  All of our understanding of others is understood from our “own lived 
experience” (p. 175).  What complicates this more so, is the idea that human beings 
communicate with and without intent.  To have a degree of accuracy, and for friendship to 





time, and occur more than once.  We cannot, for example, be friends with someone in the future.  
Our knowledge informs our way of navigating our world, the objects within that world, and the 
people embedded in the world.  Our knowledge also informs our expectations of our friends.   
 With this in mind, no matter how we encounter others, we draw from our stock of 
knowledge to understand who they are and how they are.  Whether it might be the bus driver 
with whom we exchange a polite, “How are you,” or an online troll, we anticipate generalized 
patterns of communicating as well as expectations about who they are.  Technology is reshaping 
our lifeworld and our relationships within it Bakardjieva (2005).  This chapter has attempted to 
show that one way that the lifeworld and our relationships are changing is related to the basic 
level of human interaction, encounter.  Technology is only expanding horizons for encounters, 
not destroying them.   Popular but faulty rhetoric suggests that individuals are solitary and alone, 
slaves to their devices.  They ignore possibilities for social relationships as they are stuck in their 
devices.  The research, however, shows us that whether it be through blogging, chatting, singing, 
reading, or any of the other various means of communicating in our media-saturated 
environment, our possibilities for encounters are rich.  
  In the next chapter, we will explore the tension of breaking past encounters with the 
recognition of uniqueness in a mediated environment.  In this chapter, we discussed some ways 
in which we encounter others.  Encountering others does not guarantee a friendship, though.  
Instead, what must happen is a recognition of the other’s uniqueness, their individuality that is 
particularly theirs.  The chapter will examine the work of Walter Ong, Corey Anton, and Don 
Idhe to explore the intersections of intentionality, voice, and personhood.    It examines the role 
that technology plays in impeding or facilitating this recognition, and makes connections to 





Particularity and Personhood:  Humanizing the Friend through Voice 
“Friendship is born at that moment when one person says to another: ‘What! You too? I thought 
I was the only one!’” 
--C.S. Lewis 
In Collected Papers I, Schutz argued that the “predominant function of the face-to-face 
relationship” is to “experience one another in our individual uniqueness” (1973, p. 317).  If this 
is true, then what does it say for the possibility of being experienced as unique in a mediated 
setting?   Rawlins indicated the importance of the friend’s ability to perceive “the other’s own 
selfhood” (2009, p. 31).  When we are in the presence of our friends, we drop these undermost 
garments, perceive the other’s own selfhood, and experience the other’s individual uniqueness.  
We know that they know us for who we really are, and we know them as they are.  The 
recognition of the other’s unique consciousness is recognition of their particularity, of their 
unique interior, and this is only possible with the manifestation of voice.    
This chapter will begin with a conceptualization of the term particularity, placing it in the 
communicative realm.  It draws from several scholars, although the emphasis in this chapter is 
on the work of Walter Ong, who has written extensively on interiority and the development of 
communication technology.  Particularity is essential for friendship.  Friendship requires a 
recognition of the particularity of the other.  That is, I do not just see the other as human, as 
opening, as discussed in the basic encounter chapter, but instead, I recognize this person for all 
of their uniqueness and individuality, as a specific person rather than just a person, and that they, 
too, do the same for me.   
Gronbeck (1991) argued that Ong’s greatest contribution could actually be the work that 





consciousness, Gronbeck showed that Ong placed consciousness directly within the 
communication.   Zlatic (2017), an Ong student and friend, also highlighted Ong’s importance in 
connecting the self to communications media.  He wrote that Ong’s personalism was derived 
from his life and interactions with others. What makes communication more than information 
sharing, Zlatic explained, is that in communication, interior is shared with interior.  While this 
sharing can occur without any sharing of words, he noted the following:   
There is a mysterious, sometimes unspoken, component of communication:  an 
intentionality between inexplicable interiors that precedes language use.  This 
understanding of communication rejects visualist classifications of objective/subjective, 
for to understand a person requires not objectification but encounter, an intersubjectivity 
of sharing of interiors that is best represented through sound, the material medium that 
unites two interiors.  (p. 367) 
I have discussed in previous works that Ong’s work is continuously relevant (Petricini, 
2017).  Multiple scholars continue to draw from Ong, particularly in the media ecology tradition.  
In addition to his hundreds of works, he has roughly a dozen books in his corpus.  Ong kept 
meticulous records and his entire collection is archived at St. Louis University, where he earned 
his master’s degree and returned to settle for his career.  This chapter will draw from several of 
Ong’s most influential works, including Presence of the Word, The Barbarian Within, and some 
of his articles.  It will also draw from the work of Corey Anton who has done work on interiority 
and Ong.  Through these two scholars, I will show that particularity is the reciprocal recognition 
of the other’s unique consciousness (interiority) through voice.  Whereas encounter requires the 






 Nathaniel Branden, a psychotherapist, and lover of Ayn Rand argued that one of the 
central benefits of friendship is a recognition of my own particularity which he calls 
psychological visibility (1993).  He explained that in confirmation of our own being through our 
interactions we others, we experience a sense of joy.  This joy is related not just to the visibility 
of our own consciousness but in the confirmation that life is possible.  Branden wrote: 
When we encounter a person who thinks as we do, who notices what we notice, who 
values the things we value, who tend to respond to different situations as we do, not only 
do we experience a strong sense of affinity with such a person but also we can experience 
our self through our perception of that person. (p. 70) 
We find joy in the recognition and confirmation of self when we become visible as unique 
beings.  We encounter thousands of others, especially in our technological world today, and the 
majority of them are not friends nor will ever become friends.  But sometimes there are moments 
where we notice that the other person in our encounter seems to see the “real” us, and this brings 
us joy that we hope to hold on to.  This visibility is the reason we seek intimate human 
relationships like friendship in the first place, Branden argued.   
 Sociologist Gerald Suttles (1970) noted the necessity for recognition of uniqueness in 
friendship.  He lists four essential characteristics of friendship, and three are relevant to this 
notion.  First, he showed that in friendship, “The other person in the relationship is positively 
evaluated as a person qua person rather than for incidental advantages that may accrue as a result 
of an encounter with him” (p. 98).  Second, he added, “It is appropriate to appreciate the 
objective qualities, private property, or social characteristics of a friend only because they 
represent the person himself rather than for any universal value attached to them” (p. 99).   





than simply a particular instance of a general class. To suggest that a friend could be adequately 
or arbitrarily replaced by someone else who meets the same general criteria is usually felt to be 
antithetical to ‘true friendship’” (p. 100).  Ginsberg, Gottman, and Parker (1986) showed that 
even in childhood, we already can recognize that not just anyone will do when it comes to 
friendship.  We seek particular persons for friends.   
 To be able to recognize the other in their uniqueness is a form of communicative work.  
To move beyond encountering someone and typifying them, objectifying them as one body 
among many, we must perform a series of communicative acts.  Anton (2002) wrote, “Common 
sense, as informed by modern science, tells us that persons and the world are things” (p. 185). 
Ong suggested, in The Barbarian Within (1962), that “At the heart of the linguistic situation” and 
“at the heart of all human operations of understanding” is a “twinning” (p. 42).  This 
foundational process of human intellect is a setting apart.  When we say “this,” this is “not that.”  
Ong wrote that “Man knows compendo et dividend” (p. 42).  Ong called our setting apart 
binarism, and says it is “endemic in human intellect” (p. 43).  In breaking down, we do objectify 
and dehumanize others, but, this process also is how we come to know and understand others.   
The word for friend and the thought of friend are neither the same sort of thing as the 
sensorily present friend.  The reason for this is because, as Ong argued, “The paradigmatic sense 
of presence is the presence of one conscious human being to another” (2017, p. 24).  Ong is very 
explicit about the idea that we have an actual sense of presence, as in SENSE, a felt sense of 
other persons.  He works through an example of a chair, to a plant, to a subhuman, to an animal 
to show that we as humans have very different senses of the presence of objects and things 
before us, and humans before us.  What differentiates this full sense, as in what makes human 





reciprocity.  Ong asked us to imagine the emptiness of an animal’s eye in understanding the 
problem with reciprocity.  While to encounter another we need not ever have a reciprocated 
awareness, for particularity to occur reciprocity is required.   
This mutual recognition is foundational for friendship or any intimate relationship.   In 
his interview “Why Talk,” conducted by Walter Altree (1973), Ong discussed the nature of our 
isolation in thought and the role that communication plays in building intimacy.  It is impossible 
due to our human limits to ever completely understand another without a doubt.  The closest we 
can get to another is an estimation, and this is achieved through their communicative acts and our 
interpretation.  Ong writes: 
Even a husband and wife never find out what it feels like to be the other.  They try, they 
get awfully close.  But no matter what, each of us remains isolated in his or her own 
consciousness, each one in his own little prison.  (2000, p. 374) 
The isolation, though, is also our grace.  Ong notes that our ability to distinguish I from others, to 
set apart, is the foundation of our ability to communicate.   
Shared Interiors 
Words are at the fundamental level the opening of consciousness to the other for the 
sharing of interiority.  All thought and all communication are only possible through relationships 
with others, and Ong says that all communication “goes on in a context of belief” (year, p. 265).  
All communication, no matter in which form, expects a response.  When we speak to others, we 
are making a statement about our belief in their existence. Ong wrote that each communicative 
act we engage in with another is a recognition, a recognition of “a presence to whose word I can, 





265).  In turning and communicating with another person, we believe them to be alive and 
capable of reciprocating.  Anton stated that “presence and interiority” are key to understanding 
the basic fact of Ong’s phenomenology—that “persons...are interiorities who are present in 
voice” (p. 74). We believe in their existence in each communicative action we partake.   
Triadic Intentionality 
  For Anton, intentionality provides a pathway for understanding person and world that 
avoids the various problems associated with the objectification of other inherent in language 
itself that we see as problematic in other ontologies.  Anton proposed an understanding of the 
triadic structure of intentionality that is useful here in an understanding of how intentionality 
gives rise to voice and interiority.  Anton (2002) explained that the three components of 
intentionality are:  intentios (“intentional activities), intentums (“their correlative intended 
objects), and a peculiar proper (“specific intendableness”) (p. 187).   Anton clarified that “When 
we consider some object, any object at all, our object is not in ‘the object itself,’ but rather in the 
object given its ‘intendableness’”  (p. 188).  He used a pen for an example, and here, I would like 
to substitute instead the word friend to show how this triadic structure is important to 
understanding the relationship between interiority, particularity, and friendship.  On one hand, 
there is “an act of seeing, the object begin seen, and the seeableness” of the friend.  He also noted 
perhaps we instead think through the “touchableness” of the friend.  In this case, there is the act 
of touching, the friend being touched, and the touchableness of the friend.  He told us to “Note 
that the thing seen and the thing touched are the same, and yet are manifested differently 
according to the differing manners of making contact” (p. 188).  This, he argued, shows that 
“This intentional relatedness implies that any perceived entity in so far as it is perceived, is an 





project is that “‘intendableness’ cannot be reductively isolated to deriving either from the world 
or from the subject.  It is, on the contrary, a dialogic constitution” (p. 188).  In the everyday 
realm of encounter, the natural attitude, the mundane then, drawing from our earlier point, Anton 
would argue that “intentional threads, while pre-reflective, are taut such that the ‘intentio’ is 
absent and we mindlessly dwell in the ‘intentum.’” (p. 189).  The givenness of our friends is 
manifested via voice in a context of belief.  We mindlessly dwell in our communication with our 
friends, their interiors given to us.   
When we hear our friend, for example, rarely if ever are we focused on the hearing itself 
and instead “dwell in what is heard” (p. 189).  We also do this with speech.  We speak without 
attending to the fact that we are speaking.  And, if we take this further, we can see that we listen 
without attending to the fact that a friend is speaking or that we are listening, we instead dwell in 
what the words make manifest, that is the interior of the other and especially their uniqueness.   
He also points out that we are not singularly experiencing one sense and no others, but instead, 
we can imagine that we dwell in the existence of our friend no matter how we encounter them, 
that is, what is primarily in focus as another speaks to us.   In those moments in which we 
confirm our friend as unique, and they confirm us as unique, we hardly pause to utter, “Wow, 
you are unique.”  Rather, in the process of the revelation of interiors, we recognize something 









Voice in a Context of Belief 
In the previous chapter, when we discussed the different possibilities for an encounter, 
within these encounters communication was not a required component.  While an encounter is 
communicative, it does not rely on the sharing of a communicative environment.  Also, 
communication does not necessarily lead to particularity.  While all reaching out might be 
revelatory of an interior, it is not necessarily recognized as this interior.  Voice is the revelation 
of this particular interior.  Friendship requires mutual recognition of each friend’s interior.   
Voice is exterior for Ong, and all communication is a break out of our own interior and 
an attempt to grasp the other (2002).   All communication is in a way a breakthrough into 
interior, but dialogue specifically leads to particularity.  Ong notes that “this dialogue assures me 
also of the uniqueness of your consciousness and of its ultimate inviolability” (p. 270).  We will 
discuss dialogue and friendship later, and this dwelling in the givenness will be important.  
Anton has argued that voice for Ong “is not only the paradigmatic sound in the human world, but 
it is also a key phenomenon for understanding persons” (2012, p. 73).  Is voice only possible 
however through sound?   
While Ong (2000) does not exclude the ability for the presence of interiority to be made 
clear through strictly sound, he does privilege sound.  He wrote that “true interiority is 
communicative” (p. 117).  However, sound, he argued, conveys more information about physical 
and psychological elements.  While he noted sound’s ability to convey interiors in space, such as 
a cave, he does recognize that hearing is not the only way in which we can explore interiors of 
objects in general.  He noted that both movement and touch can convey information about 
interiors.  But again, there is a danger in placing the same weight in human beings as we would 





human history.  Dance (1989) writes, regarding sound’s primacy to paradigmatic human 
dialogue:    
Ong senses that this initial utterance may constitute the primal means of knowing—of 
knowing other, of knowing self, of knowing outside, of knowing inside.  This 
utterance of self may well be the primal noetic which allows the human being to 
make known to itself and to others its ‘I.’  (p. 188) 
Sound is particularly important in the “revelation of the other” (Dance, 1989, p. 186)—their 
interiority, their thoughts, their words.  Soukup (2012) wrote, “Sound reveals the interior.  The 
social structures of all human life presume those interiors” (p. 41).  Soukup wrote of the ability 
of sound to establish a sense of immediacy and simultaneity, although texting can now be nearly 
as simultaneous as spoken conversation if one’s physical skills and technological access allows.   
Our senses form our place of being in the world, Ong explained how sound, specifically, 
shapes our being.  Ong wrote on the topic of simultaneity that, “Because it situates me in the 
midst of a world, sound conveys simultaneity” (p. 130).  Sound, he suggested, establishes a sense 
of the present in presence.  When we are in actual physical presence, we share everything going 
on at oncedness.  In addition to simultaneity, sound is also connected to human thought.  Ong 
wrote that sound “has proved in all cultures the most immediate sensory coefficient of thought” 
(p. 140) and again, this is correlated with our interactions with others.  There is a direct 
connection between thought and sound.  Still, though, this does not mean that voice is only 
possible through sound.   
 Ong asks us when pondering voice, to consider what might happen when the speaker 





be “what happens to voice and belief when the other person is behind the screen?”  Drawing 
from Heidegger, Buber, and Lavelle, Ong showed us that the other’s “sense of self remains 
outside my direct awareness, and yet I can feel its aura and know that there is some interiority 
with whom I am dealing” (2002, p. 268).  In the contact we make with the other, Ong argues that 
it is “mediated by exterior phenomena that implements commerce between interiors” (p. 269).  
Brook (2002) worked from Ong.  She argued that “sight alone” cannot “deal with interiors” and 
that “other senses can help to reconstitute the interiority of experience” (p. 70).  She continued:  
Focusing on the other senses, the way we can and sometimes do use them presents the 
interiors in a way it could be argued is closer to them as given.  That is, the encounter 
with interiors in the world which carries a veracity to the experience and to the interiors 
themselves. (p. 74)  
Givenness is essential here for this idea and brings us back to the earlier discussion of Anton. 
When we add our voice to a communicative event, we are giving our interior.  If we imagine an 
impersonal conversation, quite scripted, there is no revelation of voice and hence no true sharing 
this particular interior.  We might stand next to someone in the elevator and comment on the 
weather.  This is a manifestation of interior, but it reveals nothing really about the self and the 
words could belong to anyone.  But the revelatory of voice moves us again from an to this.  In 
our comments on the weather, if we move from a general script to a revelation about our 
childhood and a snowstorm we remembered, we then have added our voice.  In such a 
conversation, it is possible that our revelation may not be noticed, nor may be reciprocated.  It 
may be recognized, but not reciprocated.  But, in revealing our voice, we are giving something 






A Side Note—Buber’s Confirmation and Particularity 
 There are elements of this discussion that may sound similar to scholars of Buber’s work.  
Having been influenced by the work of Walter J. Ong, I cannot ignore that he was influenced 
greatly by the work of Buber.  While this section specifically does not draw from Buber, one of 
the main themes throughout Buber’s works was that of confirmation.  Sarah Scott, philosophy 
scholar, wrote in the peer-reviewed Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry that for Buber, It 
is “In confirmation one meets, chooses and recognizes the other as a subject with the capacity to 
actualize one’s own potential. In order for confirmation to be complete one must know that he is 
being made present to the other” (n.p.).  She drew our attention to the fact that “confirmation is 
not the same as acceptance or unconditional affirmation of everything the other says or does” 
(n.p.).  She continued that “Since we are not born completely focused and differentiated and 
must struggle to achieve a unified personality, sometimes we have to help an “other” to actualize 
themselves against their own immediate inclination” (n.p.).  Scott identifies several terms that 
Buber uses to “describe the grasp of the other that is necessary for confirmation” in the I-Thou 
relationship including; ‘embrace,’ ‘inclusion,’ ‘imagining the real,’ and ‘synthesizing 
apperception’” (n.p.) and this rings true of elements we have seen and will see throughout this 
work on friendship.  
 One hesitancy with using the term and instead choosing the term particularity in this 
work is related to the psychologizing of the term for the field of psychotherapy swept up and 
adapted as part of the self-actualization hierarchy.  Friedman (1988) traces the adaptation and 
conversation with the work of Carl Rogers related to confirmation.  Friedman wrote that “Buber 





into the separate psyches of the participants” (2005, p. 29).   Confirmation cannot occur 
intrinsically.  Instead, it can only manifest between persons.  Friedman added: 
Being made present, as a person is the heart of what Buber calls confirmation. 
Confirmation is interhuman, but it is not simply social or interpersonal. Unless one is 
confirmed in one’s uniqueness as the person one can become, one is only seemingly 
confirmed. The confirmation of the other must include an actual experiencing of the other 
side of the relationship so that one can imagine quite concretely what another is feeling, 
thinking, perceiving, and knowing.  (p. 29-30).   
Technological Implications 
Soukup (2004), an Ong student and friend, wrote concerning belief that “Electronic 
media include either delay or distance; they require both a belief in the interlocutor and a belief 
about the media” (p. 7).  Soukup, concerning electronic communication and interiority, 
explained, “In creating written words, a writer must also create an audience—not the immediacy 
of another interiority who will call forth the writer’s interior, but an artificial, imaged person” (p. 
9).  He continued, “Here, too, we come to belief that, for the writer create a text as something 
separate from the writer’s own interior and separate from any actual person.  The possibility of 
writing exists in the imaged other, but gives up the possibility of an interactive response” (p. 9).  
He further added that “The notion of response to a presence, to a voiced word, disappears and is 
attenuated to behavior” (p. 9).  Later, again related to electronic media and the notion of voice, 
Soukup asked if electronic media invite us or summon us to belief.  He explained that “They, 
like writing, are artifacts, objects separated from us; unlike writing, they speak with their own 
voice, although it is voice deferred.  And, like writing, these newer communication forms share 





language of interiority, it can invoke these possibilities with any medium.  Voice is what 
summons a belief in the other.  Voice is not the sound of the other but instead the combination of 
words that are strung together to reach out from inside the other.   
 Soukup (2004) explained that “The voice, as Ong notes, implies not only the self and 
interiority; it implies a divided self as well, for every speaker simultaneously takes on the role of 
listener” (p. 10).  Soukup brings to the forefront the notion of rhetoric.  He summarized Ong’s 
1977 essay “From Mimesis to Irony.”  He writes, “Formal oral performances have both a 
particular audience situation and a particular rhetoric.  This implies that each frame has its own 
rhetoric and its own rhetoric situation.  The voice in its immediacy summons the hearer to belief” 
(p. 11).  Continuing on, he wrote, “The voice in its immediacy summons the hearer to belief.  
Rhetoric here fosters a shared interiority, a shared understanding of the world” (p. 11).     He 
added that “The dramatic performance, in contrast, with its characters and masks summons belief 
through a rhetoric of imagination.  This rhetoric calls forth roles, including the role of belief” (p. 
11).  Each medium then has a specific rhetorical situation that summons belief.  There is a 
difference between performative and descriptive acts, Soukup noted.  He wrote, “Each frame, 
each medium, adds something to the language and thus to the relationships that we humans 
enter” (p. 11).  He then explained that “If the living voice summons us to belief through its 
immediacy, it makes a double claim:  Whatever the locutionary status, a word of address 
summons us to belief in the other and belief that the other’s locution has the status that it claims” 
(p. 11-12).  He continued, “Another way to put this is that the locution’s content (meaning) 
makes a claim on us to belief in the voice of the speaker” (p. 12).  Then, drawing from The 
Pragmatics of Human Communication¸ Soukup pointed out that “Every word of address does at 





hearer” (p. 12).  In addition to belief about the person, Soukup also noted that electronic requires 
a belief “about the medium, its fidelity, its reliability, its transparency” (p. 12).  When we send a 
text message, for example, we believe that our message will be received. 
Interior can be revealed through mediated means.  Voice is projectable through mediated 
means.  Reciprocal recognition, too, is possible through mediated settings.  Just like walking on 
to an elevator, mediated communication can certainly be scripted and reveal nothing.  However, 
in sending a message out there in which I reveal this interior, I am believing that it can be 
received and often, it is received.  I might send a message to a friend about a snowstorm, and that 
friend, hours later, can certainly respond in a way recognizes my unique interior and our 
asynchronous communication can be a reciprocal recognition of the other’s unique interior—we 
have entered the space of particularity.   
Soukup (2004) explained mediated belief like this:  “The frame again interposes an 
additional relationship message:  not ‘Here is a content,’ but “here is (1) a content at a distance, 
(2) a relationship with a person addressing you, and (3) a relationship to the frame that is far 
away from you” (p. 12).  Ultimately, Soukup concluded at the end that electronic media can 
relay belief, but only through “layers of hermeneutic action” (p. 14).  He wrote, “The more 
unlike the frame of utterance to the immediacy of voice, the more extended the demands for 
interpretation” (p. 14).  He wrote, “The frames of secondary orality pose challenges that foster a 
hermeneutic of suspicion” (p. 14).  The idea of the hermeneutic of suspicion and the increased 
need for interpretation in our media-saturated world moves us to the next section of this work, 
where we will examine the interplay of digitization and dialogue.  Zlatic wrote, “new media can 
promote personalist encounters in original ways” (p. 31).  Related to speech, Zlatic (2004) wrote, 





written, printed, or digitalized, cannot escape this grounding” (p. 34). All discourse then allows 
for the call from one unique interior to the next. 
 In the last chapter, we noted that technology was advancing in ways that allowed for the 
human encounter to radically change. The goal of this chapter was to examine how particularity 
emerges from an encounter, and to examine whether or not it could still occur outside of the 
face-to-face communicative setting.  Particularity emerges in the reciprocal development of 
voice, and voice, as we saw here, is the language of interiority.  Interiority can be conjured 
through all human discourse.    
In the next chapter, we will continue the conversation by visiting Ong’s work on 
depersonalization and hermeneutics.  In addition to Ong, Buber and Schutz will also be utilized 
to gain insight in the relationship between talk, text, and technology.   Jumping off from the 
nature of human thought in this chapter, the next chapter delves deeper into the ways in which 







Dialogue and Digitization:  The Language of Friendship 
“Ultimately the bond of all companionship, whether in marriage or in friendship, is 
conversation.” 
– Oscar Wilde  
One of the most pressing issues that Ong explored at the end of his life was the 
increasingly difficult problem of hermeneutics in an electronic world.  Two years ago, his final 
manuscript was posthumously published, Language as Hermeneutic.  Of particular concern for 
Ong was depersonalization.  Farrell, in the introduction to Presence of the Word, explained that 
for Ong, depersonalization refers to “situations in which we no longer advert to a person or are 
aware that someone is speaking” (p. xix).  Farrell added that what Ong meant was that “we do 
not advert to the person behind the word, so to speak, the human voice from which such an 
utterance might come because the written or printed texts with words seem to detach them from a 
person” (p. xix).  As mediated communication became standard practice and many of our regular 
interactions now occurred through a screen, this continues to be a concern.   
Depersonalization is more than just an occurrence related to textual communication.  
Buber, in his work on dialogue, recognized that humans naturally flow from I-Thou orientations 
to I-It.  It is a feature of human communication—one so problematic that Buber dedicated much 
of his scholarship to exploring its effects.  One way depersonalization manifests with current 
technology is related to the reduction of the other as an information-giving tool rather than a 
person.  Bakardjieva  (2005) explained that we “suffer” through a series of reductions which 
include “intensity and spontaneity, of reciprocity and tangibility” (p. 65).  As we will see later 
though, the association of reduction with loss is sometimes wrong.  In the previous chapters, we 





will begin by reviewing some of the basic tenets of the work of Martin Buber on dialogue.  
Buber’s work greatly influenced Walter Ong, particularly Ong’s work on presence.  His accounts 
of presence, belief, and voice were grounded ultimately in Buber’s conceptualization of dialogue 
(Farrell, 2012).  While Ong’s admiration for Buber is clear throughout his works, I have 
struggled to find a connection between Schutz and Buber.  At the time of writing, I have found 
only one piece of literature examining common themes and connections between Buber and 
Schutz.  Grinnell (1983) studied the use of the “Pure we” in Schutz and compared it to Buber’s 
“I-Thou.”  Grinnell noted, “fundamental to both Schutz and Buber are the notions that 
intersubjectivity is tied to the lived presence of the self with other” (p. 185).  Martin Buber was 
born in 1878 in Vienna.  Schutz was born about two decades later in 1899, also in Vienna.  Both 
were born into Jewish families.  Both attended the University of Vienna, although Schutz studied 
law and was there about two decades after Buber who studied philosophy.  While there is no 
explicit connection, Schutz's work on interpretation can inform our understanding of dialogue in 
this work.   
The central concern for this chapter is not whether dialogue is necessary for friendship. It 
is.  Nor is it whether dialogue is possible via mediated settings.  It is.   This chapter instead 
shows that while dialogue can occur online, there are several implications associated with the 
nature of our interpretations of others that are unique to our electronic age.  All communication 
is hermeneutic. Dialogue, the language of friendship, is hermeneutic.  Technologically-mediated 
communication has altered our understanding of others.  Zlatic (2017) explained that “All 
language use is hermeneutic” and “all writing is digitization” (p. 371)  Sara van der Berg, Ong 
scholar and co-editor of Language as Hermeneutic,  wrote in the introduction that “Ong set forth 





people; all language is hermeneutic; and digital technologies evoke interpretation as a corrective 
to the apparent totalizing of information that the dichotomous structure of digitization conveys” 
(2017, p. 2).    To address and explore the implication of these issues on friendship in our age, 
this chapter begins by drawing from Buber and Ong to overview the basics of dialogue.  It then 
transitions to Schutz to explore how our interpretation of others and the surrounding world is 
communicative.  After, Ong’s thoughts on textual communication are overviewed to respond to 
several current themes that need to be re-examined in today’s world.  It concludes by making 
connections to technologies today and friendship.   
Dialogue 
When we think of the term dialogue, we are likely to imagine a conversation between two 
people.  Perhaps we might imagine the dialogue in a movie or in a fiction text where the narrator 
breaks and the characters then talk.  Dialogue though is more than words.  Friedman (1965a) a 
Buber scholar, wrote that “genuine dialogue can take place in silence, whereas much 
conversation is really monologue” (p. xvii).  For Buber, human dialogue is grounded in “the 
sign” (1965a, p. 4).  Specifically, he argued that “the sign” meant “sound and gesture” (p. 4).  He 
added, though, that written language actually can be considered dialogue in “special 
circumstances” (p. 4).  The example of a special circumstance that he used was two friends 
sitting in a meeting passing notes back and forth.  In this setting, the friends are engaged in 
dialogue.  He added that the absence of sound and gesture (sign) does not eliminate the 
possibility of dialogue, however, it would be impossible for an outsider to understand the nature 
of the dialogue of silence without being an active participant.  Farrell, in the introduction to the 
2000 edition of Ong’s Presence of the Word, also wrote of the special relationship of silence to 





paradigmatically in live conversation, and perhaps in moments of silence together, too” (p. 
xix).   While dialogue is more than just words, they are an important element of dialogue.  
Silence has word-dependent meaning.   
Words and language play central roles in authentic dialogue and lead to the creation of a 
realm of mutual meaning between two persons.   Buber noted that there are three specific modes 
of our being in the world related to our utterances.  He called them “present continuance, 
potential possession, and actual occurrence” (1965b, p. 110).  Potential possession, he explained, 
is “the totality of what has ever been uttered in a certain realm of language” (p. 110).   Actual 
occurrence is “its spokenness” and he explained that what sets it apart from the other two is that 
it presupposes “a historical acquisition” (p. 110).  For Buber, present continuance is the “totality 
of that which can be spoken in a particular realm of language in a particular segment of time, 
regarded from the point of view of the person who is able to say what is to be said” (p. 110).  The 
importance of present continuance here Buber argued is that it is the foundation for both 
“genuine author” and “genuine dialogue’ (p. 110).  Genuine dialogue lacks scripting.  Scripting 
is a limitation of the words and utterances that can and should be said in a particular place at a 
particular time.  Scripted dialogue finds its existence outside the between of the two participants 
as such, it has no place in the spontaneity and generative space of genuine dialogue.   
 The ‘between’ two persons is an important element of dialogue.  Both Buber and Ong 
recognize the social nature of thought and its place in language.  Thinking is speaking to oneself.  
From their points of view, thought is only possible because of language. While thought can be 
spontaneous, and it may be generative in the sense of a new idea, it lacks its generation in the 
shared space that emerges between two persons in dialogue. Ong argued, “The origins of thought 





itself” (2000, p. 140).  He added, “As we know it, thought appears only in a linguistic setting” (p. 
145).  He added, “There is a limitless variety of nonverbal activity connected to thinking, but 
when our thought is fully developed, it manifests itself as verbalized, although the thought may 
be interior and the word not thinking” (p. 145).  For Ong, to be generative thought still has to be 
verbalized so that it can become part of our ongoing language.  To be able to alter language 
means to be brought into being between persons, which again highlights the generative nature of 
language.   
Buber called the “between” “the oscillating sphere between the persons” (1965b, p. 112).  
Buber showed that the between is a dynamic space that emerges between two people who come 
together in genuine dialogue.  It comes into being with communicative work and can disappear.  
It is not permanent between two persons.  It requires a turning of being towards the other in 
complete truthfulness. The between is a generative space for both meaning and being.  This is 
how dialogue becomes the language of friendship.  As we discussed in the previous chapter, the 
reciprocal recognition of being, particularity, is an important element of friendship.  This 
emerges through dialogue in the between.  To show exactly how in the space of the between 
through genuine dialogue, friends are mutually received in their givenness and confirmed as their 
unique selves, Buber’ writes the following in Knowledge of Man (1965b):   
Relation is fulfilled in a full making present when I think of the other not merely as this 
very one, but experience, in the particular approximation of the given moment, the 
experience belonging to him this very one.  Here and now for the first time does the other 
become a self for me, and the making independent of his being which was carried out in 
the first moment of distancing is shown in a new highly pregnant sense as a 





understood not in psychological but in a strictly ontological sense, and should therefore 
rather be called ‘becoming a self with me.’  But it is ontologically complete only when 
the other knows that he is made present by me in his self and when this knowledge 
induces the process of his inmost self-becoming. (p. 71)   
But also in this space, the meaning of the relationship itself as friendship is co-created and given 
meaning.  In addition to the creation of Thou, the meaning of friendship itself is co-created in the 
dialogic space of the between.  Wright (1978) wrote that because friendship lacks formal 
constraints and definitions, it is solely dependent on interpretation.    
In his 2009 work, The Compass of Friendship, Rawlins set the stage for dialogue as 
necessary for human friendship.  He wrote that “Time together, straightforward talk, shared 
stories, and mutual respect produce the ‘co-knowledge’ of creating friendships” (p. 1) and that 
friendships are a space for the co-creation of “deep understandings allowing for shared moral 
visions and rights unique to their friendship” (p. 1-2).  Dialogue moves friends to a space in 
which a co-creation of a meaningful existence is possible.  Regarding interpretation and 
hermeneutics, Rawlins (2009) wrote, “Our perceptual process of noting similarities and 
differences goes on constantly, even as we act and communicate in ways that change their 
significance or create new alignments among them” (p. 17).  Like in the previous chapters, we 
come to know others by setting them apart and coming together—distancing and drawing near.   
Interpretation 
In the dialogue of friendship, the interpretive process is reciprocal and ever-changing.  
Cocking and Kennett (1998) wrote, “It is not that I must reveal myself to, or see myself in, the 





interests and to their way of seeing me” (p. 505).  Because of the receptivity and reciprocity, 
beyond the meaning-making of the friendship itself and the visibility of the unique self, Cocking 
and Kennett argued that we then “develop in a way that is particular to the relationship” (p. 505).  
They added, “the self my friend sees is, at least in part, a product of the friendship” (p. 505).   
For Cocking and Kennett (1998), this interpretative process is key for the flourishing of the 
friendship.  Helm (2010) slightly disagreed with Cocking and Kennett.  He did believe that they 
were correct in the important role that friendship plays in our lives, but that they were wrong 
when they attributed “our receptivity to direction and interpretation” as dispositional and 
internal.  Instead, he argued that we need a normative perspective.  This is important, because 
while the meaning of friendship is created in the ‘between,’ there are certain normative 
constraints imposed from the outside that direct friendship that we discussed in our first chapter.   
These normative constraints are part of our stock of knowledge that informs how we 
interpret others and our relationships.   Schutz drew from Husserl but also diverged from him, 
dismissing transcendental intersubjectivity and instead placed intersubjectivity in the mundane.  
In Collected Papers I (1973), Schutz thoroughly addressed analogic apperception.  Husserl (and 
multiple other phenomenologists, including Ong) have argued that human thought is binary.  
Schutz wrote, “Husserl, in the later period of his life, studied the general phenomenon of paring 
or coupling which is, according to him, a general feature of our consciousness” (p. 294).  At a 
very basic level, if we are “copresent” with a table, we see only one part of the table but know it 
as “table.”  Here, Schutz wrote, that “this perception of the visible front side of the object 
involves an apperception by analogy of the unseen backside, an apperception which, to be sure, 





we walked around the object”  (p. 295).  We fill in the missing pieces in our perception to create 
a whole.  
 We have particular expectations about the un-sensed portion of the object based on our 
stock of knowledge, and our expectations (anticipations) may not be entirely correct.  Schutz 
explained that: 
we may say that the frontside, which is apperceived in immediacy or given to us in 
presentation, appresents the unseen backside in an analogical way, which, however, does 
not mean by way of an inference by analogy.  The appresenting term, that which is 
present in immediate apperception is coupled or paired with the appresented pair. (1973, 
p. 295). 
We discussed this twinning in chapter three, also, related to the uniqueness of friendship. Being 
in the world, we piece together discrete experiences to create a flowing stream of continuity in 
perception.   
A Side Note—Husserl’s Contribution 
 To perceive means filling in the gaps.  When we perceive a chair, we know it as a chair, 
although we might only see one dimension of the chair.  When we perceive a friend, we fill in 
the gaps but we fill them in in a much more complex way.  In any case, the entire perception 
draws from retentions and protentions—we recollect and anticipate the future of the intentional 
object in a single perception.   The protention is the biggest interest here.  If I am with a person, I 
assume they are real without question in the everyday natural attitude.  I draw from all of my 





as my prior experiences with others, and from non-interactions but recipes that have been 
socially passed to me.  When it comes to a chair, or a desk, or a tree, what comes to mind is the 
essential characteristics which make the object what it is, above all other objects.  This is the 
eidectic reduction.   
 Schutz draws from Husserl specifically in his framing of intersubjectivity and its 
relationship to temporality.  In On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time 
(1964), Husserl attempted to uncover the flow of duration in experience when the content of our 
experience is a series of nows.  Time, he argues, consists of a now, a retention, and protention.  
Events that are “just now” become just past.  They are no longer a “present melody” Husserl 
explained, but accumulate in memory.  All perception is not lost, but instead becomes retained in 
consciousness.  If I experience cold, I retain that feel of the cold.  Merleu-Ponty in 
Phenomenology of Perception (2002) wrote:   
Husserl uses the terms protentions and retentions for the intentionalities which anchor me 
to an environment. They do not run from a central I, but from my perceptual field itself, 
so to speak, which draws along in its wake its own horizon of retentions, and bites into 
the future with its protentions. I do not pass through a series of instances of now, the 
images of which I preserve and which, placed end to end, make a line. With the arrival of 
every moment, its predecessor undergoes a change: I still have it in hand and it is still 
there, but already it is sinking away below the level of presents; in order to retain it, I 
need to reach through a thin layer of time. It is still the preceding moment, and I have the 
power to rejoin it as it was just now; I am not cut off from it, but still it would not belong 
to the past unless something had altered, unless it were beginning to outline itself against, 





moment arrives, the second undergoes a new modification; from being a retention it 
becomes the retention of a retention, and the layer of time between it and me thickens. (p. 
485) 
 All of our experience in the flow of duration is made up of just now, just past, and 
immediately next.  In the now, we anticipate what may happen next.  It is not a slow, paused, 
intentional anticipation but an automatic feature of our experience.   In doing so, the next instant 
projections are our protentions.  Our perception is experienced as duration, however, should we 
direct our intentional powers toward duration the content of our consciousness now shifts in the 
experience.  Schutz (1970a) adapted Husserl’s project on temporality to explore human action, 
which for Schutz is communicative action.  He wrote that: 
A special problem as to the anticipations of future events originates, however, in the 
sphere of human action.  For the purpose of this paper the term ‘action’ shall designate 
human conduct as an ongoing process that is devised by the actor in advance, that is, 
based on  a preconceived project.  (p. 289) 
Schutz argues that “All projecting consist in an anticipation of future conduct by way of 
phantasying” (p. 289).  Projection, for Schutz, is more than just phantasying. There is the act of 
imagination, but there is also “motivated phntasying,” he argued.  He added “motivated by the 
anticipated supervening intention of the carrying out the project” (p. 289).  For Schutz, there is a 
limiting factor on the imagined, the motivated, and the real.  He wrote,   
The practicability of carrying out the projected action within the imposed fram of reality 
of the Lebensweltt is an essential characteristic of the project.  This refers, however, to 





actions means that according to my present knowledge at hand the projected action, at 
least as to its type, would have been feasible if the action had occurred in the past. (p. 
289) 
He added in another text: 
Any experience refers likewise to the future.  It carries along protentions of occurrences 
expected to follow immediately—they are so called by Husserl as a counterpart to 
retentions---and anticipations of temporally more distant events with which the present 
experiences is expected to be related.  In commonsense thinking these anticipations and 
expectations follow basically the typical structures that have held good so far for our past 
experiences and are incorporated in our stock of knowledge at hand” (1970b, p. 137) 
Analogic Apperception 
We also do the same in our experiences with others.  Schutz (1996) explained that our 
experience of others is incomplete.  He wrote, “I have experienced only some discrete stretches 
of the enduring life of the Other” (p. 201).  He added, “I know his past--up to the present 
moment—only intermittently and it is not likely that my encounters with him coincided with 
what were his truly ‘relevant moments,’ moments he considered and continues to consider to be 
of great relevance for him” (p. 201).  We are incapable of truly ever having complete access to 
the Other’s experience.  Schutz explained that “this is so because I lack the knowledge both of 
the relevant factors of his past life and of the intrinsically personal effects they had on him and 
co-determine his present feelings and decisions” (p. 201).  Ultimately, at this very basic level of 
meeting, we can say that “The total present of the Other, including memories of his that are co-





accessibility, we make particular inferences about that inaccessibility of others, drawing from our 
stock of knowledge.  Particularly with our friends, Briggle (2008) pointed out that the 
accumulation of knowledge we build about our friends allows us to make decisions in their best 
interest, even in their absence.   
Every day, we encounter various objects.  Schutz wrote that “Among those objects which 
we experience in the vivid present are other people’s behavior and thoughts” (1970b, p. 166).  As 
we listen to another person speaking, Schutz argued, “we participate in the immediate present of 
the other’s thought” (p. 166).  Schutz showed us that we are unable to grasp our stream of 
thought in the vivid present.  Instead, we can only reflect.  Should one, however, stop to think 
about the grasping of that stream of thought, I no longer experience it but instead now reflect.  
Schutz (1976) wrote, “My experience of the fellow-man is direct as long as I am 
straightforwardly engaged in the We-relation, that is, as long as I participate in the common 
stream of our experiences.  If I think and reflect on our experience, this directness is broken” (p. 
26).  Essentially, our partner becomes an object—the object of thought.  As discussed earlier, 
objectification and depersonalization are issues that stem from the nature of human thought and 
language, as we continuously draw from our stock of knowledge and apply information, 
sometimes incorrectly, to guide our interactions.   
Maines showed that friendships are both personal and categorical, and as such, a 
relational label emerges (not categorical).  We draw on our typifications to structure the 
relationship.   To further emphasize how this is important to friendship and social relationships in 





In the pure We-relation, I apprehend only the existence of a fellow-man and the fact that 
he is confronting me.  For a concrete social relation to become established, however, I 
must also know how he is oriented to me.  In face-to-face situations I gain knowledge of 
this specific aspect of my partner’s conscious life by observing the concrete manifestation 
of his subjective experiences in the common stream of the We-relation. (p. 27) 
Continuing from Schutz in Collected Papers I, he wrote “that the We-relation as such transcends 
the existence of either consociate within the paramount reality” and he continued that it “can be 
appresented only by symbolization” (p. 353).  He noted that “My friend is to me and I am to him 
an element of the reality of everyday life” (p. 353).  He added, “But our friendship surpasses our 
individual situation within the finite province of meaning of the paramount reality” (p. 353).  For 
Schutz, the parties to the situation are those which define the particulars of that situation.  He 
adds that “A joint interest makes them partners, and the idea of partnership is perhaps the most 
general term for appresented We-relation” (p. 354).  All types of human social relationships rely 
on appresentation to various degrees, even friendship.   
Schutz advanced the idea that all of our encounters are filtered through our scheme of 
interpretation which is our stock of knowledge.  Not only do all encounters become interpreted 
that way, but as we are with our friend, we add to our stock of knowledge about that specific 
person and the relationship itself, which then becomes a reference point from which we 
understand the other person.  Through repeat encounters, a social relationship emerges and our 
ability to interpret the other becomes more accurate.   
Related to our apprehensions of other persons whom we are no longer in corporeal co-
presence with, Schutz argued that we do so by “means of a fixed concept, or type, derived 





of someone through another person, that is, mediated by a second person, Schutz explained that 
“I have no concrete vivid picture of my own with which to start:  I must depend on what my 
friend tells me” and “I have to depend on my friend’s assumption, not my own, that the 
contemporary he is describing has not changed” (p. 223).  When we are oriented to the other, or 
aware of their presence, Schutz said that this “serves to call attention to the peculiar way in 
which I apprehend the conscious experiences of my contemporaries” (1970b, p. 225).  He argued 
that “I apprehend them as anonymous processes’ (p. 225).  He called this a “They-orientation” 
and contrasted it to a “Thou-orientation.”  He wrote, “When I am Thou-oriented, I apprehend the 
other person’s experiences within their setting in his stream of consciousness” (p. 225).  He 
wrote, that our awareness in the They-orientation is an abstraction and “My knowledge of my 
contemporaries is, therefore, inferential and discursive” (p. 225).  Because all language is 
hermeneutic and because of the nature of human consciousness, all knowledge of all others is 
inferential and discursive.   
In The Social Construction of Reality (1996), drawing heavily from Schutz, Berger and 
Luckmann advanced the idea that our stock of knowledge at hand is the ground of all 
interpretation for all of our experience.  However, even in our face-to-face situations, they 
acknowledged three central problems.  They wrote, “the knowledge of the man who acts and 
thinks within the world of his daily life is not homogeneous; it is (1) incoherent, (2) only 
partially clear, and (3) not at all free from contradictions” (p. 75).  All interactions are 
interpretive, all communication is hermeneutic. Ong explained that there is a reciprocity in 
discourse, a reciprocity that creates as it is created.  He wrote, “Thus reciprocal discourse 
commonly interprets itself bilaterally (or multilaterally if more than two are engaged in it) as it 





hermeneutic in hermeneutics’ natural habitat” (p. 42).  Then, “Oral conversation advertises the 
intersubjectivity of all human thought and its tie-in with the intersubjectivity of expression” (p. 
42).  Ong wrote the following passage to clarify how, exactly, all language requires 
interpretation:   
There is no end to interpretation.  In its quite ordinary and simple sense, to interpret 
means to bring out what is concealed in a given manifestation, that is, in a given 
phenomenon or state of affairs providing information.  We can interpret not only 
verbalized expression, but anything that provides information:  a sense, a roll of thunder, 
a gesture, a personal attitude shown in various ways, an utterance.  (2017, p.13) 
While all communication conceals, there is a special concern when it comes to mediated 
communication.    
Hermeneutic Presence 
Don Idhe in Technology and the Lifeworld delineated the various relationships humans 
have with and through technology.  Idhe recognized the argument that pervades modern 
scholarship that “technologies are thought to take us away from ordinary and face-to-face 
experience and distance us from others, nature or even objects” (Idhe, 2010, p. 3).  Idhe, instead, 
argued from the position that “contemporary technologies actually embody or re-embody our 
fleshly experience in new ways, in interactive ways” (p. iii), and he worked to uncover “the new 
ways in which contemporary experience is transformed through new or re-embodiments” (p. iii).   
Working through Idhe and drawing from Clark’s (2008) claim that writing is extended thought, I 





encounters.   We now are in a world where we can solely encounter others via mediated settings.  
This means that we, too, also can interpret them strictly through mediation.   
Bakardjieva (2005), too, made the connection that our communication with others is 
hermeneutic.  She wrote, “The response of the Other comes to me through a hermeneutic 
relation: I–(technology– social world)” (p. 64-65).  In a hermeneutic relation, we “read” others.  
But this reading requires several extra layers of interpretive ability, including some beyond our 
control (such as access to the internet).   
 I have written earlier that “All human communicative exchange is between persons, 
human persons, their bodies, and although mediated in various forms, it is still between bodies” 
(Petricini, 2019).  When we communicate with others today, most of our communication is 
hybridized.  We interact with our closest partners both in-person and via screens.  Drawing from 
Idhe’s phenomenology, we perceive the screen and through the screen.  Whether through text, 
video, or audio, we encounter others in a filtered way.  The more we remove the other from the 
totality of our senses, the more we rely on our interpretive abilities to fill in our understanding of 
them and the less we rely on information communicated by them.   
Reduced Cues and Effects 
Up until now, the purpose has been to show the role of interpretation in dialogue to pave 
the way for the following implications.  Mediated communication has changed elements related 
to dialogue.  The conclusion that it has changed it for the worse is not supported by the research.  
Mediated dialogue is possible and requires additional levels of communicative work for success.  
There is no doubt that mediated communication reduces the available cues that aid in interpreting 
meaning when we engage in communication with other persons face to face.  Often, if we are 





facial expressions that may indicate that the words they are saying may not reflect how they feel.  
We are unable to reach out and hug them or touch them at all.  The sensory cues that make up the 
full experience of presence are absent.   
It is important to consider though the hybridized nature of today’s relationships.  It is 
nothing out of the ordinary for one to send an email to a colleague that is in the office next to 
them.  I often turn to email out of respect to her particularity.  Email creates a reminder that 
makes life easier than pop into her office, and it allows her to address my communication on her 
time, rather than intruding.  When my son was younger and was sleeping, often I would text my 
husband in the next room rather than risk a minimal whisper that would wake my son.  Rarely do 
we communicate with someone strictly via mediated settings, even our friends.  Technology has 
seemingly been transformed in response to these reduced cues.  When I travel, I can send home 
videos of my time away.  I can take pictures and receive pictures from home while I’m gone, and 
I can even call and video chat with my family at bedtime and read a story to my son.   
Failing to be attentive to the hybridized nature of most relationships has created a 
scholarship form of tunnel vision that is one problem.  Additionally, even if cues are absent, 
absence can be beneficial in various aspects of our lives and is not always indicative of loss.  
Bakardjieva wrote, “both my means of self-expression and the codes in which the social is 
represented to me have to be adapted to the structure of the mediating technology (and the social 
institutions and practices growing upon it)” (p. 65).  She cautioned us that this can be a source of 
alienation.  Ong agreed that communication technologies have created alienation.  In many 
works and lectures, he showed that reading increasingly became an interiorizing and solitary 
activity.  While they do promote alienation and objectivity, they also have promoted 





interiorizing.  They relate things to my consciousness, but they also enable me to relate my 
consciousness to itself” (2002, p. 385).   Interiorization, specifically, for Ong in this interview is 
about the fact that “Man can say ‘I’  He can come back and take possession of himself, get hold 
of his own consciousness” (2002, p. 385).  Briggle’s (2008) work also supports the idea that the 
absence created can be quite positive.  He wrote, “the reader of the written words will interpret 
them in light of his experiences” and he continued “Through this interpretive process, meanings 
emerge and indeed the very indicator itself is partly constituted by this work at the receiving 
end” (p. 77).  He continued, “Through dialogue, the written words will take on new, emergent 
meanings that suppose initial intentions on the writer’s part as they are interpreted by the reader” 
(p. 77).  He even argued that “because the act of writing plunges the friends toward great depths 
of introspections, these interpretive processes can take place at a more profound level” (p. 77).  
Walther and Parks (2002) have shown also that there are particular cues filtered out of 
mediated communication, but there are also elements of mediated communication that are not 
present in the face-to-face.  Citing multiple studies, the pair identified several benefits of 
mediated interpersonal communication.  They wrote that studies reported improved mental 
wellbeing, access to superior expertise, support, and relationships grounded in similarity (versus 
solely proximity like in the past).  Zhao explored Schutz and other relevant literature to show 
that mediated exchanges allow people to “express themselves more openly, engaging in intimate 
exchanges of feelings and thought with one another free from the concerns that constrain human 
interactions in geospace” (p. 101).   In addition to the above, there are other benefits to mediated 







Introspection and Interiority 
Zhao (2005) also noted the level of introspection necessary to communicate online.  He 
wrote, “Telling telecopresent others who we are therefore requires a level of introspection and 
reflectively that is not normally exercised in the realm of face-to-face interaction” (p. 397).  Zhao 
explained that when we are within the actual physical presence of another person, we do not 
need to describe ourselves.  He wrote, “they can see for themselves” and “they will come to 
know us over time” (p. 397).  When it comes to mediated communication though, particularly 
text-based, the cues are so filtered that it is necessary to give self-descriptions.  Zhao wrote, “in 
text-based online communications we are nothing until we type at the keyboard and others do not 
know us unless we tell them something” (p. 397).  In addition to increased self-awareness 
through text-based communication, Briggle also noted another important element—
deliberateness.  He wrote, “Writing occurs at a slower pace than speaking, which fosters the 
attentiveness and discipline to discover deeper truths about one’s nature” (p. 77).  He added 
that “It also affords greater opportunities to formulate precise langue to describe one’s character 
to articulate one’s reactions to the words of a friend” (p. 77).  He continued “This deliberateness 
can thus act as an anchor to submerge the friendship to great depths” (p. 77).  He did note that 
different types of media encourage different types of levels regarding this, e.g. email versus text.   
Particularly, related to the cues-filtered out approaches that argue that our friendship 
possibilities are limited via virtual environments due to the loss of cues, there is no guarantee 
that the richer cues in the face-to-face context enrich relationships.  Briggle wrote, “In offline 
contexts, we may encounter richer cues, but we may also often be constrained from working with 
them to do the important interpretive effort for the of building close friendships” (p. 75).  He 





Finally, one more instance in which absence can allow for deeper understanding is related 
to the judgments and stereotypes that prevent dialogue related to one’s appearance in face to face 
settings that can disappear via mediated settings.  Walther (1996) said: 
Although interpersonal impressions do accrue in CMC, the social information on which 
they are based in conveyed primarily through language.  And verbal behavior is 
commonly assumed to be more subject to our editing and control than are nonverbal 
behaviors.  Thus first impressions are highly manageable in CMC, and such social 
valuations as one is able to garner are not impeded by messy hair, lack of makeup, or 
normal imperfections, much less more pronounced physical distractors or disabilities.  (p. 
20) 
Mediated communication does distance the individual creating meaning from the words which 
are used to convey that meaning.  It fragments and digitizes communication and removes 
speakers from dialogue.  When this happens, there is an objectification of the self.  We see in our 
mediated world a great amount of concern with how one’s words appear, or one’s image appears 
via words.  Drawing from Buber, Friedman wrote that “The essential problematic of the sphere 
of the between, writes Buber, is the duality of being and seeming.  The man dominated by being 
gives himself to the other spontaneously without thinking about the image of himself awakened I 
the beholder” (p. 27).   He then explained, “The ‘seeming man’, in contrast, is primarily 
concerned with what the other thinks of him, and produces a look calculated to make himself 
appear ‘spontaneous’, ‘sincere’, or whatever he thinks will win the other’s approval. This 
‘seeming’ destroys the authentic of the life between man and man and thus the authenticity of 
human existence in general” (pp. 27-28).  But, important to note here is that Buber wrote this 





endemic to all human communication in general.  In this above work, Buber argued that all 
human relation requires a distancing.   
Phenomenological Distance and Depersonalization through Text 
Ong wrote, “A text certainly does separate an utterance from its author, who, once he or 
she has written down the text, may as well be dead” (p. 29).  In this context “A text,” is a broader 
work than the average Tweet or phone message.  That being said, when one imagines small 
fragments of type from individual “authors,” they tend to consider them “utterances.”  They are, 
without a doubt, not spoken.  They could be rehearsed, or perhaps not.  These short snippets of 
words, though, vary depending on the immediacy of response.  Take a ten-word sentence typed 
out for a Tweet, versus a ten-word sentence typed into a text message.  Here, due to the setting, 
both are text and both may say the same thing, but the anticipated response where we imagine 
others is quite different.  It seems that the degree to which various media feel separate relates to 
anonymity and intimacy.  Ong addressed this.  He wrote, “writing creates anonymous discourse, 
as has often been pointed out” (p. 45).  He continued, “But removing an utterance from its author 
is not removing it from discourse” (p. 45).  He explicitly then stated that “No utterance can exist 
outside discourse, outside a transactional setting” (p. 45).  He further clarified “Putting an 
utterance into script, then, can only interrupt discourse, string it out indefinitely in time and 
space” (p. 45).  He continued later that “Text, however, functions fully as a text (and thus in 
actuality raises consciousness) only when it reenters discourse” (p. 46).  He added, “Text can be 
made to reenter discourse, to function as utterance only by something nontextual, that is, by a 
code in a living person’s mind for converting the visual into the auditory, the code that we learn 





In Language as Hermeneutic, Ong actually tied language learning and interpretation to 
intersubjectivity itself.  He called intersubjectivity “mysterious” and argued that it “marks human 
consciousness” (p. 88), and he argued that it what underlies all language.  He wrote, “In learning 
to speak a language, the child has to learn to interpret intersubjectively” (p. 88).  He further 
added that “For a sound to function as a word, the speaker has to intend that the sound he or she 
makes so functions—that is, that the sound is not just a sound but has some specially intended 
purpose of its own” (p. 88).  Furthermore, “the speaker has to know that the hearer knows that he 
or she so intends” (p. 88).  He continued, “And all this network has to be set up initially without 
being explained in words, for it lies beneath the use of words as words” (p. 88).  Instead, he 
noted, “It lies in our intersubjectivity, in our being able to be aware and, in a way, to participate 
in and interpret the subjective consciousness of other human beings” (p. 88).  He argued, 
“Hermeneutic or interpretive activity, like intentionality, precedes as well as accompanies 
naming as such” (p. 88).  To clarify this point, Ong explained that “from the start, language 
learning is not essentially an exercise in affixing names and structuring them in relation to one 
another but is a complex hermeneutic or interpretive process...involving intersubjectivity” (p. 
88).  Whether inserting text into an ongoing discourse or engaging in face to face conversation, 
all language is hermeneutic.  Hermeneutics is concerned with showing us what is concealed.  
Ong wrote, “Interpretation or hermeneutics makes up for such missing elements, the absences 
with which all texts present us” (p. 39).  All text creates an absence of meaning outside the words 
themselves and the meaning the interpreter ascribes to those words.   
All language requires interpretation, however, the more removed from the paradigmatic 
setting, the more the individual interpreter must draw from his or her conjectures to interpret the 





more cues about others in their absence.  Soukup wrote that “Handwritten texts more urgently 
than face-to-face communication required interpretation because here people first experienced 
the absence of the author, the absence of the kind of dialogue to which that had been 
accustomed” (2012, p. 40).  Despite this, face to face communication is still paradigmatic for all 
other forms of communication.  Ong argued that in the interpretive process of the face-to-face, it 
begins before the utterance of any words.  Meaning, he explains, is always negotiated and this is 
a natural part of the ‘discursive process” (p. 40).  He wrote: 
In fact, in oral utterance the negotiation begins even before the oral utterance itself.  The 
first speaker needs to anticipate some conjectural feedback from an interlocutor before he 
or she can devise something to say or even to think.  Only if we are to some degree in the 
mind of another can we formulate our own thought, for what I say (and articulately think) 
depends on my conjectures, before I begin to speak, about your state of mind and about 
the possible range of your response.    (2017, p. 40).   
The paradigmatic form of interacting with others is the face-to-face situation.  
 All meaning is embodied, even the meaning of the being of the other.   Ong explained 
that words themselves represent.  He noted that “The re- in ‘represent’ suggests some kind of 
sense of presence antecedent to verbalization” (p. 23).  Ong asked us to understand the “the word 
for chair and the thought for chair are neither the same sort of thing as the sensorily present 
chair” (p. 23).  Zlatic (2017) wrote that for Ong, “[a]ll language use is hermeneutic because 
being is not equivalent with idea; every statement must be interpreted in light of contexts, 
purposes, attitudes, and so on” (p. 371).  Textual communication is not even possible without 
face-to-face communication we all encounter naturally in our world.  Soukup (2012) wrote that 





even to read a text is to liken the text as sound, in a sense when we “decode” it.  This process, 
however, requires a system to decode it, which is grounded again in the primacy of the 
paradigmatic form of communication.   All text arises from speech and all text is read and 
belongs to a greater discourse, Ong has explained.    
While all language is hermeneutic, textual language, Ong argued, requires more 
interpretation.  He explained that “A basic reason why text can call urgently for interpretation or 
hermeneutics is that text always comes always out of the past.  Spoken words come into being 
always in the real, existent, holistic present.  Writing does not” (p. 36).  We must fill in the gaps 
based on our stock of knowledge at hand.     
When it comes to the difficulty of interpreting outside of the face to face situation, Ong, like the 
research done by Walther and Parks, argued that there are cues that are filtered out.  He wrote:   
Spoken words are in great part further given meaning, further explained, interpreted as 
they are being uttered, not merely verbally but often in other ways such as subtle personal 
interaction with the other party or parties to the discourse as well as by nonverbal 
elements in the fuller context or situation in which they are spoken—who is speaking to 
whom, on what occasion, with what sort of force, in what sort of social structure, with 
what unarticulated presuppositions involved I the situation or its background, with what 
facial expressions, gestures, and so on.  Such nonverbal elements are missing in a text 
and need somehow to be made up for.  Interpretation or hermeneutics makes up for such 
missing elements, the absences with which all text present us, and deconstructionists have 





The purpose of this chapter has been to show that due to the nature of interpretation in the 
dialogic process, dialogue is possible in mediated settings but it imposes several specific 
challenges in our relationships and communication with others.  As a result, there are several 
directions and implications that need to be explored further.  First, despite the I-Thou, I-It 
transition that is part and parcel of all communication, like textual communication, mediated 
communication is especially conducive to objectification.  Ong wrote, “Taken up by different 
readers at different times, always after its creation, the text constantly emerges in always new 
context” (2017, p. 36).  Text is visual, “lying there passively, able to be operated on as spoken 
words are not” (p. 37).  He also noted the “think-like quality” of texts (p. 37).  This “thing-like 
quality” creates a separation as we interpret that is different than the interpretation of spoken 
words.  Ong explained, “Spoken words are in great part further given meaning, further explained, 
interpreted as they are being uttered, not merely verbally but often in other ways such as subtle 
personal interaction with the other party or parties to the discourse as well as by nonverbal 
elements I the fuller context or situation in which they are spoken” (p. 39).  In some settings, the 
immediacy of continuous interpretation is delayed.   Because of this, we need to be cautious 
about the interpretations we make about our asynchronous encounters.   
 For example, if a friend sent a text that said, “I am mad at you” without context, I could 
interpret that text in several different ways.  Should the friend go to work and be unable to text 
for the next eight hours, I would be unable to clarify in any way exactly what they meant.  
Perhaps I choose to get angry.  Perhaps I get nervous, wondering how I upset them.  I could 
imagine that they are joking about something I did.  No matter how I proceed, I am drawn into 






Anonymity and Receiver  
In some instances, we are uncertain even WHO will be the recipient in our 
communicative exchanges via solely text.  Ong wrote, “a distinctive feature of textual utterance 
as against oral utterance is that its author cannot absolutely predict or often even discover who all 
will continue the discourse he or she has engaged in by inscribing the text” (p. 46).  Malcolm 
Gladwell (2019) surveyed multiple current events to understand how we interpret the behavior of 
those we do not know.  From judges and police officers, to medical workers and instructors, we 
cannot escape the nature of human thought and interpretation.  Gladwell argued that we default 
to truth when interpreting others.  He blames this and the “illusion of transparency” for our 
difficulty in recognizing the “stranger as an individual” (p. 458).  He advocated for a consistent 
confrontation of self when confronting the stranger, in which one “ask[s] yourself where and 
when you’re confronting the stranger---because those two things powerfully influence your 
interpretation of who the stranger is” (p. 467).  This is interesting because it is true that speaking 
to someone face to face is confirmed again that the who behind the discussion is there.  However, 
orality alone in today’s world does not ensure this.  Instead, this is a feature of face-to-face or 
even face to screen to screen to face.  Yet, there is much more uncertainty there in the textual 
case as we are never 100% sure who is reading our messages.  At the same time, we are also 
never sure who is hearing our conversation with someone in which we are face to face.  Because 
of this, we need to again be cautious and aware of this new possibility of our age.   
Ong was attentive to the various forms of media, particularly of mass media versus 
mediated interpersonal communication.  He noted that “it is not always true that person-to-
person contact is nonexistent in today’s mass media, particularly in those using the spoken word” 





relationships at a pitch otherwise impossible” (p. 291).   Ong explained, “To be present to 
himself, man must find the presence of another or others.  Man’s life-world is not the opposite of 
solipsist:  it is a world not of presence but of presences” (p. 295).  He then wrote, “In presences 
we mature.  Each individual I finds himself by dealing with a thou, and another thou, and 
another.  The presence of other persons fills man’s consciousness, as objects cannot” (p 
295).  Then, if we go back to Aristotle, if human flourishing cannot occur in a vacuum, we need 
others to be our best selves, then all friendships that promote mutual human flourishing, 
regardless of where the communication takes place, are true friendships.  Continuing, Ong wrote, 
“Situated among objects, a person may indeed find them interesting, but he responds only to 
other persons, other presences, who are not objects.  In a whole universe filled with countless 
objects and occupied by only one other man alone, it would be to the man alone that I could 
present myself, establish a relationship of presence” (p. 295).  Ong then explains that presence 
today is different, though.  He writes, “The kind of presence which early man was able to 
establish in the universe was vastly different from the presence enjoyed by technological man 
today.  Despite what personalizing effects may have been realized in his immediate environment, 
for early man the globe was not truly peopled” (p. 296).  He adds, “The presence of man to 
himself over the face of the globe is basically a presence of the word.  It is not a peripatetic 
presence.  Individual men do not all journey to the ends of the earth and back to encounter each 
other.  The presence is realized within human communications media” (p. 298).  He notes that it 
makes the past present—which is something Schutz discusses in his work on intersubjectivity—
the world of our predecessors and Ong adds to that part here.  Also, we are exposed to everyone 





Our technology has expanded to create enriched cues to compensate for the lack of cues.  
Because of this, we also now require more specialized interpretive training.  For example, emojis 
and their meaning can vary.  In Japan, the emoji for steam coming out its nose is used to signify 
triumph, while here in the United States, it is often used to signify anger.  All language is 
hermeneutic, Ong explains.  But it seems that as we reduce the cues more and more, we create a 
more desperate need for interpretation if we alter his earlier quote.  Ong noted, “With special 
skills and great effort the reader may be able to reconstruct conjectured responses of the absent 
writer which will fit the text somehow into the milieu in which the reading is being done” (p. 
47).  And this does happen.  But, arguably there is also a between space created when two people 
converse via cyberspace, in which the milieu itself is the between that is generated between the 
two individuals. Ong later wrote that text creates a “laborious, self-conscious, one-sided" level of 
work (p. 47).   
He noted, “Diminishing the temporal distance of the printed word decreased the 
impersonal distance between reader and writer” (p. 504).  He then went on to predict, 
“Eventually other forms of mediated communication will provide great, more direct interaction 
beyond the immediacy of the event and increase the interactive nature of the discourse in ways 
that artificially simulate (not nonetheless approach) direct verbal communication” (p. 505). The 
next chapter will explore these new instances in which communication has been spread across 
time and space.  
Zhao argues that in comparison with shared space, instead, telecopresence requires more 
communication.  He wrote, grounded in Habermas:   
In the realm of consociates, mutual knowledge is constructed based on the sharing of 





communicative action.  Communicative action is a form of ‘speech acts’ by which ‘two 
subjects come to an understanding with one another.’ (p. 118) 
Even more importantly, those who are together virtually are unable to make as many 
assumptions and do more communicative work, Zhao argued.     
Like the previous chapter, communicative work has been the focus of this chapter.  In the 
next chapter, we will explore how shared space, shared thought, and shared language come 
together. Social systems have changed, and the next chapter will review how they have changed 
related to time and space.  Perceptions and experiences of time and space of changed, although 
there are enduring elements of friendship in time.  The next chapter also examines the notion of 






Time and Space:   Altered Dimensions of Friendship 
Nothing makes the earth seem so spacious as to have friends at a distance; they make the 
latitudes and longitudes. 
--Henry David Thoreau 
 For most of human history, social relationships were limited by pace and time.  
Friendships were created and maintained within specific physical locations.  Adams (1998) 
wrote, “even maintaining already established relationships across distances was difficult because 
contact was infrequent, expensive, or unsatisfying”  (p. 157).  Today, it has been said that 
friendships exist independent of time and space (Dreher, 2009, p. 407)  Time and space as social 
dimensions of relationships that have often failed to be addressed outside of phenomenological 
works.   Giddens (1979) has influenced multiple scholars relating to time and space in human 
relationships.  He specifically argued that “neither time nor space of been incorporated into the 
center of social theory” (p. 202).  Giddens argued that “The extensions of social systems in space 
and time is an evident feature of the overall development of human society” (pp. 203-4).  This 
chapter will explore the altered dimensions of time and space and the associated effects on 
friendships.    
 As communication technologies evolved, our perceptions of and experience in time and 
space have changed.    Schutz argued in his works that “I experience a fellow-man directly if and 
when he shares with me a common sector of time and space” (1976, p. 24).  It was a central 
element of his phenomenology.  For Schutz, sharing time is what is central to “a genuine 
simultaneity of our two streams of consciousness” (p. 24).  Sharing space, Schutz explained, is 
what is central for “my fellow-man [to appear] to me in person as he himself and none other” (p. 





anonymity of the experienced social world” (p. 43) She added, “Technological mediation, and 
particularly information and communication technologies, similarly rearranges the structures of 
anonymity stretching from the most intimate we-relations to the most distant they-relations” (p. 
64).   Proximal distance and phenomenological distance related to anonymity and intimacy then 
seem to be affected.    
Time and Space as Social Dimensions 
 Parks and Floyd (1996) noted that traditional relationship development characteristics 
are:  “physical proximity, frequent interaction, information about physical appearance, cues 
about group members, and information about the broader social context”  (p. 84).  Often, online 
relationships are considered to be impersonal.  Despite this view, even when examined by way of 
models of traditional relationships, Parks and Floyd argued that relationships do occur online.  
The evidence suggests then, that proximity has nothing to do with friendship.   While there 
appears to be a shift in proximal limitations, new research related to social media networks 
shows that there appears to be a limit on the number of “friends” one can maintain at one time.  
Emmeche (2019) pointed out that limits are not just due to physical space, and instead showed 
that there are actual cognitive limits.   
Friendship Transcends Time and Space 
There are several relationships between time and friendship.  Friendship, as noted before, 
seems to transcend space and time, while still being bound by time.  Friends must share the same 
historical moment.  Friendship itself requires a duration through time.  Also, an absence of 
communication over long periods does not end a friendship.   Much of the literature on 





had never been apart.  Dreher (2009) wrote that “friends can live great distances apart” and that 
friendship “can be reactivated after a tremendously long time” (p. 407).  While friendship does 
seem to transcend time, it is also bound by time.  Dreher pointed out that “friendship can only be 
constructed in concrete historical worlds” (p. 408). It would be impossible, for example, for me 
to be friends with my great-great-grandmother’s friend, despite the possibility of me finding a 
journal and knowing her innermost thoughts.  And, while friendship can extend through shared 
biographical time and space, it cannot extend over non-shared time, because dialogue is 
reciprocal.   
Friendship as Duration 
Another significant way that friendship is related to time is the notion of friendship as 
duration.   Stocker (1981)  wrote, “friendship must have a significant temporal duration:  that it 
must last more than one minute, or one hour” (p. 752).  Our encounters with our friends are 
discrete units of extensions of time.  We do not spend all of our time with them, nor would we 
want or be able to.  That being said, while our interactions with them are discrete, our actual 
friendship is experienced as duration.  Schutz (1970b) drew from Bergson in his discussion of 
duree.  He began “What we, in fact, experience in duration is not a being that is discrete and 
well-defined but a constant transition from a now-thus to a new now-thus” (p. 60).  Our 
experience of the Other’s presence in the actual experiencing moment is duration.  We 
experience friendship as a constant transition.  Schutz argued that discrete experience and pure 
duration is a “difference between two levels of consciousness” (p. 61).   Schutz asked us to 
imagine our immersion in our streams of consciousness.  He wrote, “in my duration, I do not find 
any clearly differentiated experiences at all” (p. 62).  He continued, “At one moment an 





unidirectional, irreversible stream and find that between a moment ago and just now I have 
grown older.  But I cannot become aware of this” (p. 62).  Should we turn our awareness towards 
the stream, what Schutz calls reflection, we are then turning against the stream and we cease to 
be immersed during our reflection.  The Now that has become a thus is only understood through 
remembrance.  Ultimately, Schutz’ point here was that “The simple experience of living is the 
flow of duration” (p. 62).  All meaningful experience is ultimately discrete as it requires, for the 
nature of being meaningful, a reflective turn.   And so, then, as a meaning-making relationship, 
our experiences with friends are discrete moments that are filed into a protracted sense of 
duration with them.  Schutz wrote:  
Because the concept of meaningful experience always presupposes that the experience of 
which meaning is predicated is a discrete one, it now becomes quite clear that only past 
experience can be called meaningful, that is, one that is present to the retrospective 
glance as already finished and done with. (p. 63) 
Meaning, particularly, he wrote, is “merely an operation of intentionality” (p. 63).  Our stream of 
consciousness is our duree.  Schutz noted that: 
In and by our bodily movements we perform the transition from our duree to the spatial 
or cosmic time and our working actions partake of both.  In simultaneity we experience 
the working action as a series of events in outer and in inner time, unifying both 
dimensions into a single flex which shall be called the vivid present.  The vivid present 
originates, therefore, in an intersection of duree and cosmic time. (p. 70) 
Our communicative acts are what draw our inner duree out to the manifestation of duration in 





Dreher (2009) argued that the particular uniqueness of the relationship must be shared “as well 
as experience of an existential nature” (p. 413).  That is to say, that within each of the 
individual’s biographical identities, life narratives, they must find the friendship to be a 
friendship as well as be orientated reciprocally toward each other AS friend.   
Schutz addressed issues associated with the separation of two people by both space and 
time.  He made several related points.  First, he argued “that apprehension does not necessarily 
presuppose actual perception, but that the appresenting member of the appresentational pair may 
also be a recollection or even a phantasm” (1970, p. 201).  Second, he added “that the result or 
product of another activity refers to the action from which it resulted and, thus, can function as a 
sign of his cogitations” (p. 201).  Finally, he notes “that the principle of the relative irrelevance 
of the vehicle is applicable (the printed lecture refers to the talk of the lecturer)” (p. 201).  So we 
still perform analogic apperception, independent of actual existence.   
Bakardjieva (2005) argued that there are three critical aspects of “temporality of the 
lifeworld in the Schutzian framework” (p. 41).   One, the “fixed course of temporality,” she 
wrote, it is derived “from the intersection of subjective time (stream of consciousness), 
biological time (the rhythm of the body), world time (the seasons) and social time (the calendar)” 
(p. 41).  Technology, she noted, helps bring biological, world, and social time “into closer 
conformity with my subjective time” (p. 63).  She added, “In a sense, this can be interpreted and 
experienced by the actor as an increase in personal freedom, spontaneity, and control, or in other 
words as empowerment and disalienation” (p. 63).  Technology can help us overcome challenges 






Cultural Transformations in Time and Space 
Ancient Humanity 
 Many scholars have traced the changing nature of our consciousness of time throughout 
human history.  Eliade, in Myth of the Eternal Return (1954), explored archaic ontologies using 
recordings of various myths, narratives, and rituals.  Without the ability to record knowledge or 
information, the world available to these early groups of people was the world as it could exist 
only in the spoken word.  Sound exists only in time, it has no spatial dimensions.  Sound is 
completely bound by time, by the moment one sound comes into existence, the sound that comes 
before is already gone (Ong, 2000).  What could be remembered, stored, and passed then was 
limited to the capability of the human mind and verbal language.  Early human beings 
experienced being in the eternal present.  Natural events, by all appearances, seemed to be 
cyclical.  Over time, the moon waxed and waned.  The sun seemed to return to its position on the 
horizon.  The heavens, too, seemed to adhere to a cyclical pattern, always returning to a point of 
beginning.  Eliade explains that collective knowledge endured through repetition (1954, p. 20).   
This is not just in language, meaning metrical phrases, songs, and stories.  This included actual 
repetition of acts and rituals which help transport the individual into the perceived time of the 
original creation of the act itself.  What we have here are human beings who are limited to a 
knowledge of the eternal present and knowledge of a sense of being as it is in the beginning.  
Eliade writes,  “Through repetition of the cosmogonic act, concrete time, in which the 
construction takes place, is projected into mythical time, in illo tempore when the foundation of 
the world occurred” (p. 20).  All acts had archetypes, the main archetype being creation.   
Time spent repeating archetypical acts was time spent in illo tempore, or sacred time.  





not time.  Eliade writes, “an object or an act becomes real only insofar as it imitates or repeats an 
archetype.” (p. 34).  Sacred time was not experienced as time, however, as we might understand 
ourselves in time in today’s world, either.  Instead, to be in the act of ritual was to create an 
“abolition of time through the imitation of archetypes and the repetition of paradigmatic 
gestures”  (p. 35).  Profane time “is without meaning:  in the state of ‘becoming’” (p. 35), he 
explained.  As communicative technologies changed, though, so did our experience of time.   
Chirographic Culture 
As human beings relied more and more on scripts to record, the mind began to explore 
and reflect on being in the world and being in time.  Eliade points out that in the development of 
monotheistic cultures of the ancient world, we begin to see narratives in which there appears to 
be a shift toward a somewhat historical or even linear understanding of time—that it has a 
beginning and an end.  For most cultures, time was still cyclical.    Havelock (1986) wrote, “The 
substitutions for the ‘timeless present’ turning into the ‘logical present’ in place of the 
‘immediate present’ or the past or future, became a pre-occupation of the pre-Platonic 
philosophers, particularly Parmenides.”  (p. 106).  We can see in the work of many ancient Greek 
philosophers an explosion in abstract thinking and by 100 B.C.E., Eliade says that knowledge of 
the human as a historical being was commonplace.  
Middle Ages 
By the middle ages, a sense of measured time infiltrated human consciousness, changed 
by and changing how humans interacted with the world, each other, and themselves.  To say that 
language alone changed consciousness is to reduce the complexity of the vast changes that 





orientation toward the visual field of sensory experience and jolted language somewhat out of the 
sound world in which it had been since the beginning.  Second, written word also made it 
possible for knowledge to be stored outside the human, and in such, thought could now be 
abstract.  The new orientation toward the visual, then, and the ability to know think abstractly led 
to a new orientation toward the linear, mechanistic, quantified experience of time.  
Mumford argued that the mechanistic, linear, sequential time stemmed from the 
monastery of the middle ages.  (2010).  He wrote,  
Benedict added a seventh period to the devotions of the day, and in seventh century, by a 
bull of Pope Sabinianus, it was decreed that the bells of the monastery be rung seven 
times in the twenty-four hours.  These punctuation marks in the day were known as the 
canonical hours, and some means of keeping count of them and ensuring their regular 
repetition became necessary.  (p. 13) 
Jacques Le Goff, a medieval historian, has studied the rise of both Christian time and 
secular time in his works Medieval Imagination (1992) and Time, Work and Culture in the 
Middle Ages (1980).  The 11th century marks the beginnings of change.  Le Goff explained that 
“For the Bible, and primitive Christianity, time is primarily theological time.  It ‘begins with 
God’ and is ‘dominated by him’” (1980,  p. 30) and continued, “Their eternity was merely the 
extension of time into infinity…” (p. 31).  An orientation toward the quantitative was 
developing, though.  Time “spent” in church and time spent praying now had a direct effect on 
time spent in purgatory in the afterlife.  In this quantitative orientation, time was the means to 
God.  Time carried the Christian in one direction, linearly, to God.  By no means was time 





Spiritual fissures began to arise in the 12th and 13th centuries, which Le Goff investigated 
specifically by tracing artifacts of the medieval merchants (1980).  Le Goff explained that 
merchants were subject to natural time, or “the dominion of meteorological time, to the cycle of 
season and the unpredictability of storms and natural cataclysms”  (1980 p. 345).  As the flow of 
communication and records increased, so too did commercial networks, networks in which time 
was now an object of measurements.  Le Goff noted the commonality of letters of exchange in 
12th and 13th century Champagne.  In the 14th century, escapement devices began to be used in 
towered mechanical clocks, ensuring mechanical accuracy (Le Goff, 1992).  Consciousness was 
now altered as the sound of the bells signaled a measured, punctuated time that was independent 
of religious life.  At this same time, the vanishing point now began to be used in painting, murals 
now depicted cycles, and portraits became more realistic, capturing the subject in time (Le Goff, 
1980).   
Modernity 
The post-modern era experiences time differently than modernity.  We are in a society so 
fragmented in the individual experience that in the present world, trying to reflect on any 
collective experience might be impossible.  If the consciousness of time is intertwined with the 
medium of the word, whether it be oral, written, or print, electronic or digital, then the present 
world is an age in which the preference for the method of delivery of the word, although 
computerized, varies greatly between individuals.  Despite these limitations, from a rhetorical 
standpoint, there are generalizations and even implications that arise from study.   
Born in 1912, by the time Ong published In the Human Grain (1967), a collection of 
essays in which he explored the consciousness of human time, he had experienced two world 





Western world into a new era of mechanistic time.  In the 1850s, the railroad system 
standardized time across North America.  Sun time varies every eight miles from east to west, 
but the railroad system of time now grouped time into four locations, spatial locations (Mumford, 
2010).  The standardization solidified a linear experience of time across space.  The railroad in 
one sense, then, built a collective spatial time structure.  In another, it annihilated time and space, 
transporting people with speeds thought never possible.  Boorstin wrote, “As there comes to be 
less and less difference between the time it takes to reach one place rather than another, time 
itself dissolves as a measure of space”  (1987, p. 115).   
 The railroad was only one means through which space/time structure changed in that era.  
Vehicles of transportation evolved to transport goods and people faster and faster, and 
communication technologies, such as the telegraph, telephone, radio, and television now made it 
possible the transport interior through space in record time and these electronic technologies 
drew the word toward an oral/aural orientation.  In Ong’s world of the electronic age, voice now 
was becoming alive, and printed word was melding with sound.  This post-typographical era, the 
electronic era, established man in a radically new relationship to time” (2000, p. 98).  Ong wrote, 
in Knowledge in Time (1968), that knowledge is now accessible to the human being: knowledge 
of the physical universe, knowledge of man and his life world, and knowledge of man in time.  
He noted,  “Until quite recent years, man had no very effective idea of the real time scales 
applying to the universe of which he was a part” (1968, p.13).  We know ourselves on a macro 
scale, meaning of our place in the evolving physical universe, and on a micro-scale, meaning as 
part of an evolving unique person.  He wrote, “Today we know the world as something with  





in ways that are matter for scientific, cosmological, and historical study” (1968, p. 14).  This has 
had an effect on our experience of others in time and space and as a result, our friendships.   
Media-Saturated Culture 
 In both oral culture and electronic culture, there is a strong sense of simultaneity and 
presence between individuals, but Ong pointed out that simultaneity in the electronic world is 
“supercharged” (2000, p. 91).   He explained that “The computer is actually the most quantified 
and most highly sequential or linear of all instruments; it creates a sense of simultaneity only 
because its inhuman speedup of sequences makes it appear to annihilate them” (p. 91).  This 
speedup has still drawn us inward, but at the same time outward.  It has created a paradox and 
draws us toward both interiorization and exteriorization (1967, 1968).  As time and space have 
been “annihilated,” it has led to a heightened sense of presence yet at the same time, electronic 
technologies draw people inward, into themselves and have offered a possibility of reflection of 
the self in a historical way not possible in the oral world (2000, p. 312).   
 The process of digitization in our age refers to the process of converting everything into 
binary code, or quantification.  Mumford wrote of the mechanical age (early electronic) that 
“Irrespective of strain or fatigue, despite reluctance or apathy, the household rises close to its set 
hour” (2010, p. 269) and it is no stretch to say that most individuals still are servants to time.  
Time consciousness as it “..arbitrarily rule[s] over human functions is to reduce existence itself 
to mere time-serving and to spread the shades of the prison-house over too large an area of 
human conduct” (Mumford, 2010, p. 271).  Boorstin believed that experience was being 
homogenized.  He writes, “Moving only through time, measuring our distances in homogenous 
ticks of the clock we are at a loss to explain ourselves, what we are doing, where, or even 





ourselves lost in general and lost in time (2013) and numerous philosophers find the electronic 
and present era marked by a lack of moral unity, coherence, and narrative.  
 It becomes difficult to think of any aspect of human life that has not been quantified.  
Even childbirth now occurs on a schedule as more and more mothers and their obstetricians plan 
dates for cesarean sections, not just for medical necessity but for mere convenience.  Marshall 
McCluhan writes that  “…time is separated from the rhythms of human experience”  (2003, p. 
199).  Despite being a scholar of the electronic age, he recognized that “Time measured by 
abstract uniform units gradually pervades all sense of life” (2003, p. 199).  In his era, he 
recognized that  “Not only work, but also eating and sleeping, came to accommodate themselves 
to the clock rather than organic needs.”  (2003, p. 199).  Rushkoff in his book Present Shock 
discusses chronobiology (2013).  Researchers have discovered that the human body seems to 
operate on a 24-hour cycle, known as a circadian rhythm, independent of any time cue.  
Melatonin production, the hormone that makes us feel tired, has been shown to decrease with 
exposure to sunlight and increase with exposure to darkness, and melatonin production even is 
interfered with when an individual is exposed to blue-light rays—the rays emitted from 
smartphones, computer, and television screens.  Body temperatures fluctuate with exposure to 
daylight.  Rushkoff argues that today’s age is marked with the “…false digital premise that all 
time is equivalent and interchangeable.”   (2003, p. 94).  This has definitive effects on our 
experience of others and our friendships.  Studies in the millennial generation suggest that there 
appears to be what are being called “micro-generational gaps.”   Preferences for technology 
greatly varies.  The choice of medium affects experience, and these choices appear to be highly 






Breaking the Barriers of Intimacy 
One major way that time and space are connected to our experience of others in social 
relationships is intimacy.  While intimacy has traditionally been associated with time and space, 
as our mediums have changed, a new view of intimacy has become necessary.  Intimacyis 
communicative and developed through communicative work and as such, transcends time and 
space.  One way in which time is connected to intimacy is due to rate.  Rate implies immediacy, 
which can build intimacy, although, paradoxically, friends can go long amounts of time with no 
communication at all and still be close friends.  Time also matters because friends have to exist 
in the same historical moment and share biographical time.  Friends also do need to dedicate a 
specific amount of time to the other in the friendship.   
Intimacy Defined—A Review 
 Intimacy is a very well-studied term in interpersonal relations research and suffers the 
same fate as definitions of friendship—there are multiple (Bennett, 2000; Goleman & Cherniss, 
2001; Hatfield, 1982; Sexton & Sexton 1982; Perlman & Fehr, 1987).  Solomon and Theiss 
(2012) identify five components of intimacy; closeness, openness, trust, affection, and mutuality.  
The pair define intimacy as “connection between two people that includes psychological, 
emotional, and behavioral bonds” (p. 266).  Sinclair and Dowdy (2005) in the development of 
the emotional intimacy scale differentiated emotional intimacy from other types of intimacy like 
physical.  They define it as involving “a perception of closeness to another that allows sharing of 
personal feelings, accompanied by expectations of understanding, affirmation, and 
demonstrations of caring” (p. 194).  Derlega (2013) agreed that belonging and closeness were 





experience are essential to the intimacy building process.  Drawing from Buber, she drew to the 
forefront the role of dialogue in this process.   
 Intimacy is recognized to be a main feature in all relations, including friendship, familial, 
and romantic partnerships.  Jurkane-Hobein (2015) argued that relationships required “intimacy 
work” as part of normal relational maintenance (p. 224).  Along with Mjöberg (2009) and Leslie 
and Morgan (2011), she argues that it is a relationship quality that is dynamic and requires 
ongoing work. In their study Marriage and the Construction of Reality, Berger and Kellner 
(1964) drew from Schutz to discuss conversation, biography, and their associated roles in 
building closeness in marriages.  Again, these relationship are ever evolving and co-construct 
meaning, and as such intimacy is a form of communicative work.   
Family relationship research is another well-investigated area of intimacy study.  Leslie 
and Morgan (2011) highlighted three types of intimacy:  embodied, emotional, and then they add 
particular knowledge about the other.  Jurkane-Hobein (2015) compared emotional intimacy in 
Leslie and Morgan’s work to Jamieson’s (1998) emphasis on disclosure.  She wrote that 
“Intimate knowledge relates to everyday routines and emerges from the former two, thus, 
providing the couple certain privileged knowledge about each other, such as sleeping patterns or 
personal preferences” (p. 225).  This knowledge, she wrote, is not dependent on intimacy, 
though, so she added a time dimension and argued that it must be daily.  She wrote that 
embodied, emotional, and intimate knowledge “are the result of a mutual process of caring, 
touching, interacting, and having conversation” (p. 225).   Fehr (2004) pointed to the fact that 
friendships, like family and romantic relationships, are another source of intimacy in our 





satisfaction was judged based on idealized notions about the nature of friendship, in large part 
related to intimacy expectations.   
Across the spectrum of relationships, from family to friendship, reports of intimacy and 
qualitative measures often include the notion of a feeling of being close with another person.  
Aron and Aron (1986) argued that closeness is dependent on similarity of identity.  Berscheid, 
Snyder, and Omoto (2004) developed the Relational Closeness Scale.  The three examined 
multiple factors on the feeling of closeness, but specifically important to this chapter were their 
conclusions that time spent alone together, doing things with each other, and communicating 
were related to feelings of closeness.    
Long-Distance Relationships—A Review 
 Related to intimacy, another area of study in interpersonal relationship is long-distance 
relationships.  Maguire and Kinney (2010) define long-distance relationships intimate 
relationships “between partners who are geographically separated from one another” (p. 26).  
Just like in studies in intimacy, there are studies on long-distance family, romantic, and 
friendship-type relationships, although friendship is the least studied.  Cao, Sellen, Brushs, 
Berheim, Kirk, Edge, and Ding (2013) examined family relationships that spanned time zones.  It 
was noted that family members preferred synchronous settings like phone calls and video 
chatting the most.   Two major recognized themes associated with this preference were feeling 
more present and connected.   
Cao, Sellen, Brushs, Berheim, Kirk, Edge, and Ding (2013) examined family 
relationships that spanned time zones.  It was noted that family members preferred synchronous 
settings like phone calls and video chatting the most.   Two major recognized themes associated 





distance friendship research, Rohlfing (1990; 1991) concluded in her study that at that time, in 
the early 1990’s, that almost 90% of study participants reported a long-distance friendship.   
Rohlfing (1995) concluded that there are qualitative differences between proximal relationships 
and long-distance relationships. Johnson (2001) found no significant difference in relational 
satisfaction between proximal and long-distance relationships, however.   
Jurkane-Hobein (2015), noted in the previous section, did a study exploring intimacy in 
long-distance relationships.  She specifically wanted to examine practices that fostered intimacy.  
She concluded that an important element in long-distance relationships related to intimacy is 
imagination, and imagination guides “four dimensions of intimacy:  embodied, emotional, daily, 
and imagined” (p. 226).  She drew from Illouz and Sadeh (2007) to conceptualize the notion of 
imagination in the long-distance setting.  She wrote, “Internet imagination is self-generated 
through textual and visual mediated communication” which is in contrast to self-generated 
imagination (p. 226).  With regard to the four types of intimacy, there were a variety of practices 
examined by Jurkane-Hobein.  Daily intimacy, she expressed, is developed through 
communicating about daily life events.  Emotional intimacy, she added, is based on mutual 
disclosure.  Embodied intimacy, she argued can be experienced in a long-distance relationship as 
the body has physiological responses to communication.   
Zones of Relevance 
Schutz worked to delineate different zones of relevance to my body in space.   As I stand, 
my body in space, there are particular spatial zones.  For example, there is the zone of actual 
reach.  I can reach out and touch my computer.  But there is also present reach.  A world that was 
within my actual reach can move out of my present reach.  But the world within our formerly 





room, the computer, to me, is still on that table.  Schutz and Luckmann wrote that this is 
“conscious activity in the form of remembrance and anticipation” (p. 45).  Based on how things 
were, I then remember them and anticipate them.  My computer might very well have been 
stolen.   
Schutz and Luckmann wrote, “The world in actual reach has essential the temporal 
character of the present” (p. 51).    They wrote:   
The world in potential reach has a much more complicated temporal structure.  The world 
in restorable reach is based upon the past, upon that which was previously in my reach 
and upon that which (as I assume on the grounds of the idealizations of the ‘and so forth’ 
and ‘I can always do it again) can once again be brought into my actual reach.  (p. 51).   
We have particular zones of objects in the world that we encounter and perceive.  Schutz calls 
these our zones of relevance and highlights four zones.  We have the world within reach.  The 
world within reach “can be immediately observed by us and also at least partially dominated by 
us” Schutz explains (Schutz, On Phenomenology and Social Relations, 1970, p. 112).  The 
second zone is associated with “fields not open to our domination but mediately connected with 
the zone of primary relevance” (p. 112).  The final two are “reliatvely irrelevant” and 
“irrelevant” (p. 112).  This is important because a small portion of our stock of knowledge is 
grounded within our interactions within these zones, and the action within these zones are 
affected by those recipes we have available to us.  Our stock of knowledge molds particular 
typifications.  A typification is an expectation, an idea type based on the knowledge we have 
accumulated either via direct experience or passed down from our world.  As we encounter other 
objects, we reach into our stock of knowledge and apply these typifications.  Schutz writes, “In 





transferred to any other similar object, perceived merely as its type” (Schutz, On Phenomenology 
and Social Relations, 1970, p. 117).  Although the process of analogic apperception is different 
when we are discussing human beings, this brings to mind questions related to friends.   We have 
particular typifications of friends, and this is automatic and unreflective for our every day 
interactions.  However, there is a moment in which we “name” that friend and enter into a 
reflective attentiveness.  When we name something, for example “friend,” “we are related it by 
its typicality to pre-experienced things of similar typical structure, and we accept its open 
horizon to future experiences of the same type, which are therefore capable of being given the 
same name (p. 117).   
For Schutz’ zones, they are discussed with regard to four different dimensions; space, 
time, and ability to change the environment, and social relationships. Bakardjieva (2005) 
explains: 
With regard to action, these dimensions of the spatial arrangement of the lifeworld take 
the shape of differentiated ‘zones of operation’ (p. 41). Within the world of actual reach 
and as a subsection of it there exists a zone which the subject can influence through direct 
action – the zone of operation. Schutz draws a distinction between the ‘primary zone of 
operation,’ where action is tied to the physical body of the actor, and the ‘secondary zone 
of operation’ (and its corresponding ‘secondary reach’), in which action can be 
performed only with the help of various media. The province of mediated action meets its 
limits in the prevailing technological conditions of a society, and is being dramatically 
enlarged with the advance of technology and its penetration into the everyday lifeworld. 
Schutz clearly recognizes the broad variation of subjective secondary zones of operation 





occupies within them determine differential access to what is technologically possible. (p. 
40).   
Bakardjieva (2005) also discussed the nature of Schutz zones based on social relationships.  She 
wrote:  
We-relations are established at different levels of nearness, depth, engagement, 
coordination, mutuality or, in sum, immediacy. Tracking further these different 
‘gradations of immediacy’ (p. 69), Schutz moves into the zones of the social world 
populated by ‘contemporaries’. This term refers to ‘those other men with whom I do not 
actually have a werelation, but whose life falls in the same present span of world time as 
mine’ (p. 69). Our experience of contemporaries is qualitatively different from that of our 
fellow men. This difference lies in the dramatic decrease in the ‘abundance of symptoms 
through which the conscious life of the other is accessible to me’ (p. 69). Therefore, 
contemporaries are experienced as ‘types’ (p. 75) to which certain attributes, certain 
functions and behaviour are ascribed. These types display various degrees of anonymity 
on the basis of which the world of contemporaries is stratified into personal types, 
functionary types, and typifications of social collectivities. The anonymity of a 
typification is inversely proportional to its fullness of content, which is determined by the 
origin of the typification – was it inferred from immediate experience of an earlier 
fellow-man, or was it a learned generalization of social reality? (p. 42).   
She continued:  
Thus the immediate encounter with a fellow-man and the mediate experience of a highly 





be found. At this point, an isomorphism between the spatial and the social structures of 
the everyday lifeworld becomes obvious. The structures of attainability and restorability 
characterizing the spatial arrangement of the lifeworld can be recognized in the subjective 
experience of the social world as well. Based on the complex graduation of immediacy 
constituted by the various degrees of restorability and attainability of a once-existent or 
achievable we-relation, the structure of the social relationships between contemporaries 
emerges. Schutz’s structures of the social world present the key to understanding the 
unique character of communication technologies compared to all other technologies and 
artefacts. Communication technologies and devices mediate subjects’ perceptions of and 
actions onto the social world, while the effects of all other technologies are realized first 
and foremost in the physical world. It is clear from the outset that media are implicated in 
a recharting of the zones of anonymity of the experienced social world. Mass media, for 
example, enlarge the number of types of contemporaries of whose existence I know in 
general, that is, whose existence I can infer on (p. 44).   
Finally, she wrote:   
More and more, our zone of actual reach comes to resemble a control tower from where 
we can perceive distant objects and social entities by reading them off technical 
representations – I–(technology– world), which extends our zones of actual and potential 
reach. We can also exert action upon distant objects and people through technological 
levers – (I– technology)–world, which extends our secondary zone of operation and our 
province of possible operation. (p. 61)  
Zhao (2006) has argued that technology has created a new zone, one that effects all four of the 





Specifically, the Internet has created a new spatieotmeporal zone--the zone of the ‘there 
and now,’ a new mode of communication—the electronic text chat, and a new social 
gathering place—the online public domain.  (p. 458) 
Related to this topic, he wrote: 
Conditions of social interaction refer to the totality of the environment in which 
interpersonal contacts take place  From the perspective of phenomelogy, such an 
environment consists of not only the ‘contact situations’ that directly affect a given social 
encounter but also the ‘zones of operation’ that participation the lifeworld into different 
time-space segments.  The advent of the Internet has brought about significant changes to 
this environment by creating (1) a new spatiotemporal zone—the zone of the ‘there and 
now,’ (2) a new mode of communication—the electronic text chat, and (3) a new social 
gathering place—the online public domain.  (p. 459) 
The foundation of intimacy in friendship is retention.  The shift from out of reach to within reach 
seems continuous.  We believe that our friend when they leave our physical presence, will return 
to that presence and be the same friend with the same qualities and traits in which there were 
originally in our presence.  And, this is developed through a build-up over time.  When we 
encounter someone in a face-to-face situation, as they continue to meet us in the present over and 
over again, we build up a stock of knowledge about who we believe them to be.  Even when they 
cease to be within our actual reach, as in, within our physical presence, they are still present to us 
as a remembrance and as an anticipated person in the future, so that we can then build a pattern 
of our encounters with them.  Schutz (1970a) addressed the idea of a human being walking out of 
our direct reach, and in doing so points to the notion of our experience of friendship that is built 





Far from seeming obvious, it actually seems absurd that someone we are close to has 
somehow become ‘different’ now that he is out of sight, except in the trite sense that our 
experiences of him bear the mark of pastness.  (p. 220) 
The jump from attainable reach from a face-to-face setting to a virtual setting is not that difficult, 
providing that the verbally explicit there is created in such a way that our stock of knowledge 
provides us with enough information to adequately anticipate information, as the remembrance is 
irrelevant anyway based on Schutz’ observation that only a very small amount of information 
about our world comes from personal experience.   
Drawing from Husserl, Schutz (1970a) examined “subjective time” to explain “the 
interconnectedness of the stream of thought” (p. 11).  Schutz wrote that “The actual present, 
therefore, is not an instantaneity, but the persisting form for continuously changing contents” (p. 
11). He continued, “Actual impression is nothing else than the limiting phase of a continuous 
series of retentions, or, in the other direction, of a continuous series of anticipations, both chains 
to be interpreted as continuous successions of intentional relationships” (p. 11).  Furthermore, he 
writes, “Therefore, says Husserl, each actual experienced present carries along its horizon of the 
experienced past, which is necessarily always filled with content, and its horizon of the future, 
which is empty or filled merely with the content of the anticipated future present” (p. 11).  And 
so, we can say then that with each encounter, the content of our friendship is filled more and 
more, both with past and future horizons.    
In the previous chapter, the notion of absent cues was discussed and the inaccurate 
tendency to association absence with loss.  This, too, has been done with immediacy.  A lack of 
immediacy is not a lack of intimacy, but it can become problematic when we begin to 





are marked by an increase in the number of perceptions I have of the other person and a 
narrowing of the perspectives within which I view him” (1970a, p. 218).   
Gumpert and Cathart (1986) pointed out that all human communication is a derivative of the 
interpersonal communication process.  They wrote, “An environment in which we talk to each 
other and see each other while we are actually in the presence of the other is no longer necessary 
to interpersonal communication” (p. 165).    They added:  
Interpersonal intimacy has traditionally entailed physical and psychological closeness.  
We could be intimate only with those that we could be close to physically and 
emotionally.  As Edward T. Hall has pointed out in his works on nonverbal 
communication, we actually divide personal space into intimate and social distance 
depending on how close we allow others to come.  (p. 165) 
As communicative, intimacy transcends space and time and can account for the large distances 
between friends both across time and space.  Cocking and Kennett (1998) explored the 
relationship of intimacy to friendship.  They argued that intimacy is not even a requirement for 
friendship in the first place, and even if it were, it is not tied to space.  The pair wrote that 
typically literature does tend to focus on “intimate friendships” and that these friendships entail 
“reciprocal deep affection, well-wishing, and the desire for shared experiences” (p. 502). The 
pair highlighted the nature of self-disclosure on intimacy.  There is a huge dedication of 
communication literature to self-disclosure and trust, and it is beyond the scope of this project; 
however, this project does take the position that intimacy is an essential feature of friendship.  
Cocking and Kennett wrote that self-disclosure “is thought to cement the bonds of trust and 
intimacy that exist between close friends and has been understood to mark companion friendship 





disclosure paints intimacy in friendship as requiring a telling of secrets.  Another version is the 
mirror-view which argues that intimacy requires a seeing of ourselves in the other.  Cocking and 
Kennett argue that the mirror-view and secrets-view of friendship “fail to identify features that 
are in part constitutive of close or companion friendship” and “that they miss the mark quote” 
concerning understanding the self in the role of friendship.   
 They point out that sometimes friends lack similar interests, and sometimes similarity 
does not create friendship.   Sometimes friends do not “herald increasing intimacy” and they 
explained, “I may like to discuss philosophy with you but have no wish to go the to a football 
game with you upon discovering that you, too, follow football” (p. 508).  When it comes to self-
disclosure, Cocking and Kennett mention that it is kind of absurd to imagine that we could share 
our most private moments, e.g. using the bathroom, without having the opposite effect of 
alienating others.  They then responded to imaginary arguments to this idea—that the kind of 
information disclosed needs to be revelatory.  Cocking and Kennett (1998) recognized that 
sharing secrets and concerns “can serve to deepen and nurture intimacy” (p. 508).   However, 
they clarify that the nature of the privacy of the disclosure has nothing to do with intimacy, and 
instead it is “the value we assess to the hopes and concerns we share (whether we wish them to 
be kept private or not) and the fact that we choose to talk to each other about what matters to us 
that contributes to the growth of intimacy between us” (p. 508).  Intimacy grows through 
communicative choice—the choice to communicate, communication with you, how to 
communicate and to call you my friend.   
Bennett (2016) argued that technology obscures the “need for close physical space” (p. 
254).  For her, there is a loss associated with lack of physical space which is “rectified,” she 





drew from Elull and technique and she cautioned against the “tendency to truncate the basic 
premise of human relations—presence—for the sake of a more efficient means of dealing with 
the other” (p. 255).  She argued:  
While social media allow people to be co-preset (i.e. present to each other simultaneously 
in different time zones and locations), the absence of one’s physical presence leaves a 
friendship (or any relationship ) in a precarious situation.  The inability to act towards or 
touch another creates a situation that is emotionally sparse, certainly lacking in 
relationship richness.  Connecting with others online, over time, creates a normalcy for 
absence.  (p. 255) 
Zhao, too, notes the issues associated with lack of touch.  He wrote: 
In computer-mediated communication under corporeal telecopresence, one’s sense of 
copresence is dampened by the loss of the possibility of haptic engagement.  However, 
the belief that one is in contact with a real human being, although remotely, sustains the 
social suspense and excitement that underlie face-to-face interaction.  Such a belief is 
constantly being validated based on the behavioral cues (such as voice over the telephone 
and images on the screen) gleaned from the mediated communications.  (p. 451) 
Regarding intimacy, Chambers writes: 
technologies express deep-seated aspirations for intimate connections of choice based on 
trust, sharing and reciprocity. Paradoxically, while the concept of intimacy has been 
interrogated through the lens of friendship, friendship has come to be idealised and 
venerated. Thus, late modernity brings with it a new kind of intimate relationship and 





confined to ties of duty but entered into voluntarily in a context of mutual benefit. 
Friendship signifies less formal, more casual companion-like bonds. The concept of 
friendship mirrors the ‘pure relationship’ by signifying the desire for equality and choice 
in all relationships. The variability and emphasis on choice involved in this kind of 
intimate relationship correspond well with social media by promoting a sense of choice, 
control and reciprocity at the same time. This corresponds with the idea of social network 
sites such as Facebook as more casual, immediate, informal modes of communication. 
These personal networks can involve self-disclosure, shared secrets and a sense of 
exclusiveness. Individuals can construct their own narratives of self through fluid, 
flexible ties. (p. 52) 
Bennett did note that “For online social networking to work, people must be absent from each 
other.  Distance is a necessity” (p. 250).  But distance and remoteness are part and parcel of all 
human relationships because they are communicative phenomena.  In Ong’s Contributions to 
Cultural Studies, Farrell (2015) asked, “How…does intimate sharing proceed?  How, according 
to Ong, do persons commune with one another?” (p. 108).   
Ong argued that “personal presence in a text is not the same as the presence of two 
persons to one another in spoken dialogue” (2002, p. 521).  He adds, “And indeed in some 
texts—such as lists, certain perfunctory reports, and the like—the presence of the text’s author 
can be minimized.  But, however remotely, it is there, although it lies in the background” (p. 
521).  This is essential because if we say that presence is a necessary component of friendship, 
then ultimately it still would be made manifest in communication that would be strictly textual 





spirits, is exemplified paradigmatically in live conversation, and perhaps in moments of silence 
together” (p. xix).   
Intimacy and Distance 
 All relationships have an element of distance because of the nature of what it means to be 
a human being with consciousness and intimacy has its limits. In his interview with Altree, Ong 
said: 
The same is true of all human beings.  Even a husband and wife never find out what it 
feels like to be the other.  They try, they get awfully close.  But no matter what, each of 
us remains isolated in his or her own consciousness, each one in his own little prison.  
And yet such isolated beings are the only ones on earth who can communicate.  This is 
what a mere animal can’t do.  He can’t say “I” can’t enter into himself in isolation.  So he 
has nothing to say.  We can communicate, paradoxically, because we are completely 
different from one another.  (p. 398) 
Distancing is a natural part of our relationships with others, both in the physical realm 
and in cyberspace.  Zhao pointed out that in the physical domain, we have ways of keeping 
others closed off from our spaces—He called these involvement shields and wrote, “Besides 
using walls and gates that physically keep others from getting within range, people also create 
‘situational closures’ to symbolically close off a region into which they retreat.  For example, a 
door curtain, even if transparent”  (p. 576).  Online, he noted, we do the same—we might 





In either region, the establishment of compresence also depends on people’s willingness 
to engage and be engaged by others, as various involvement shields can be deployed to 
block access if people are not interested in participating.  (p. 578) 
Zhao explained that “electronic text chat” “combines the permanence of writing and the 
synchronicity of speaking” and that this is “an entirely new mode of human contact created by 
the internet” (p. 462).  Zhao explained that “In the traditional society, intimacy is closely tied to 
physical proximity and others become progressively more anonymous as they are distanced from 
each other.    
 Communicative technologies have altered our experience of space and time, and as a 
result, because of the connection between friendship and space and time, we find ourselves at the 
forefront of new possibilities for connection.  Different technologies have different effects and 
are conducive to different forms of encounter and intimacy.  Mok, Wellman, and Carrasco 
(2010) found that email, for example, had minimal effects on relationship maintenance.  At the 
time of the study, the trio noted that face-to-face communication between friends and relatives 
remained unchanged from the 1970s to the time of the study.  Phone contact did slightly 
increase.  Yang, Brown, and Braun (2014) observed that specific channels that are more 
conducive to building and fostering intimacy than others.  For example, they noted that cell 
phones are the most intimate and social networking sites the least.   
Ong wrote the following concerning intimacy and electronic media: 
Does Hopkins electrically implemented relationship with his subject establish any special 
relationship with his readers?  It does establish a new kind of directness in the 





Chambers also noted a new intimacy.  Chambers (2013) argued that “today’s technologically 
mediated relationships give rise to a new, mediated intimacy which incorporates friendship and 
reflects the fluid, diverse and informal nature of contemporary personal interactions” (p. 45).   
Adams (1998) pointed out that not only are we altering our friendships but that we are 
developing technology that suits the purpose of forming and maintaining friendships.   
Zhao argued that we need to update Schutz’ divisions to incorporate a third realm, 
“consociated contemporaries” (p. 91).  This group shares time but not space, he explains.  There 
are new spaces for contact and it requires new understandings.  The third realm, specifically, 
Zhao argued is one in which there is an interaction between face and device.  In this realm, the 
mediated realm, there is a significant amount of trust that must occur in addition to the usual trust 
between two persons in dialogue.  Zhao uses the example of a mailperson delivering a letter 
between two people.  Each person trusts in their understanding of the system to deliver their 






Sunaisthesis:  The Synechdotal Activity of Friendship Ethics 
“I don’t need a friend who changes when I change and who nods when I nod; my shadow does 
that much better.” 
– Plutarch 
 Plutarch made an important observation about friendship.  Our friends are not those who 
mirror us.  Our friends are those with whom our selves become visible to us, but in a way that 
generates and transforms meaning.   Currently, there is a debate that is ongoing about the nature 
of friendship and ethical being in a media-saturated age.  McFall (2012), for example, argued 
that character friendships cannot be created online.  He added that hybridized character 
friendships are possible but cannot be sustained only through mediated communication.  Valor 
(2012) reasoned that social media do support and strengthen friendships, but they must 
supplement and not substitute for face-to-face interactions.  Bennett asked, “Just what does it 
mean to be a true friend?  Is it the same in 2014 as it was twenty years ago?  Is the online friend 
synonymous with or an adequate substitute for the friend who lives down the street?” (p. 251) 
and along these same lines, what does it mean to be a good friend?   
Multiple scholars have attempted to understand the essential qualities of friendship, one 
of the earliest of which was Aristotle in the Nichomachean Ethics and Eduemonian Ethics.  
Aristotle argued that friendship was itself a virtue, and Cooper (1980) argued that Aristotelian 
virtues fail to even manifest in the absence of authentic friendship.  There is no doubt about the 
importance of friendship in our lives, especially today.  Suttles (1970) explained that 
“Friendships are especially valued in a population where social contracts have outgrown the 





Friendship is necessary for human flourishing, but technological changes have affected how we 
interact with others.   
Von Heyking (2008) wrote that “Aristotle’s friendship teaching has been called the 
‘peak’ of his moral teaching” (p. 179).  However, diving deeper, Von Heyking wrote, “His 
understanding of sunaisthesis (joint perception/awareness) as the activity of virtue friendship has 
been called the ‘peak of the peak” (p. 179).  Von Heyking argued that “Friendship is built into 
the very way human beings think and act toward one another as moral agents, which shows its 
foundational role for political life” (p. 179).  He continued, “Because sunaisthesis cannot be 
judged by a standard or rule outside of itself, the paper considers the emphasis Aristotle places 
on the practice of friendship” (p. 179).  Friendship, he noted, is considered “to be the highest and 
‘most divine’ human capacity” (p. 179). Sunaisthesis is essential for friendship and all human 
flourishing.  Sunaisthesis is central to ethics, Liu explained, because it “refers to the way friends 
feel the life or existence of each as good, meaningful, and desirable”  (p. 589).  For Liu, 
sunaisthesis is “a way that friends grasp each other’s lives” (p. 590).  As such, she explained 
“sunaisthesis is therefore a fundamental form of intimacy and an indispensable component of 
friendship” (p. 590).  She added that “We are not really close to our friends unless we have a 
feeling for what gives their lives meaning or what moves them” (p. 590).  She continued, “And 
as a way of appreciating the goodness in each other’s lives, sunaisthesis would also appear to be 
necessary for friendships” (p. 590).  Sunaisthesis, Liu argued, is “one of the most 
important…activities of friendship” (p. 590).  Because sunaisthesis is the activity of virtue 
friendship, it then will be the focus of this chapter.  This chapter begins by overviewing the 
importance of sunaisthesis for Aristotle’s moral philosophy and friendship.  It reviews the 





sunaisthesis by examining it as the synthesis of human living together, perceiving together, and 
doing together within a communication framework.  After, it concludes that as communicative, it 
can and does occur online.   
Aristotle on Friendship 
For Aristotle, there were types of friendship—utility, pleasure, and virtue.  The most 
desirable friendship for the good life is virtue-friendship.  McFall (2012), drawing from 
Aristotle, explained that character-friends “provide for each other, an opportunity for robust 
moral reflection” (p. 222).  Friendship is a conduit for human flourishing, and arguably for 
Aristotle, the conduit for human flourishing.  Multiple scholars recognize the importance of 
friendship for Aristotle’s entire project on ethics.  Cooper (1980), as noted before, noted it was 
the central component of all of his work.  Thomas (1993) explained, “It is clear that Aristotle 
took friendship to contribute in an enormous way to human flourishing” (p. 48).  Kaliarnta 
(2016) wrote, “Aristotle’s theory of the good life and in particular, his analysis of the role that 
friendships play in achieving human flourishing, has been one of the most influential and long-
lasting theories on human connections and friendships” (p. 66).  Von Heyking (2017) argued that 
“friendship is the quintessential human activity, where the soul and its constituent parts are fully 
activated in their intellectual and moral capacities” (p. 179).   He added that for Aristotle, 
friendship was “an intellectual and moral activity” (p. 180).  As an intellectual activity, 
friendship is related to the ecology of knowing.  One reason why this issue is so pressing is that 
friendship is foundational to the creation of knowledge itself, and communicative practices 
within friendships are one way in which knowledge is produced.  Maines (1989)  even equated 
an “ecology of friendship” with “an ecology of knowing” (p. 198).  Cooper (1980) noted that 





natural principles but requires self-knowledge and conscious self-affirmation.  Self-knowledge is 
thus an essential part of what it is to flourish” (p. 341).  Von Heyking added, “Friendship is the 
expression of the human intellect whose nature it is to identify with the known” (p. 187).  Also 
associated with knowing is situating ourselves within a world of narrative and virtue structures.   
Rawlins (2009) wrote, “Friends also co-create deep understandings allowing for shared 
moral visions and rights unique to their friendship” (p. 1-2).   Friendship is an epistemological 
and ontological space, deeply entwined with our virtue structures.  He adds that “In close 
friendship we desire good things to happen to our friend because we care about this particular 
person” (p. 5).  From an Aristotelian perspective, our well-wishing, Rawlins showed, is “mutual” 
(p. 5).  He writes that this includes “reciprocated concern and actions to benefit each friend” (p. 
5).  These concerns and these actions, then, lead us to the realm of ethics, as there are significant 
choices involved in “connected, responsible, positive freedoms” (p. 9).  Rawlins argued that “It 
requires unforced yet mutually contingent choices to respond to each other as friends” (p. 9).  Up 
until this chapter, much of the discussion has revolved around several moments of choice within 
friendships—the choice to reach out, the choice to partake in dialogue, the choice of how to 
communicate. 
 For Rawlins, ethics specifically enter the arena of friendship when we make choices 
related to similarity and difference.  He wrote, “All communicative contexts are reflexive 
achievements.  When we share emerging moments of real time, we co-construct the ‘now’ in 






All interpersonal events composing a ‘set of alternatives’ simultaneously are partially 
performed and partially perceived.  We construct choices as we select them and select 
among them as they are constructed. (p. 22) 
Co-creating knowledge and sharing moral visions requires the agreement in choice, and Aristotle 
addressed how friends can make good choices together using the term sunaisthesis.   
Sunaisthesis 
Living 
 To understand sunaisthesis, it is important to overview two ethical components of the 
good in friendship.  The first is desiring or doing good for others, the second with.  Rawlins 
explained that “In close friendship we desire good things to happen to our friend because we care 
about this particular person.  The activities compassing personal friendship occur for the most 
part in private settings out of public eyes and ears” (2009, p. 5).  Stocker (1981) considers 
friendship from a teleological position and argues that teleology alone is not sufficient in 
understanding the good acts we do for our friends and that they do for us.  He wrote, “To 
understand them we must recur to their source, or arche not simply their end, or telos” (p. 747).  
He then examined the arche of friendship.  For Stocker, we first begin with the friendly act itself, 
“to identify it as a friendly act” that “only its purpose, goals, ends, desires, and the like are 
critical” (p. 748).  He added that “Character and other elements we act out of are relevant if at 
all, only because and to the extent they are reducible to teleological elements” (p. 748).  He noted 
that there is a difference between “friendly acts done for a friend” and “acts done out of general 






Doing Good for Others 
Sokolowski (2002) argued that virtue friendships require shared virtues.  He showed 
sharing virtues “involves calibration” and honing.  He continued that “It demands that in the 
contingences and vicissitudes of life we possess the insight and the character to achieve truly the 
good of another” (p. 462).  Not only then do we need to be moral agents, but we must meet our 
friend in the particular to know “precisely what he needs…and how he needs it” (p. 462).  To be 
able to do this requires the ability to share perceptions of the good.  Stocker considered this an 
“expansion” and an “ ‘intersubjectivizing’ of the good by me” (p. 459).  This is sunaisthesis.  It 
is the synecdochal activity that creates a “we” in the space of friendship.   
Sunaisthesis is used in both the Eudemonian and Nicomachean Ethics.  Flakne’s work 
(2005) demonstrated that sunaisthesis was “overlooked” and “misconstrued” in the majority of 
the literature, which was unfortunate because she considered it “central to Aristotle's philosophy 
of friendship” (p. 37).  Kosman (2004) wrote that the literal translation of sunaisthesis is co-
perception, although it was taken up by a later tradition to mean apperception.  He wrote that the 
latter tradition used in in a way that meant: 
either the inward awareness that accompanies perception (what we often call simply 
consciousness) or the self-awareness or self-consciousness of ourselves as conscious.  
But Aristotle here intends a more literal sense of sunaisthesis, a sense that can be heard in 
the etymology of the term:  the shared or common perception that friends enjoy. (p. 150) 
Von Heyking also breaks down the term specifically in Aristotle’s work.  He argued that 





beautiful.  Acting rigorously or nobly cannot be reduced either to following a rule nor 
subjectivity” (p. 183).  Continuing, he explained that: 
Adding the sun-prefix to form sunaisthesis was rare in antiquity.  Plutarch uses it to 
describe the fellow-feeling Solon created in Athens with his legal reforms.  However, its 
primary meaning in antiquity was self-consciousness without necessarily referring to 
another, and its meaning shifted to signify the interiorization of the self.  (p. 183) 
Flakne argued the term derives from suzen, that is, the social life, and aisthesis, or perception.   
Doing Good with Others 
 Liu (2010) wrote that “human living (to zen) is living together (to suzen)” (p. 580).  Her 
argument is part of a broader claim of Aristotle’s that we are social creatures by nature. She and 
Kosman (2004) both showed that Aristotle considers living together to consist of more than co-
location.  Liu wrote, “Aristotle equates living together with simply spending days (to 
sunemereuein) in each other’s company, an activity whose significance shows up most 
conspicuously in contrast to the lives of grazing animals” (p. 594).  She pointed out in Aristotle 
that although sheep graze together, they do not live together that human beings live together.  
Kosman addressed the misconception that a happy life requires self-sufficiency.  He warned that 
the notion “might lead us to view friends as an unnecessary addition to such a life”  (p. 135).  He 
wrote:  
It is peculiar to think of a happy person living in isolation, and more than just peculiar to 
think that such a person might choose to live his life apart from the company of others 
like himself, other persons, whom he might love and be loved by.  (p. 135) 






Liu explained that “Perceiving is part of to zen” (p. 583). Co-perceiving is part of to 
suzen.  Liu considered friends to be “second selves” because they, too, exist and feel pleasure 
from living.  She wrote “we need to jointly perceive (to sunaisthanesithai) friends, and this 
requires us to live together (to suzen) with them” (p. 583). Kosman asked, “What is a human life 
in the fullest sense of actively living, that is, as the end toward which the structures and powers 
of a human being are directed” (p. 136)?  For Aristotle, Kosman argued, “that it consists in the 
active exercises of perceiving and knowing” (p. 136).  He added that “therefore life in common 
with others must also consist of perceiving and knowing in common with them” (p. 136).    
Kosman struggled with a particular section in Aristotle in which Aristotle claims that 
perceiving and knowing is desirable.  He wrote that there is a translation error that has been 
perpetuated.   He draws our attention to a translation of Aristotle that claims that “to perceive and 
know oneself are what is most desirable for each person” (p. 137).  Kosman wrote, “According 
to interpretation, you will recall, friends are desirable because they provide an avenue, imperfect 
but all we have, to the pleasure and moral betterment that derives from self-awareness”  (p. 137).  
He  continued: 
If, in other words, we abstract consciousness in the sense of considering it without 
reference to the particular subject of consciousness, then there would be no difference 
between my desiring that I be conscious and my desiring that some other person be 
conscious. But that would be, Aristotle continues, like supposing that my desire to live 
might be satisfied by some other person living instead of me. (p. 138) 





For me to wish to be is for me to wish for my being, which is, for Aristotle, to wish for 
awareness in the form of subjectivity; and this subjectivity is not another characteristic of 
mine.  That the desire for life and thus for conscious is for each person a desire for his or 
her own consciousness does not then specify an additional element in the original desire, 
but a necessary part of the structure of that desire.  One may desire that there be life or 
that there be consciousness without desiring that life or consciousness be one’s own. (p.  
140) 
Kosman differentiated between the “exercises of consciousness” and “the mere possession of the 
powers of consciousness” (p. 141).  It is the exercise of consciousness that Aristotle believed we 
desire.  This is because amid “the society of friends,” the “power of thought” is transformed 
“into the activity of thought” (p. 145).  Kosman called this transformation the “power of 
consciousness” and that it “constitutes the end of human life” (p. 145).  The end to which all 
human life aims is to be conscious, which is impossible without being conscious in the 
consciousness of others.  Consciousness enacted with others is communication.   
 In her 2013 work, Danblon wrote that the translations that conflated sunaisthesis with 
conscience “reveals the epistemological gap between the Aristotelian conception of rationality 
and its modern version, especially as it is inherited by Descartes” (p. 501).  She wrote:  
What Aristotle called sunaisthesis is the human capacity to feel that one feels, to put 
together sensations and emotions, but also to interact with others by sharing (discursive) 
representations of this common feeling.  In other words, as an ancient version of the 
modern conscience, sunaisthesis is the human capacity to experience the common sense. 






Being together or even perceiving together is not the ultimate good.  It is doing together 
that is important.  It requires shared “contemplation,” “praxis,” “cooperation,” and collaboration”  
(Kosman, 2004, p. 148).  Eating in the same space is not a true “shared” activity.  Shared activity 
involves an “enlargement of being,” Kosman argued.  From this perspective, Kosman showed 
that co-living: 
is understood in a new way, such that being conscious together does not indicate being 
conscious, as it were, side by side, but forming together a partnership of consciousness, a 
community characterized by the common perception that is sunaisthesis.  (p. 148) 
This living though moves beyond perception and requires “shared plans and projects, communal 
hopes and memories, cooperative theories and strategies” and “common ways of looking at and 
experiencing our common world” (p. 149).    
Kosman added that the idea of “living together” “involves a corporate life properly called 
political, the life of comrades engaged in shard projects of language, thought, action, and 
culture” (p. 150).  He wrote that “the partnership of good friends will above all” according to 
Aristotle “be concerned with the goods of our lives, and will thus involve thinking together and 
feasting together” (p. 151).  His point was that “Reading sunaisthesis this way will enable us to 
parse correctly the passage I earlier cited as important to Aristotle’s argument: the perceiving of 
one’s friends is in a sense necessarily the perceiving of oneself and knowing oneself”  (p. 151).  
Kosman then argued that the translation should be “for one’s friend to perceive is necessarily in 
some sense for oneself to perceive, and in some sense, for oneself to know” (p. 151).   To justify 





It is not that I see myself in my friend and therefore see myself in seeing my friend.  It is 
rather that he and I, joining together in the partnership that friends constitute, become a 
conscious community, a single soul, as Diogenes recalls Aristotle to have said, dwelling 
in two bodies.  (p. 151) 
Aristotle insisted, Kosman argued, that sunaisthesis “be realized by common discourse” (p. 153).  
He added, “Sunaisthesis is not primarily what friendship provides, but part of an explanation of 
what is required if it is to be desirable” (p. 153).  Creating communicative works together is the 
end of sunaisthesis.   
 Emmeche (2019) explained that “for some forms of friendships, the agents not merely 
attend to common interests; their perception is shared, mediated by the very relationship as an 
embodied activity of distributed cognition” (p. 47).  He gave the example of art.  He pointed out 
instances in which “friends or colleagues work close together to solve problems or develop new 
forms of creative expression” (p. 47).  Emmeche explained that using Flakne’s perspective of 
sunaisthesis, it explains our limitations on the number of friends we can maintain.  It requires 
ongoing communicative labor that requires a significant amount of cognitive energy.   
Synecdoche and Sunaisthesis 
 In living, perceiving, and doing together, friends cease to exist as individual I’s and 
instead become a We.  Sunaisthesis is the synecdochal activity in word, thought, a deed that 
creates the We.  In 1964, Warren attempted to unravel the mystery of the term sunaisthesis in the 
work of Plotinus. He explained that “Sunaisthesis defies accurate translation, and the best I can 





it does not simply mean consciousness (the awareness of the duality of knower and 
known) or self-conscious (the awareness in which what is known is the knower).  Even 
when the terms are sunaisthesis hautou, one can not simply translate, ‘self-
consciousness.’  This phrase may mean a consciousness that one part of a mental whole 
has for another part, i.e. That we are thinking certain thoughts. (p. 90) 
Warren wrote that sunaisthesis “is a relation of part to whole, whole to part, and part to 
part” (p. 91).  He continued that “One might say that the particularly ‘sunaisthetizing’ agent is a 
kind of unity such that its consciousness or awareness is always of that unity itself” (p. 90).  As 
for the agent which enacts sunaisthesis, Warren argued that it “may be a particular individual or 
even the universe” (p. 91).  Warren wrote, “Sunaisthesis refers to a plurality in a unity and a 
consciousness or awareness in some way of that whole with itself (p. 91).  Sunaisthesis is 
awareness of my awareness, awareness of the other’s awareness, awareness of the Other’s 
awareness of my awareness, and the Other’s awareness of my awareness of their awareness.   
Flakne referred to sunaisthesis as “double intentionality” (p. 49). She wrote:   
What is important here is that in the kind of aesthesis that is sun-aesthesis, I intend toward 
both what my friend intends toward, and to her being-in-intention.  The sensible form that I 
‘take on’ in sunaisthesis, then, is that of my friend’ determined human life, a life organized 
around ends which tie together past, present, and future capacities for determination.  (p. 49) 
She added:  
Not only do I intend, in my aisthesis, my perception, to an object, but I also intend toward 





determined perceiving and knowing, a perceiving and knowing organized around ends that 
give you pleasure.  (p. 51) 
Drawing from Aristotle, Liu even argued that we cannot even perceive our own lives 
independent of friends.  She wrote, “we do not perceive either our own or each other’s lives 
directly, but rather through synecdochic activities that reveal the structure of the whole” (p. 589). 
For Liu, joint perception, sunaisthesis “requires an intimate acquaintance with each other’s lives” 
(p. 595).  She added, “This acquainting consists in knowledge of the character, history, and 
trajectory of a life, as well as sympathetic understanding of how that life has been experienced” 
(p. 594).  It is communicative.   It can only be achieved communicatively, not by being in one’s 
physical presence.   
In Eudemian Ethics,  Flakne argued that Aristotle differentiates between an abstract, 
particular living and social knowing and perceiving.  She wrote that “Sunaisthetic speech is a 
special kind of speech, one that someone pertains to the ethical ideal of self-sufficiency” (p. 49).  
She continued that  “Sunaisthetic speech transforms perceiving selves into ethical selves” (p. 49).  
The true good life requires being together and doing good together, and as such, is impossible 
without sunaisthesis.   
 Bennett (2016) argued that “As we transfer more and more of our human exchange to 
mediated environments such as Facebook, we inadvertently limit our ability to grow in 
relationships” (p. 256).  She insinuated that relationships that have been transferred to Facebook 
are more likely to be “sparse, superficial and unsatisfying” and went on that we must convince 
“ourselves that they are genuine” (p. 256).  She then added that “Trust, loyalty, faithfulness all 
are developed in an environment that is tangible, actual—a place where people are meeting face-





too was skeptical of the ability of technologically-mediated communication.  He argued that 
“technological communication” impedes our ability to morally reflect through friendship.  He 
also added that proximity did not necessarily facilitate “moral betterment” (p. 223).    McFall 
acknowledged that while mediated communication “can aid existing character-friendships,” he 
maintained that it cannot create or sustain them.   
Bennett and McFall are only two among many who are not encouraged by the direction 
that modern technology seems to be taking our friendships.  Many others are much more 
hopeful.  If we consider the three components of sunaisthesis, living, perceiving, and doing, we 
can evaluate the role of technology.  Vallor (2012) pointed out that the notion of the shared life is 
problematic when we interpret Aristotle in light of technology.  He wrote, “deeper reflection on 
the meaning of the shared life (suzen) for Aristotle raises important and troubling questions about 
the capacity of online social media to support complete friendships of virtue in the contemporary 
world” (p. 185).   He added that without co-location, “social media and other forms of online 
interaction seem antithetical to shared living” (p. 288).  Human living is togetherness.    
Togetherness is quite possible today in online environments, offline environments, or 
using a combination of the two in a hybridized style of relation.  Mary Chayko (2012) considered 
the possibilities for relationships that exist as a result of our technology and explored the notion 
of the sociomental bond.  She defined these bonds as existing “primarily in a mental realm, a 
space that is not created solely in the imagination of one individual but requires two or more 
minds” (p. 1).  She argued that “they are no less real for being located in a mental realm. They 
are the manifestation of an absolutely genuine and often deeply felt sense that despite physical 





with another person, one that does not depend on face-to-face meetings to be initiated or 
maintained” (p. 2).   Chayko pointed out that: 
Even when the people involved in a sociomental connection do not know, have never 
seen, and cannot accurately visualize one another, a kind of mental pathway exists 
between them, along which information may be passed or people may otherwise 
influence one another. It is as though a passageway to many potential forms of social 
exchange and social relationship has been opened. The people involved may not be aware 
of this passageway or “use” it in any but the most weakly realized fashion, but due to the 
sociomental connection that exists, they have an increased opportunity to use it at some 
point in the future. Thus many more outcomes to an interpersonal association (including 
face-to-face relationships, friendships, and even love affairs are possible when a mental 
pathway has first been opened between two people in the form of a sociomental 
connection. (p. 73) 
Elder (2014) argued that social media preserves the relevantly human and valuable portions of 
life, especially reasoning, play, and exchange of ideas” (p. 287) and as such, can also lead to the 
sharing of flourishing lives.   
Elder (2010) highlighted that Aristotle associated shared living with conversation and 
thought.  He argued that “Any medium allowing friends to share conversations and thought 
should thus be compatible with virtue friendship” (p. 288).  More specifically, Elder wrote:  
Our capacity to share our lives and thoughts via language and other symbolic 





experiences, and perceptions that constitutes the realest sense of living together, and 
conversations are facilitated rather than discouraged by many social media. (p. 289) 
Von Heyking (2017), in a response to critics of his work The Form of Politics, argued that to 
even be able to asynchronously share, across time and space, his response to his critics is an 
example of sunaisthesis.  Their work is collaborative.  Von Heyking even suggested that one 
partner can even be silent.   
Munn (2012) argues that: 
Under my account of shared activity, friends engaged in such activity jointly pursue a 
goal when all of them not only desire a particular outcome, but also desire that the 
outcome be the product of the combined activity of the group, as it is composed.  As 
friends, they may be willing to reduce the likelihood of achieving the desired outcome, in 
order to ensure that if it is achieved, the group which achieves it is composed of the 
friends.  (p. 4) 
Munn (2012) places the sharing solely within the communicative praxis realm.  He 
writes, “I take communication to be the planning of activity, the sharing of ideas, the 
development of procedures and so on, while activity involves putting the things into praxis” (p. 
4).  The foundations of friendship related to mutual caring and intimacy can only arise through 
communicative praxis.  He writes, “two components commonly held to be required for 
friendship, namely mutual caring and intimacy, predominantly arise through shared experience, 
rather than independently of it (p. 9).  Friendship allows for a space of sharing moral visions.  In 






Conclusion:  Communication Ethics and Digitized Friendship 
In Book VII of Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle argued that friendship “is either itself a virtue 
or connected with virtue” (1155a).  In the beginning of this work, it was noted that one reason for 
an approach to friendship as communicative phenomenon is that it allows us to attend to the 
historic moment we are currently in and that it frames communication in a way that allows us to 
navigate friendship in an age of virtue contention. Whether friendship is a good, a faculty, or a 
virtue does not discount framing friendship as a communicative phenomenon.   Arnett and 
Arneson define a communicative ethic as a “value-laden philosophy of communication that gives 
weight to issues and events” (p. 9).  They likened it to an “evaluative” house.  The foundation of 
the particular communication ethic in this chapter is to begin from the framework that friendship 
is a communicative phenomenon and expand.   
Eberwein and Porlezza (2016) have argued that technology has led to a challenge of 
communication ethics in our age in two ways.  First, they wrote that “digitization of the media 
creates new ethical problems that stimulate calls for a redefinitions of the norms and values of 
public communication” (p. 328).  Second, they argued that “new instruments of web-based 
media observation introduce new possibilities for media (self-)regulation and accountability, thus 
complementing the initiatives of traditional institutions like press councils” (p. 328).     
Sociological literature recognizes several major social institutions, but generally friendship is 
not considered a major social institution across cultures.  The historical evidence, though, 
suggests that it is.  Friendship persists across time and place and is a central good that is 
protected and promoted in all cultures.  One cannot have happiness in the absence of others.  
There are multiple benefits to having friends.  Like discussed in the first chapter, pain tolerance 





cognitive benefits, such as slowing cognitive decline in older adults (James, Wilson, Barnes & 
Bennett, 2011).  Also, social network size has been linked inversely to depression (Hill, 
Griffiths, & House, 2015).  In childhood, friends help each other through the development 
process.   Friends make us better people, and they also help us participate and create meaning in 
the polis.   
Virtue Ethics 
To exemplify how friends help us become better people and better citizens, Stocker (1981) 
explained that friends enlarge our mentality of the good.  He wrote, “This expansion of my desire 
for the good, this ‘intersubjectivizing’ of the good by me, means that I have become more 
virtuous, more human, more perfect as an agent.  (p. 459).  Meilaender (1981) argued that 
envisioning an Aristotelian perspective on friendship can prove problematic in our time.  This is 
because we fail to recognize the nature of friendship in the formation of virtue and moral 
excellence.  To explain this, he wrote: 
In our society the private bond of friendship is usually regarded as far less important than 
the public bond of citizenship.  And indeed, if the preferential character of friendship 
creates problems for Christian ethics, it is not difficult to see why the more universal 
bond of citizenship might have done to seem more deserving as a focus for our attention 
and activity. (p. 68) 
He added:   
Friendship, as we understand it today—an intimate, personal, and private bond among a 
small group of people—is for Aristotle only a more perfect expression of the bond which 





The relationship of friendship and the effects on character development and society at 
large uniquely calls for a virtue ethics approach.  Even more specifically, as a communicative 
phenomenon, a communication ethics approach grounded in virtue ethics is pressing.   
Traditionally, empirical studies in mediated communication and their effects trend in 
deontological and utilitarian frameworks (Vallor, 2012).   In an earlier work, Vallor (2010) 
argued that these frameworks have drastically narrowed our understanding of the effects of 
technology on human flourishing.   From a deontological and utilitarian perspective, 
technologies’ roles and effects on friendship are defined and judged in measurable and 
quantifiable ways associated with the individual and fail to recognize friendship as between 
persons.  To explain this problem, Vallor wrote:   
Such studies can encourage a narrowly utilitarian calculus that draws conclusions about 
the impact of new social media on user’s well-being simply from measures of their 
enjoyment of psychosocial goods such as feelings of ‘life satisfaction’, ‘self-esteem’ or 
‘social capital. ’ (Vallor, 2012, p. 187).   
These frameworks often tend to be narrowly focused on particular times, and the broader nature 
of technological impacts over the course of human history are left out.  Vallor suggested as a 
solution a turn to virtue ethics. Virtue ethics, she explains, “has the ability to account for the 
long-term and cumulative impact of particular practices on our character” (p. 187).  As 
friendship has been important in every era of human history, scholarship that is attentive to its 
nature in history and the practices which it encourages and also effects it is important.   
 Stocker (1981) also recognized problems with a teleological approach to understanding 
friendship.  He used the example of courage to show us that we run the risk of reifying pratcies 





One can act in order to show that one is courageous.  But to act for that end need not be 
to act courageously, nor conversely.  Rather to act courageously constitutive involves 
acting from a certain appreciation of the situations danger, a suitable handling of fear, and 
the like.  And these features, among others, are not amenable to a teleological 
understanding.  Thus, there is no goal, properly so-called the seeking of which is, as such, 
to act courageously.  (p. 758) 
Therapeutic culture finds value in teleological perspectives.  According to the New York Times 
(https://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/05/books/books-of-the-times-classic-advice-please-leave-
well-enough-alone.html) Dale Carnegie’s How to Win Friends and Influence People (1936) has 
sold over 30 million copies.  One of his suggestions in his work was for people to be sincere.  
But in telling someone to be sincere, it is impossible then for them to be sincere.  Rather than be 
sincere, their focus of attention is on the state of being so.  When we tell someone what they 
ought to do in a friendship, we ignore that friendships are communicative phenomenon that 
develop between persons.  Friends ought to meet in person more.  Friends must spend more time 
meeting face-to-face.  These perspectives run the risk of treating the particular practices as 
means to ends rather than allowing the practices to naturally evolve through discourse.    
Scult (1989) argues that through discourse, friends “raise their relationship to the highest 
moral level” (p. 206).  Scult invoked hommonoia to explain that friendship is not a “relationship 
that exists for the sake of satisfying our yearning for companionship” (p. 208).  He says that “It is 
an idea to guide us in developing the moral dimension of already existing institutional and quasi-
institutional relationships” (p. 308).  He then argued that the “instrumental function” of 
friendship is to “bring out the communal sensibilities that exist between individuals in order for 





good judgment” (p. 208).   Scult felt that virtue attraction was the cement of friendships.  He 
wrote it was because friends are those with whom we engage in “moral pursuits” (p. 209).  
Sokolowski (2002) argued that “Friendship exceeds justice as a human perfection” (p. 452).  He 
explained that “The virtues are embodiments of practical intelligence” and that:   
We ourselves are the works of doing.  Virtues, therefore, are embodiments of practical 
reason, and the installation of reason into our inclinations takes place through the actions 
we perform and the choices we make. (p. 453) 
Communication Ethics 
Fritz (2014) in advancing the notion of professional civility as a communicative virtue, 
argued that it can provide a home for care of institutions.  She explained that “Care for 
institutions involves thoughtful engagement of an organization’s horizon of possibilities and a 
thoughtful, deliberate phenomenological turning toward key facets of organizational experience” 
(p. 223).  This work has been an exercise in the thoughtful engagement of friendship’s horizon of 
possibilities and has turned to the key facets of experience related to friendship, outlined in each 
chapter.   
Fritz argued that MacIntyre considered institutions “necessary to reach the telos of human 
flourishing” (p. 224) and in the previous chapter and throughout this work, it has been a central 
tenet that from Aristotle and beyond, friendship has been considered instrumental in human 
flourishing.  Fritz explained that with organizations, and similarly institutions, we are summed 
“to tend to them with the care that we extend to human Others” (p. 223).  She continues that 
“Such care embraces a unity of contraries” (p. 223) and necessitates a reflection cares for 





and private life” (p. 224).  Fritz advocated for protected and promoting those specific practices 
which led to professional flourishing in the workplace.   
Fritz incorporated a conceptual framework that centered on three components: 
1) “the need to see beyond immediate presenting problems occurring in institutional 
contexts” 
2)  “the importance of taking a long-term view rather than a short-term view of 
organizational health”  
3) “and a rejection of the equivalent, in organizational terms, of temporary comfort 
reflective of a therapeutic response in the interpersonal context”  
In this conclusion, the goal is to adapt the above framework to attend to friendship as an 
institutional from a communications ethics approach, and to engage in the particular forms of 
communication work and associated practices of each highlighted throughout this work.   
We have already shown that there is some substantial disagreement in our era about what 
constitutes friendship itself.  Arnett, Fritz, and Bell (2009) argued that each communication ethic 
“carries or reflects two sorts of related goods” (p. 4).  The first, the explained, is “a substantive 
good” and the second “is a set of communicative practices that ensures active protection and 
promotion of a given good” (p. 4).   The trio suggested that the defining good of our postmodern 
age is “difference” (p. 5).  Arnett (2010) has argued that a defining feature of philosophy of 
communication that helps situate it as unique from philosophy in general is its attention to the 
particulars.  Regarding this attention, he drew from Arendt and wrote, “Philosophy of 
communication engages particulars contingent on a particular situation, a particular moment, and 





stood the test of time, he noted Aristotle’s virtue ethics and Buber’s dialogue, and said that they 
“offer examples of temporal conviction that remain significant as long as a given theory 
continues to pass a pragmatic test of public opinion in the public domain” (p. 58).  The entry 
point of the particular is particularly relevant for friendship studies.   
Elder (2010) noted that “The shared good life” needs to address the universal good of 
human happiness and “particular goods for particular” human beings (p. 288).  Sokowlowski 
(2002) said that virtue friendships require shared virtues.  He showed sharing virtues “involves 
calibration” and honing.  He continued that “It demands that in the contingences and vicissitudes 
of life we possess the insight and the character to achieve truly the good of another” (p. 462).  
Not only then do we need to be moral agents, but we must meet our friend in the particular to 
know “precisely what he needs…and how he needs it” (p. 462).  A philosophy of communication 
approach can help then meet the friendship in the way it needs met and avoid the pitfall of 
reification.   
An Ethical Analysis 
 Looking back to earlier, Arnett, Fritz and Bell (2009) highlighted a twofold nature of 
goods.  First, there is a substantive good, and secondary are a set of practices that protect and 
promote that good.  On one level, we might say that human flourishing is the substantive good 
and friendship is one of a set of practices that protect and promote that good.  We can also say 
that friendship is a substantive good, and investigate the particular practices that might protect 
and promote friendship.  This work will do so, and it will examine the themes written about in 
each chapter as a practice.  Finally, we also might say that each individual theme itself is a good 
and then examine the individual practices that protect and promote each.  This work will also do 






 To begin, it seems pertinent first to review the specific conceptualization of each theme 
from a communicative framework and highlight some of the major ideas from each.  In Chapter 
Two, we began by discussing the nature of Alfred Schutz’ work on intersubjectivity and its 
importance to all social relationships.  All human beings are by nature of being human embedded 
in an already social world that existed before their birth and will continue to exist after their 
death.  Intersubjectivity is the state of only knowing the world in the between of persons, as all 
thought and knowledge are socially created.  Schutz’s approach is Aristotelian, which we see 
later, although not explicitly called such.   
In this natural state of every day existence, we take for granted our world, and because of 
that, we also take for granted the existence of other humans.  We take for granted that they exist 
like we exist, and we are able to do so because of the thesis of general reciprocity.  For most of 
human history, we encountered others in their originary presence first bodily.  Their bodies were 
presented to us as objects, and much like we move through the apperceptive process to envision 
that they have a heart, and stomach and all other organs and physical feature we can imagine, we 
also do so with their consciousness.  With their consciousness, it cannot be accessed from the 
outside in any type of tangible way.  Instead, we must rely on their words to grasp their 
interiority.  When we encounter the bodies of others in our world, they are given to us in their 
originary presence.  When we enter a space in which it becomes possible to communicate one’s 
interior and make it exterior through language, we find ourselves in a communicative common 
environment.  This led us to define encounters as the communicative phenomenon in which 





 The ways in which we encounter others, that is enter into communicative common 
environments, is not space-bound in today’s world.  To illustrate this point, I will now examine 
some of the ways in which I encountered others yesterday.  To begin my day, I encountered each 
member of my family in some way as the house became alive.  Although my niece grumpily 
walked passed me with no communication whatsoever, in that moment we shared a 
communicative common environment.  When she closed the bathroom door, she used an 
“involvement shield.”    As I drove the kids to school, each driver I encountered on the road had 
the potential for a shared communicative environment.  Had I found myself sitting at the light 
too long, thinking about my dissertation, I surely would have heard at the minimum a honking 
horn.   
 When I dropped them off at school, kids and parents hustled and bustled to stay out of the 
way of other cars.  I encountered rushed parents and students looking forward to the day—or not, 
some looked quite irritated.  While I exchanged no words with any of them, some shared eye 
contact or a wave or nod.  In each of these instances, we see a case of encounter.  I arrived home 
and immediately checked my email.  Again, I encountered others, in their textual presence, in a 
very asynchronous way.  As I began working on my dissertation, I received an email from 
someone asking me to call.  When I encountered her email, I then called.  Throughout my day, 
whether mediated or not, I encountered many people in many different ways.  I encountered 
some both in person and via text.  The point is that in our peopled world, we encounter others 
regularly and in various different ways.   
 As a practice that helps achieve friendship, encounter is a necessary requirement, for we 
must share communicative common environments with someone to be their friend.  I cannot be 





good to promote and protect, there is much more to say.  From an ethical perspective, I believe 
that we can look at the specific practices that promote and protect encounter from an individual 
and institutional perspective.   
 At the institutional and individual level, we can apply Fritz’ earlier mentioned 
framework.  First, she suggested a commitment to long-term health, to seeing beyond just the 
present, and to be wary of therapeutic approaches.    Literature has tended to imagine technology 
as have opening the door for everyone to contact everyone all the time, but Zhao and Elesh 
(2008) explain this is a faulty way of looking at the state of electronic media in our world.  They 
explain, “It might be true that calling has led to more contact with friends and family members, 
but there is little sign that telephone calling opened up new social contacts” (p. 567).  This is 
problematic because as we know, philosophy of communication encourages a commitment to 
learning through difference.  Meeting difference, from this perspective, would mean encouraging 
the openness to encounter.  It means promoting the development of media and all endeavors that 
allow for encountering difference and promoting it, and protecting the public spheres in which 
encounter is possible.   
 In practice this, requires a recognition of very real problems that prevent others from 
pursuing encounters in difference.  First, would be comfort, of course.  Learning in difference 
requires communicative work.  Encounter requires communicative work, and cognitive and 
emotional energy. Another issue is stereotypes, prejudices, and bias.  Difference needs to be met 
with courage, and possibilities and positivities related to encounter should be promoted.  
Protecting diversity is of utmost importance in the realm of encounter.  Part of this is a secondary 
problem, and that is the digital divide.  While the majority of people in the United States do have 





represent millions of people who do not.  And from a more global perspective, as of 2015 only 
about half of the world population even had access to the internet (https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-
D/Statistics/Documents/facts/ICTFactsFigures2015.pdf).  In the world’s least developed 
countries, under 10 percent had access to the internet.  With the various possibilities that merge 
from encounter alone and the role of encounter in human flourishing from its connection to 
friendship alone, ensuring that all have equal access to the spaces in which humanity can access 
others should be priority.   
 Zhao and Elesh (2008) noted the digital divide as one among several issues related to 
misconceptions about our possibilities for encounter.  In addition to the digital divide, they note 
that there are “normative factors that restrict social connectivity” (p. 568).  Even within the same 
physical space, the pair note that “Being ‘within range’ is not the same as being available for 
contact” (p. 569).  Indeed, our earlier comment about stereotypes and prejudices apply here.  
While some normative constraints are beneficial, others are harmful.  Here then, a promotion and 
protection of an ongoing conversation about the nature of these restraints and their constant 
evaluation and reevaluation in the public sphere is necessary.   
 Particularity 
 In the third chapter, the phenomenon we investigated was particularity.  There, we left off 
from the encounter chapter saying that mere encounter is not enough to spark a friendship.  
Instead, there is a tension that emerges.  In each encounter there is the potential for a social 
relation, and in the communicative process one will arise through the tension between mere 
encounter and particularity.  In the chapter, we identified that particularity is the reciprocal 
recognition of the other’s unique consciousness (interiority) through voice within a context of 





one’s unique consciousness that belongs to no other human being nor ever will.  Ong, in several 
of his works including In the Human Grain (1967b), explained that the atoms in our bodies are 
millions of years old and for them all to come together to create the being that is us is no less 
than proof that God exists.  If we go further, what a miracle that the atoms in two bodies build to 
give rise to two unique interiorities that they come together to do good things together!   
 Doing good things together means that we have an expression into the outer world of our 
consciousness—we communicate.  Everyone does, but to move from an everyday encounter to a 
relation requires a recognition of one’s particularity.  And that alone is not enough—it must be 
reciprocal and voluntary.  Using Anton’s work, it is important to remember that this process 
cannot be forced or scripted.  We dwell in the what is said, we dwell in our friend, and we dwell 
in the friendship without stopping to reflect on these things in themselves.  In the moment’s that 
we do, then focus of our attention changes.  Like encounter, as a practice particularity is 
naturally associated with human flourishing because it is a practice that leads to the good of 
friendship (and other important social relationships).  
On one hand, one of the reasons that we should protect and promote particularity is 
because it, itself, is a good.  Aristotle’s work on ethics discussed the nature of pleasure, pain, and 
our purpose in life.  While not all things that are good bring pleasure, particularity DOES.  
Revisiting chapter three, remember that Nathaniel Branden highlighted that human beings 
experience actual joy when we experience being “visible” as unique individuals to others.  Recall 
that he wrote:   
When we encounter a person who thinks as we do, who notices what we notice, who 





do we experience a strong sense of affinity with such a person but also we can experience 
our self through our perception of that person. (p. 70) 
The practices then that allow us to even express ourselves as particulars in our world, then, need 
to be protected and promoted.  The protection of autonomy, and choice but managed and 
negotiated through the tension of similarity and difference embedded in difference is one of 
Rawlins major contributions to friendship.   
To clarify the specific practices to promote and protect related to the overall good of 
particularity requires andeeper understanding of the role of particularity in creating the virtuous 
individual.  The very recognition of the good is a co-created construct.  To explain this process, 
Stocker (1981) writes the following:   
I do not seek this larger good simply because it is useful for me.  If I were to do so, my 
‘perfect’ friendship would have slipped into being a friendship based on utility. Nor do I 
seek this larger good simply because it gives me a good feelings to do so, because it is 
pleasant to me.  If I were to do so, my ‘perfect’ friendship would have deviated into being 
a friendship based on pleasure.  Rather, I see this good for another because I have become 
someone who is capable of friendship, someone who can desire and accomplish the good 
of others as my own good.  I want good things not only for myself but for others as well, 
and the others in question have the same disposition toward me.  The friendship is 
reciprocal and mutually acknowledged.  This reciprocal and enlarged well-wishing 
involved a categorical form.  It is a highly sophisticated intellectual structure.  It is a form 
of recognition or identification.  The good of my friend is identified as my own good, and 
my good is identified as the good of my friend, and both of us rejoice in the 





Being able to have virtuous friendship requires intimate knowledge about the friend, 
understanding their particular being, because to be a good friend means to do good things for the 
other friend, which requires recognition.  Stocker explains further:   
Perfect friendship, friendship of the highest kind, requires that each of the friends wishes and 
performs the good of the other friend.  He wills the good of his friend; that is, he takes the 
good of the friend as his own good.  When I act with and for a friend, I act in such a way that 
what is good for the friend as such, is wished for and done as my own good.  His good, as 
good for him, has become my good, and he acts in the same manner toward me.  The good 
each of us seeks is not just our own individual good but the good in common and the good 
for the other.  If my friend and I are accomplishing something as friends, I am not just trying 
to do something that benefits me; I am trying to do something that benefits him as well, and I 
do it precisely as benefiting him.  Its being good for him has become good for me.  I have 
enlarged my sense of what is good for me.  I wish not only things that benefit me 
individually, but also things that benefit others (my friends), and I wish those things precisely 
as benefiting them.   
In the third chapter and into the fourth, the role of dialogue is recognized as important for the 
development of particularity between persons.  Therefore, particular practices that promote and 
protect authentic dialogue are those that need to be in focus.  Media that help facilitate this need 
to be in the forefront of our discussions.  While there is rhetoric about the negative effects of 
technology on our relationships, more emphasis needs to be placed on the positives of 
technology.  Using one single app like Snapchat, users have at their fingertips voice, video, text, 





games with others.  Platforms like Youtube allowed me to take videos of my world and life and 
share them with my friend in Monterrey as she and I shared a common goal of language learning.   
 From a philosophy of communication approach, using the Fritzian framework, again 
long-term views and the rejection of temporary comfort are important.  In a future work, I intend 
on working on a pedagogy of interiority.  The evolution of human consciousness relating to 
media is a concept that would benefit a general education curriculum.  However, to be able to 
contextualize media consumption and the role of the self and self expression in general is 
important within the broad scales of human history, one that can engage in the promotion and 
protection of particularity, providing a “why.”   
Dialogue 
Dialogue was an important component in the process of drawing out the interiority of the 
other and allowing for the emergence of particularity.  As noted previously, Ong was influenced 
greatly by Buber’s work.  In the act of coming into relation with other people, we draw on a 
stock of knowledge that brings forth an interpretive process.  Human thought in its nature is 
binary and “breaks” down what we see.  This is paradigmatic of language, as language is equally 
digitizing and breaks down as well as brings up.  For example, we are well aware that in the 
process of naming, the word given to the object of intention is not the object of intention itself.  
Words are arbitrary representations of the objects of intentionality.  However, in entering 
discourse and dialogue, words give life and representation to some things that are very really and 
not tangible, like the inner consciousness of others.   In addition to dialogue being necessary for 
particularity, it is also the only way in which a friendship can become such an “object” that it can 
be identified as such.  Friends co-create meaning, including the meaning that their unique 





 Chapter Four identifies several challenges related to dialogue and the interpretive 
process, and this is an opening for direction for a discussion on ethics.  Dialogue is clearly a 
practice that leads to human flourishing and friendship.  But dialogue is a good that needs 
protected in and of itself.  For this work, specifically, the goal is to stay as close to possible to an 
understanding of the communicative practices that promote and protect dialogue from the 
perspective of friendship and friendship ethics.   
 First, related to the co-creation of meaning, it is important to be mindful of the current 
conversation that is questioning the quality of online friendship or its authenticity or 
genuineness.  Based on the philosophical underpinnings, friendship’s significance is co-created 
in the between of persons.  As such, we employ evaluative deontological and utilitarian 
universals to relationships that are not particularly ours.   For one, friendships vary and change 
over the course of lifespans and across time and place.  Some friendships look much different 
than others.  Some are considered to have “weak ties” or dismissed as not “true” but instead 
“friendly relations.”   Rather than discussions of the nature of “true” friendship’s ability to occur 
online, from a philosophy of communication perspective the focus would be better centered on 
what practices in mediated settings can protect and promote the dialogic space that allows for the 
co-creation of friendship.  What spaces encourage people to engage in dialogue?  What can we 
do to protect these and encourage their use?   
 Throughout the chapter, the lack of cues was a main focus.  The lack of cues does reduce 
the available information for interpreting the other.  This causes, because of the nature of human 
thought and language, the interpreter to draw from their stock of knowledge from their 
protentions and retentions more so than the face-to-face setting.  Text creates phenomenological 





closeness.  From a Fritzian framework and philosophy of communication perspective, though, a 
more situated and long-term perspective is needed.   
 Like noted in the chapter, it is important to resist lamenting the loss of cues.  Loss of cues 
is not inherently negative, nor is distance.   As we saw in the chapter, studies show that when 
cues are reduced there are actually several positives.  The more reduced the cues and the more an 
individual must rely on words alone, the more introspective they must be.  They tend to be much 
more deliberate in their messages.  To exemplify this, I am going to explain a game that I play in 
my classes when we review verbal and nonverbal communication.   
 Almost all my students are familiar with charades, and I find great joy in bringing the 
game of Taboo into the classroom and telling them it is “reverse charades.”  Rather than 
eliminating the verbal, it eliminates the nonverbal.  Students must rely on their words to get their 
teammates to guess particular words that they have drawn on cards.  At the end of the activity, I 
tell them the following.  I ask them how many are good at painting.  A few raise their hands, but 
never very many.  When a student enters a class on painting, no matter they possess when they 
come in, they will learn particular skills, techniques and a strong knowledge base in order to 
leave better than when they come in.  And so it is with communication.  While it is natural to 
humans, doing it well or in the most effective way is not natural.  Studies in communication—the 
how, the why—they are what provide, like the painting class, skills, techniques, and knowledge.  
When a student leaves a painting class, the teacher cannot supply them with something they will 
need to continue to grow and create—this is the paints, the materials.  When I ask the students 
what the materials are of communication, they say words.  Words, yes, are the materials and as 
nonverbal cues are reduced, a deliberateness and level of introspection is required more so than 





The answer is learning, from learning.  From reading, from education, and from communicating 
with others.  Philosophy of communication directs us to a commitment to always learning, 
particularly from difference, and this continues to be a focal point, even more so in an age where 
cues are reduced and our words often stand alone.   
 One final problem area to probe here at the end is relate to a small section of chapter four 
where I noted that in our technological age, sometimes we may not be certain at all who, if 
anyone, will be on the other end of our message.  Not are we even unsure if anyone at all will 
read our messages, we now are in an era where “deep fakes” are a reality and a concern.  
Chesney and Citron (2019) wrote an extensive review covering the challenges and potential 
benefits that deep fakes have for culture.  They wrote, “The ability to distort reality has taken an 
exponential leap forward with ‘deep fake technology” (p. 1753).  The define deep fake 
technology as audio and visual technology that makes it possible to depict “real people” of 
“saying and doing things they never did or said” (p. 1753).   For the reasons discussed in the 
chapter, mediated communication is already conducive to depersonalization.  
Arnett and Arneson (2014) noted that Friedman suggested a “need for ‘existential trust’” in 
response to Buber’s claim that “existential mistrust has dominated” our time (p. 16).  They 
continued that “With a loss of trust, we lose the ability to distinguish genuine problems from 
manufactured problems, the genuine friend from a disingenuous salesperson, and genuine hope 
from a loss cause” (p. 16).  Instead, there is always an underlying hidden meaning that is sought.  
The inability to trust that the other is genuine, let alone actually real, is problematic.  However, 
there is hope in Ong’s claim that all language conceals but also reveals.  Arnett and Arneson 
advocated for a dialogic civility perspective.  They wrote that, “A dialogic civility perspective on 





Specifically, they note the importance of listening to the demand of a particular moment, and this 
includes interpersonally listening to the particular moment and particularity of the friend.  They 
wrote, “Dialogue suggests that “we” more than “me” must guide the discourse of self, other, and 
the historical moment” (p. 5) and therefore, from a philosophy of communication approach, we 
must lean in on the “we” to guide us.   
Intimacy 
 In the chapter where we explored space and time, we examined the nature of intimacy 
and the tendency to imagine it as a space-bound phenomenon.  Just like social systems have been 
extended, so, too, has intimacy into the noosphere.  We can trace these changes historically.   
There are several themes related to intimacy that require a final glimpse in the arena of 
communication ethics.  Chambers noted the rhetoric “that IM, texting and social network sites 
are somehow undermining human intimacy and sociality” (p. 14).   Part of the issue, she argued, 
is that skeptics fail to recognize the importance of “weak ties.”  She wrote in more detail:  
Weak ties may offer us access to the kinds of resources and varied social groups and 
belief systems that close family and friends are unable to supply. Those with extensive 
weak ties will have access to information, new ideas and tastes from outlying parts of the 
social system. For example, it gives individuals an advantage in terms of the labour 
market where employment may depend on knowing of job openings (Granovetter 1973, 
1983).  (Chambers, p. 15)  
Weak ties are not then necessarily problematic and as noted in the chapter, intimacy is not 
universally accepted as a standard feature of friendship.  Her point at the end about social capital 





 In a previous section, we were cautioned against utilitarian frameworks that measure 
friendships and their quality like this.  A more thorough of social capital and its ethical 
implications, possibly drawing from Bordieux, would be recommended as an area of future 
research.  Information-sharing, too, is another arena for further study.  In his article “Information 
and/or Communication” (2002), Ong cautioned us against conflating information and 
communication.  He wrote that information “itself does not of itself involve meaning” (p. 505).  
He added that “It does not involve human consciousness, or consciousness of any kind” (p. 505).  
This is an important distinction as we have discussed the tendency for mediated communication 
to depersonalize.  Depersonalization is further problematic in an age of information as income.  
Chambers did note that:   
I suggest that we have entered an era in which ‘friendship’ becomes both a potent 
exemplar of individuality and personal choice and a global marketing tool to influence 
our personal tastes and patterns of consumption. (p. 162) 
This requires special deliberate effort to avoid reducing what we share and how we perceive it.  
In an explanation of how two individuals can build a We-relationship (stream consciousness 
together) in an online environment, Zhao (year) explained that the two individuals move through 
“mutual biographical disclosure” (p. 119).  The pair will “reach back to their memories, unwind 
the reduced streams of inner consciousness and bare the contexts of their retrieved thoughts and 
emotions to others for examination and reflection” (p. 119).  He added, “Such voluntary 
disclosure of the innermost part of one’s consciousness” is “common” in the online world (p. 
119).  He also added in another essay the following argument.  He wrote that “In the online 
world mutual knowledge is derived from the biographic narrative people supply about 





related to existential mistrust, he reminded us that we must take their word for it.  He wrote, 
“Since observation of others in a shared living environment becomes impossible, we have no 
choice but to base our knowledge of others on what they tell us about themselves” (p. 148).  In 
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